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Nigeria is involved in a non-international armed conflict (NIAC) against Boko Haram, a non-state 
armed group (NSAG) that has been causing havoc in northern Nigeria since atleast 2009. In the past 
years, Boko Haram has developed strategically, militarily, and ideologically under the presumed 
leadership of Abu Shekau. Between 2013 and 2014, the group also expanded territorially - controlling 
large swathes of territory in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa states, - northeast Nigeria. International 
Humanitarian Law (IHL) is one of the oldest branches of international law, a complex and diverse 
area of law, covering matters such as the treatment of civilians in times of hostilities, permissible 
means and methods of conducting such hostilities, as well as rules vis-à-vis implementation, 
enforcement and accountability. Sadly, when these IHL rules are violated, or ignored, they often 
result in brutal and inhumane outcomes, as we have seen in the Boko Haram armed conflict. This 
study has examined this complex and dynamic part of international law in the context of the Boko 
Haram armed conflict. This study critically analysed the challenges facing the effective enforcement 
of international humanitarian law in the fight against Boko Haram in Nigeria. From the empirical data 
obtained, the study identified three fundamental issues, which largely inhibit the effectiveness of 
enforcing international humanitarian law in the conflict, including lack of political will on the side of 
the government; challenges of disciplined and trained security forces; and lastly, the issue of weak 
(ineffective) institutions i.e. the judiciary. Working from the tripartite challenges, the study argues that 
the unwillingness of the Nigerian authority in enforcing international humanitarian law (IHL) has led 
to several breaches of the rules of IHL during the conflict, including targeting of civilians and civilian 
objects, and acts of torture, rape and other forms of sexual violence. Among other issues,the thesis 
offers a comprehensive analysis of the causes and responses to sexual violence in the conflict. It 
explores the conditions that make women and girls most vulnerable to these acts by both parties to the 
Boko Haram conflict. Difficult questions of effective enforcement and accountability are also tackled; 
in particular, the political will of the Nigerian government’s obligation to investigate and prosecute 
alleged perpetrators of crimes in the conflict, as well as the core purpose of Common Article 1 to the 
1949 Geneva Conventions, and related obligations under the laws of war so that States, concerned 
about the atrocities that civilians, especially women and girls in the Boko Haram armed conflict are 
made to endure, may find a common cause in challenging the inhumanity that is contemptuous of 
human beings, and the untold sorrows it imposes on millions.However,part of the process of ensuring 
that violations of IHL are addressed, and that people are held accountable for their actions or 
inactions, is to educate the society about the laws of armed conflicts, and that when violations of the 
rules are brought to light, some public accounting for such acts takes place. This study is part of that 
process, and contributes to the process of disseminating the law of armed conflict, and bringing 
knowledge about its content to society at large.  
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            Map of Nigeria 
Nigeria is a federation of 36 states, and a federal capital territory of Abuja, with a population of about 206.1 
million people, in 2020, according to the UN population fund. It has about 350 ethnic groups, with about 250 
languages. Nearly 50% of the population are Muslims, mostly in the Northern part, 40% are Christians mainly 
in the Southern part, and about 10% followers of traditional African religions reside in Southern Nigeria. The 
Northern part is largely influenced by Islamic culture, education and economics while the Southern part is 
influenced by western culture, education and economics. The sect is based in Maiduguri, Borno state, the centre 
where it organises and launches its assaults on civilians. Arguably, the group has over 280,000 members across 
the 19 states of Northern Nigeria. The rate and quantity of killings carried out in the conflict especially by the 
Boko Haram members could certainly be a mobilizer of public sympathy, with over 150,000 killed since 2009. 
The escalation of the conflict has witnessed the internal displacement of about 2 million people around the 
North-Eastern part of the country. The war has led to serious violations of IHL rules committed by the forces 
involved in the conflict; the Nigerian security forces and the Boko Haram armed group.  Boko Haram has 
abducted thousands of women, girls and boys, many of whom were recruited as child soldiers, forced marriages 
and sexual oppression. On the other hand, the friendly forces have also allegedly engaged in committing the 
offence of war crimes such as extra-judicial killings, mass arbitrary arrests and detentions, torture and ill-
treatments, leading to the death of thousands while in custody. Other crimes include rape and sexual exploitation 
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‘War breeds atrocities. From the earliest conflicts of recorded history to the global struggles of modern 




The regular military officer may possibly prefer to dispute the inclination of the public to see 
war simply as incidents of mindless slaughter and tremendous damage.
2
 The effects of 
conflict, however, must put beyond rational debate the position that armed conflicts and other 
kinds of war have demonstrated over time, to be little more than morbid funfairs of varied 
harms that make the victims out of their own kind. That fact has now been acknowledged 
even by the heroes of contemporary armed conflicts. General Schwarzkopf of Desert Storm 
fame, for example, reportedly stated that: 
‘War is a profanity because, let’s face it, you’ve got two opposing parties trying to settle their 
differences by killing as many of each other as they can.’
3
 
Parker also noted that the ‘business of the military in war is killing people and breaking 
things.’
4
 Further, McNamara observed that more than 160 million lives were lost in armed 
conflicts in the last century,
5
 excluding the numbers crippled and wounded in body and mind, 
there is no doubt that a host of what is commonly accepted as immoral conducts are 
unleashed with little or no remorse by mankind against their fellow beings during hostilities. 
In his lament of the heinous brutality of war that does not restrict its devastating effects on 
combatants only, J Glenn Gray (a World War II veteran) stated that: 
“Modern wars are notorious for the destruction of nonparticipants and the razing of properties in lands 
that are accidentally in the path of combat armies and air forces. In World War II the number of 
civilians who lost their lives exceeded the number of soldiers killed in combat. … Through folly or 
fear, nearly every soldier has exposed his own men to needless destruction at one time or another. Add 
to this the unnumbered acts of injustice so omnipresent in war, which may not result in death but 
inevitably bring pain and grief, and the impartial observer may wonder how the participants in such 
deeds could ever smile again and be care free. 
The sober fact seems to be that the great majority of veterans, not to mention those who 
helped to put the weapons and ammunitions in their hands, are able to free themselves of responsibility 
with ease after the event, and frequently while they are performing it. Many a pilot or artilleryman who 
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has destroyed untold numbers of terrified noncombatants has never felt any need for repentance or 
regret. Many a general who has won his laurels at a terrible cost in human life and suffering among 




The various means of this heinous act of life destruction includes actions that are viewed as 
unlawful and often partially promoted by responsible people in responsible command of their 
armed forces. Some of these countless heinous acts of injustice that are so prevalent in armed 
conflict situations are regarded by some martial reactionaries as having strong military 
grounds.
7
 Committed too often are actions generally condemnable as abnormal, utterly 
unlawful and unnecessary harm – committed by poorly monitored rogue soldiers who were 
presumably well-trained, armed and mobilized by responsible individuals in responsible 
command of the relevant armed forces. Criminal acts committed by other persons subscribing 
to the existing havoc of hostilities, such as the Civilian JTF members in our current study, are 
another reason that account to the atrocity perpetrated during hostilities. 
In view of the above various scenarios of heinous acts perpetrated during armed 
conflicts, an insurgent group known as Boko Haram has also been causing civil and other 
disturbances in northeast Nigeria since at least 2009. The group only caught the attention of 
the international community in 2014 after the abduction of 276 school girls from Chibok, a 
town in Maiduguri Borno State, northeast Nigeria.
8
 This was not the first mass abduction 
operation conducted by the group, nor the most violent, but it surpassed previous incidents 
and made international front page news. In July 2009, the Nigerian security forces clamped 
down on Boko Haram, killing at least 700 people, including the group’s founder Mohammed 
Yusuf. Since then, the conflict has been marked by targeted killings, prevalent cases of 
abductions, burning and looting, and attacks on schools, teachers and students.
9
 Since 2009, 
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However, this research suggests that it is not the success of Boko Haram that most 
alarmed the international community of the dangers posed by the insurgents. Rather, it is the 
connections of Boko Haram group with other deadly terrorist organizations. Between 2010 
and 2013, the group joined forces with cross-border terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda, Al 
Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), and Al Shabaab, giving them global platform and 
ideological credence.
11
 Further in 2015, the group pledged its allegiance with the world’s 
number one enemy – Islamic State/ISIS.
12
 The conflict intensified between 2012 and 2014, 
and in 2015, the Nigerian army was joined by troops from neighboring countries of Chad, 
Cameroon, and Niger under the umbrella of the African Union Peace and Security Council 
with the key mandate of “Eliminating the presence and influence of Boko Haram in the 
region.”
13
 Therefore, while the kidnapping of the school girls did invited a media storm, in 
reality, it had little impact in motivating a coordinated response from the international 
community. 
The rate and quantity of killings conducted in the Boko Haram armed conflict would 
certainly mobilize public sympathy, with the multi-day massacre of over 2,000 civilians in 
Baga town, Maiduguri in 2015;
14
 the alleged killing of over 640 civilians by the Nigerian 
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military after the Giwa barrack attack in Borno State in 2012;
15
 the attack of army base in 
Borno State – robbing weapons, hardware, and vehicles, leaving over 100 Nigerian soldiers 
dead, in November 2018;
16
 and reports of over 8,000 civilians tortured to death by the 
Nigerian army since at least 2014.
17
 The conflict has destroyed the education system in the 
northeast, the group targeting schools and teachers perceived as teaching a Western syllabus. 
It has wrecked over 1,500 schools, killed over 2,295 teachers, and displaced 19,000 teachers 
across the northeastern region of Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa States.
18
 Attacks on hospitals 
have also increased from 1 in 2017, to 10 in 2018 and 11 in 2019.
19
 All twenty two attacks 
took place in Borno State. In 2019, the group killed 3 UNICEF workers and destroyed the 
maternity and child health unit of Magumeri general hospital and set ablaze its only 
ambulance.
20
 In February 2018, another 110 school girls were abducted in Dapchi town, in 
Yobe State.
21
Also in 2018, a joint team of Nigerian armed forces and Civilian JTF members 
set ablaze a market, which destroyed 5 classrooms in the village of Alizaram, Borno State.
22
 
Furthermore, women and girls have largely remained highly vulnerable to rape and 
other forms of sexual violence, including sexual exploitation, sexual slavery and forced 
marriage.
23
 The armed group has continued to be the chief perpetrator of cases of sexual 
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violence that usually take place in the context of other grave breaches of IHL, such as 
recruitment and or use of abduction. Almost all the women and girls abducted by Boko 
Haram were raped, forced into marriage and abused both physically and mentally.
24
 As 
demonstrated in chapter 4, women and girls who suffered sexual violence continued to be 
victims of stigmatization and rejection by their communities, often feared as suspects of Boko 
Haram sympathizers. Some of these incidents of sexual violence were also attributed to the 
Nigerian army along with the Civilian JTF members,
25
 especially in the internally displaced 
camps, Giwa barracks and other military detention facilities. Their situation is further 
compounded by the lack of comprehensive medical and psychological services, and access to 
justice and reparation is almost absent due to a weak judicial system and lack of sufficient, as 
well as competent judicial system in the field of international criminal law. Victims often fail 
to report their cases and sometimes refuse legal support owing to the fear of reprisals.
26
 
Overall, as identified in chapter 5, the lack of political willingness to prosecute and hold these 
alleged perpetrators to account for grave breaches of international humanitarian law by the 
Nigerian authority further frustrate the effective enforcement of international humanitarian 
law in the Boko Haram armed conflict in Nigeria.  
By December 2019, at least 7.1 million people were in dire need of humanitarian 
assistance, including 4.2 million children in urgent need of education with over 2 million 
internally displaced in northeast Nigeria, and more than 240,000 people driven to neighboring 
countries as refugees.
27
 The delivery and distribution of humanitarian support was greatly 
challenged by lack of access, with over 1.2 million people unreachable as a direct 
consequence of mounting insecurity in northeast Nigeria.
28
 This year, 2020, marks the tenth 
year since the Boko Haram armed conflict began and the group is still strong and capable of 
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launching offensive attacks, and in control of substantial part of Nigeria’s territory since 
2013. Many wonder why it is taking Nigeria so long to at least weaken their strength, and/or 
effectively prosecute perpetrators of crimes on both sides of the conflict. Is it lack of political 
will? Is it a lack of security forces expertise or weak judicial institution? Or is it due to lack 
of responsibility of States in discharging their obligation in international law? These are the 
questions that this research sought to address, especially in chapters 4 and 5 of this thesis.  
Research Aims 
 To critically analyze the challenges impeding the effective enforcement of 
international humanitarian law in respect of the Boko Haram armed conflict in Nigeria.  
Objectives 
I. To examine the challenges posed by lack of discipline of the Nigerian security forces 
in the enforcement of international humanitarian law in Nigeria.  
II. To assess the challenge posed by the lack of strong institutions in the effective 
enforcement of international humanitarian law in Nigeria. 
III. To evaluate the lack of political will as a challenge affecting the effective 
enforcement of international humanitarian law in Nigeria.  
IV. To explore the challenge posed by international law on the effective enforcement of 
international humanitarian law in Nigeria in light of the above factors. 
Approach and Limitations 
As explained in chapter 3, there are always challenges and limitations when conducting a 
research on violent non-State armed groups. Immersion into the group is not possible, and 
gaining access to the recruits was more challenging than speaking to its victims.Most of the 
reflections and observations I make on Boko Haram have evolved through experience, 
monitoring the activities of the conflict as it unfolds from afar and dissecting every word 
written by the many excellent Nigerian and international analyst. In 2017, I travelled to 
Nigeria to test some of my assumptions and was pleasantly received.The people (participants) 
I met in Abuja were open, helpful and welcoming, eager to share their views and experiences.  
27 
 
Most useful for this research, however, was realizing the level of erroneous 
information and propaganda that was perverting the crisis. Ordinary (or should I say 
extraordinary) Nigerians who have individually mobilized to help the internally displaced 
persons and victims expressed their anger at the lack of government response. By ‘passing 
the buck’ and pointing the finger at his political opponents, the present administration is 
failing to effectively addressing the danger posed by Boko Haram, allowing the group to 
blossom. As explained in chapter 5, the unwillingness of the government is further 
exacerbated by the manipulation of local media that was complicit in its obliviousness to the 
problems of the northeast. These have of course obscured previous research efforts on the 
subject, and I am indebted to each person who took time to speak with me and clarify the 
situation. 
Research Questions 
 Is it lack of political will?  
 Is it of security forces expertise? 
 Or is it due to lack of Strong Institutions (such as the Judiciary and Police)?  
 Why has there been failure by States in the effective enforcement of IHL in Nigeria 
under international law? 
 These are the questions that this research sought to address, especially in chapters 4 and 5 of 
this thesis, in light of the challenges for effective enforcement of IHL in Nigeria’s fight 
against Boko Haram since 2009.   
Theoretical Framework 
This research adopts the weak State theory in order to demonstrate how State structures 
hinder the effective enforcement of IHL in the country.  
28 
 
Weak States Theory 
A commentator on statist(ism) states that a weak state theory explains the situation where a 
country has superior power of political sovereignty over the rule of law and substantial 
control over the social and economic affairs of the country.
29
 Robert I. Rotberg is widely 
regarded as the founder of the theory of weak states, failed states and collapsed states. 
According to Rotberg, weak states are the direct “opposite of strong states,”
30
 in that these 
states that do not have the capacity to deliver on their primary duties of protecting civilian life 
and property. The basic responsibility of the state is to provide security of life and property to 
its citizens, so where a state is unable to do so, especially when the citizens are in danger of 
imminent attack, such a state, according to Rotberg, is weak. However,as explained by other 
scholars, there are different categories of this weakness.
31
 Similar to the position of Plato in 
the Republic,
32
 where the prince is to use any available means to provide for the “common 




Arguably, in recent times, the international humanitarian community has collapsed the 
borders of responsibility and sovereignty.
34
 The new approach to sovereignty is not in the 
mere expression of political independence, but a state’s capacity to take responsible and 
appropriate measures to protect and safeguard its citizens from the threat of attack. States that 
are unable to do so may lose their sovereignty because responsible members of the 
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However, in the case of failed states, the theory is traceable to scholars such as 
Helmen and Ratner, who argued that states that are in constant chaos and lack stability are 
likely to become anarchical and that collapse is eminent.
36
The inherent difference between 
failed and collapsed states is that a failed state is seen as a long term and multifaceted 
development whereas; weak state is the accretion and worse of the process.
37
Instances which 
can be used to determine whether a state is failed or collapsed include; loss of legitimacy 
followed by the collapse of public institutions.
38
 Once a state begins to lose the confidence 
and support of citizens, such a state is failing.
39
 In failed states, institutions may fail for two 
basic reasons: lack of resources, or mismanagement attributed to corruption. 
While Nigeria shares a lot in common with failed states, at least, as portrayed above, 
there is no strong evidence that compelled one to see Nigeria as a failed state. The issue is 
that laws are not effectively observed, yet the state has managed to maintain relative stability 
in the midst of resistance.  
Consequently, the assessment of these theories helped in guiding the analysis of the 
challenges for effective enforcement of IHL in Nigeria’s fight against Boko Haram. Overall, 
the researcher has demonstrated how state structure hindered or compounded the issue of 
ineffective enforcement of IHL in the country. 
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Contributions of the Study 
Thisresearch is undertaken from the standpoint of international law, by an international law 
student, mainly addressing fellow international lawyers and others who are interested in what 
international lawyers think and do from the perspective of other disciplines. To that legal-
oriented audience, the role of law is not simply about holding the perpetrators of wrong 
doings during war to account; it is also the work of that international lawyer, in his field of 
social sciences, to understand the causes of atrocities such as sexual violence, torture, and 
extrajudicial killings among others in armed conflicts, so as to restrain them through 
sounddecisions and innovative steps in the area of international law. Such restraint is greatly 
and desperately needed, particularly in a developing field of international humanitarian law in 
which counsel and judges have continued to grapple with issues - such as the extent of 
command responsibility for sexual violence, among other atrocities, perpetrated by 
subordinates during armed conflicts as demonstrated in the Boko Haram conflict; how best to 
define rape in international law so as to provide the right level of protection for women and 
girls during hostilities; whether rape may or may not rightly be considered as an act of 
genocide in the Boko Haram armed conflict and the extent of such view; whether or not 
consent given in a hostile environment is viewed valid; whether the offence of sexual 
violence perpetrated, especially in internal armed conflict is considered as grave breaches; 
and whether sufficient response exists in international law against the trademark of evil of 
sexual violence specifically, forced marriage.  
With respect to the field of decision-makers for whom this research is relevant, the 
focus is not limited to the international lawyer drafting legislation or sitting on the bench as a 
judge in a given case. The focus is also on the lawyer who appears in a case as a prosecutor. 
It is hoped that these discussions hinged on the “Critical analysis of the challenges of 
Effective Enforcement of International Humanitarian Law: A study of the fight against Boko 
31 
 
Haram in Nigeria” might assist them, more so than has hitherto been the case, in making 
better decisions on how to prosecute relevant cases. For, as the proverb goes that the 
soundness of a judgment from the bench is directly dependent on the quality of counsel 
appearing before her. Aside from judges and counsel, it is hoped that this research will also 
assist law teachers; as well as law students, who will become the legislators, judges and 
counsel of tomorrow. 
Lastly, the value of the discussions in this research lies principally in the practical 
dimensions of the issues that are studied. The aim is to integrate the theoretical into the 
practical, by reviewing and analyzing issues identified in relevant cases litigated before 
international criminal tribunals in order to understand and help address the evil of sexual 
violence in the Boko Haram armed conflict. The exercise draws mostly on months of 
practical investigations in Nigeria with victims, and relevant stakeholders and insights gained 
from many years of studies at Coventry University, as well as paper presentations both within 
and outside the UK in the field of international humanitarian law.   
Synopsis 
An encyclopedia could not cover one half of the complexities of Nigeria’s history and its 
people, and this thesis certainly does not begin to tackle this task. Rather, I have tried to focus 
on some of the issues that are most important to the Boko Haram crisis. A Critical analysis of 
the challenges of Effective Enforcement of International Humanitarian Law: A study of the 
fight against Boko Haram analyses this chameleon like group from its early days as a local 
cult to its emergence on the international stage as a credible terrorist organization, and the 
consequence of Nigeria’s response to their threat.  
Chapter 1 is a condensed history of Nigeria, laying the foundation for the evolution 
of Boko Haram and focusing on the socioeconomic and political divides between the north 
and the south of the country. It highlights the inequalities that emerged as early as the rule of 
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the British Empire and outlines the religious and ethnic differences that have contributed to 
the regular clashes between the regions. The chapter delves into the history of military rule 
and assesses its lasting impact on the political distribution of power in the country. It also 
introduces the reader to a country that is unfamiliar to many, and helps contextualize the 
environment in which Boko Haram was able to prosper. It further explores the role of religion 
in the country with a particular focus on the dynamics of political Islam, including the 
Maitatsine movement, which challenged the state of Kano in the 1970s and early 1980s, and 
then examines the government response. The second part of the chapter gives an in-depth 
overview of the evolution of Boko Haram and its transformation into a major insurgency and 
terrorist group with international links, and Nigeria’s response to the threat. 
Chapter 2 outlines the contemporary legal framework of IHL, examining the 
complexities in types of armed conflicts currently governed by IHL, exploring the legal 
thinking regarding a contentious area – that of the spillover of contemporary internal armed 
conflicts to other territories and the appropriate law that applies to such hostilities. The 
second part of the chapter narrows its focus to reviews of related literature on IHL violations 
in armed conflicts in order to explore the gap that exists in the Boko Haram armed conflict – 
and how IHL conducts and provides rights and responsibilities for persons who participate 
(or do not participate) in armed conflicts. Lastly, the chapter explores the mechanisms that 
exist for enforcement in order to hold violators accountable for their acts. 
Chapter 3 discusses the research methodology of the thesis. This study conducted 67 
in-depth interviews for the purposes of the research. The data collection focused on the 
Nigerian authorities’ treatment of people who fled villages and towns under Boko Haram 
control and settled in IDP camps in Maiduguri. We equally interviewed women and girls who 
had been detained by the security forces in Giwa barracks while fleeing their homes, or in 
villages during military operations. Four interviews were conducted with humanitarian 
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agencies involved in response operations, including Amnesty International, International 
Rescue Committee, National Human Rights Commission, and National Emergency 
Management Agency, based in Maiduguri and Abuja. Governmental organizations were also 
contacted, including the Office of the Attorney General of the Federation, and the Nigerian 
Armed Forces. In order to protect the security and respect the confidentiality of people 
interviewed, all testimonies have been de-identified. 
Chapter 4focuses on the human rights violations committed against women and girls 
in internally displaced persons camps, as well as the arbitrary detention and mistreatment of 
women and girls in military detention facilities. It also examines the violations against 
women who lived in Boko Haram control areas. 
Chapter 5Examines the political will of Nigeria to investigate and prosecute 
individuals that violate IHL rules in the course of the Boko Haram armed conflict, both the 
Nigerian security forces and the Boko Haram armed group have committed serious crimes 
amounting to war crimes and crimes against humanity. Boko Haram has unlawfully murdered 
thousands of civilians, kidnapped scores of women and girls, and boys, many of whom have 
been forcibly recruited as child soldiers or subjected to sexual slavery. On the other hand, the 
Nigerian security forces have committed extra-judicial killings, arbitrary arrests, and 
detentions, acts of torture, sexual violence and rape. In 2010, the International Criminal Court 
opened a preliminary examination in Nigeria for alleged crimes committed in the conflict. 
The Court examines if any domestic judicial proceedings exist, and if so, whether they are 
genuine and cover the same persons and the same conduct as alleged in the proceedings 
before the ICC Court.Thus, this chapter explores the political willingness of the Nigerian 
authority to ensure accountableness for crimes committed by Boko Haram and Nigerian 
security forces. It further examines the ways in which States are required to fulfill their 
obligations under international law of armed conflict. It considers the different ways in which 
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IHL is observed and enforced, and how individuals – and States – can be held accountable for 
violations of the law by third States that are not party to a given conflict. 
Chapter 6- In the final chapter, I restate the major arguments of the research and 
provide a summarized explanation of the thematic issues of the research (Indiscipline security 
forces, lack of Political Will and lack of strong/viable institutions). This part of the research 
helps readers to understand the main question of the study and its findings, in addition to any 
recommendations that can assist policy makers and bureaucrats to make informed decisions 
regarding the enforcement of international humanitarian law in Nigeria. It explains that the 
successful rise of Boko Haram in Nigeria is largely as a result of failed policies and a 
growing trend of inequality that disenfranchises entire populations. Not only can the Nigerian 
authorities make an effort to improve social policies, but they can also learn to respond 
effectively when faced with the establishment and acts of a violent group such as Boko 
Haram. While international and regional cooperation are crucial for the effective enforcement 
of international humanitarian law, in Nigeria particularly but not exclusively, a timely, 
continuous, and wholesome effort is necessary to improve security worldwide, however, 
unlikely this is to happen. 
Gap in the Literature 
The review revealed some of the major gaps in the available literature which needed to be 
bridged. First, the literature on the subject appears too generalized to tackle the specific area 
concern with this study. The literature has dealt with, at least at the international level such as 
the evolving focus of the issues relating to international humanitarian law and the increasing 
demand on states for enforcement. For example, much literature has explained at general 
level the changing face of the idea and practice of IHL and human rights in general, and how 
the international system has continued to reflect this changing dynamic. However, there is 
still a scarceness of materials on the level of implementation of IHL in the fight against Boko 
35 
 
Haram armed conflict. The generalized approach is not only misleading but has proven to be 
unclear and unable to provide cogent answers to the challenge(s) of enforcement.  
Further, the literature concentrates on some aspects of IHL such as the idea and 
practice of intervention.  As a result of the experience of various conflicts in Africa and the 
world at large, the theme of military intervention has attracted many analysts. However, there 
has been less attention to the grey areas of non-military interventions that have encouraged 
enforcement of IHL. The enforcement of IHL by local courts has attracted inadequate 
commentary is understandable, knowing well the close nature of most African societies as a 
result of long years of dictatorship, and military intervention in politics which, unfortunately, 
Nigeria too has her own problems. The few available literatures in this area captured only 
serious violations, such as the Rwanda, Sudan, DRC, Central African Republic etc.But have 
not mentioned the intense nature of the Boko Haram armed conflict in Nigeria. Despite this, 
little or no attention has been given to the limiting factors such as international law and 
international politics as challenging issues of enforcement of IHL in Nigeria.  
 Additionally, the focus of most research in this area has largely been towards gross 
violations by non-state actors. The idea that state actors have also committed crimes against 
humanity, sexual violence, rape, mass killings, and rape and so on remains largely un-
researched in the literature.Likewise, a critical evaluation of enforcing mechanisms and 
institutions in respect tothe effective enforcement and implementation of IHL rules in Nigeria 
is needed as most literature that attempted to tackle the question has remained largely 
descriptive in nature. As I undertake to research the work, this critical review, will pave way 
for clearer understanding of the inhibiting factors militating against effective enforcement of 
IHL in Nigeria’s fight against Boko Haram. The insufficient data, as a result of multiple 
factors, has also limited the horizon and standard of most works that attempted to deal with 
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this theme. Most of the published works are either narrowly written or lack the required data 
to drive home the knowledge-base and to provoke debate.  
 In conclusion, the gap(s) established above have omitted important areas that this 
research seeks to address. This research attempted to look at the challenges of effectively 
enforcing IHL rules in Nigeria within the country’s system rather than world system. Thus, 
the need to fill it has become paramount. This method, will allow future researchers to begin 
examining the issues of enforcing IHL rules during conflicts within domestic legislation 
together with mechanisms established for protecting the lives of civilians, their human 





















The Nigerian State and the Evolution of Ethno-religious Fundamentalism 
1.1 Nigeria: A Diverse Nation 
The diversity of Nigeria is both incredible and complex. It hosts about 206 million people, 
250 ethnic groups with about 500 different languages. Nearly 50 percent of the populations 
are Muslims, mostly in the Northern region, 40 percent are Christians from the Southern 
region, and about 10 percent followers of traditional African religions also reside in the 
south.
40
 Regardless of the huge ethnic differences within the country, the British in the 
colonial era laid down the foundation upon which present Nigeria was built in 1914.
41
 Since 
then, the country has been divided ethnically, religiously and regionally. The three major 
ethnic groups are at odd over political domination and power sharing; the Hausa-Fulani in the 
north, the Yoruba in the southwest and the Igbo in the southeast.
42
 Struggle over power and 
access to governments’ treasury by these ethnic groups has worsened the situation, with 
political candidates capitalizing on existing fears. Boko Haram’s grievances are deep-rooted 
in the economic inequalities, religious bigotry and political anxieties that characterized these 
two uneven regions. 
Similarly, years of exceedingly poor living conditions, vast inequalities between the 
northern and the southern regions, lack of economic opportunities, corruption and disinterest 
of the Nigerian government provided good atmosphere for Boko Haram to thrive.
43
 Most 
often, terrorist and radical groups emerge from countries with poor track record for upholding 
human rights, good governance, and lack of commitment to the wellbeing of their citizens.
44
 
Mohammed Yusuf and Abu Shekau took advantage of the professed corrupt and weak 
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government of Nigeria to recruit members to their movements. Even though their philosophy 
is not wholly anti government, Boko Haram is an ultra-salafist group with a hyper-
conservative modification idea that opposes modernism in general.
45
 
1.2 Disparity between the North and the South 
In spite increasing national revenues and an average GDP growth of 6.671 percent in 2013, 
and 6.31 percent in 2014,
46
 growth in Nigeria has been uneven and focused mostly in the 
south. In general, the quality of living in the country have declined to scales unseen since 
Nigeria’s independence in 1960, while the poverty index has risen steadily in the last decade. 
Achebe observed that the inequalities between upper and the lower pay in Nigeria was among 
the biggest in the world.
47
 A 2013 survey by the National Population Commission with the 




 Although 61 percent of the population falls under the living wage - the weight is 
unduly felt bySokoto state, whose poverty rate adds up to 86.4 percent. The inequalities in the 
north and south are also reflected in the health and education studies: Nigeria has an infant 
fatality rate estimating 157 deaths for every 1,000 live deliveries. While this figure is already 
too soaring, in the northeast, the death rate soars to 222 deaths for every 1,000 births but 
decreases to 89 fatalities in the southwest.
49
 The effort for the vaccination of children has also 
had uneven results, with 25 percent of children under two years vaccinated, but only 10 
percent in the northwest and as low as 1 percent in Sokoto. 
Educational opportunity is another example of the huge disparities between the 
regions. Level of literacy in the north hardly makes 26 percent for women, with a low of 10 
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percent for those in Sokoto against a national average of 53 percent. In Borno, centre of Boko 
Haram’s uprising; the literacy rate is 15 percent while in Lagos in the south, 92 percent of its 
population are literates.
50
 It is estimated that 7-9 million children nationally are out of school 
of which almost half a nomadic background and have inadequate access to education. These 
swings are later reflected in the level of youth unemployment that reached 54 percent among 
under 35 years in 2014, and again the north shows the highest level of unemployment in the 
country.
51
 The inequalities between the two regions are quantified by the Gini index, which 
rates Nigeria among the most uneven 35 countries in the world with a coefficient of 48.8 
(with 0 being closest equality).
52
 The Gini index, which measures the distribution of income 
within countries, indicates that disparity in Nigeria has risen over the last two decades. In 




Disparity in Nigeria is ingrained and multilayered. The following will examine how 
colonialism contributed to regional inequality. It will explore the role of religion in 
exacerbating the socio-cultural differences and assess the political tools that both the military 
and civilian government have established or have failed to establish, which provided the 
perfect environment for Boko Haram to emerge and prosper.    
1.3 The Pre-Colonial Nigeria 
The religious-ethnic divide of northern and southern Nigeria has been in existence before the 
colonial era.
54
 The diversity of cultural and religious influences helped in shaping modern 
Nigeria. Exposure to the varied Abrahamic religions in the north and south also strengthened 
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political unions which led to the rise and fall of empires.
55
 From the 11
th
 century, the religion 
of Islam has spread across northern Nigeria, principally through the tour of scholars and 
traders from the empires of Sudan and Mali.
56
 These transient guests lived in the Northern 
Province and taught their religion to the major ethnic groups; Kanuri and Hausa-Fulani 
people. By 15
th
century, Kano city has lodged a great number of Islamic scholars and attracted 
Arab and Taureg traders, as well as pilgrims that were transiting the city.
57
 By the 16
th
 
century, Borno had built a number of Islamic schools and by the 17
th
 century, Islam was 
accepted and established as the main religion of northern Nigeria well before the arrival of 
Christianity to the region.
58
 However, within these periods, Islam overlapped with traditional 
beliefs and it was not until the 19
th
 century that Islamic law was accepted and enforced 
through the creation of the Sokoto Caliphate by Usman Dan Fodio.
59
 The Caliphate lasted for 
about 100 years and it was regarded as the largest independent state in Africa.
60
 
Dan Fodio was regarded as a “model for religious reformer” whiles his caliphate 
signifies the “climax of Islamic civilization.”
61
 His victories encouraged further jihads that led 
to the establishment of Islamic states in Senegal, Sudan, Mali, Cote d’Ivoire, Chad and 
Central African Republic.
62
 Abu Shekau, the present leader of Boko Haram, has sought for 
legitimacy by rendering himself as the replacement to Dan Fodio and called for the return of 
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the Islamic caliphate in Nigeria in an open letter threatening the sultan of Sokoto.
63
 Dan Fodio 
reasoned his jihad on Muslim and traditional kings of Hausa land by calling them traitors who 
betrayed the Islamic faith,
64
 an assertion that echoes Shekau’stakfiri ideology.
65
 
On the other side of the country, the colonial masters (British) met with coastal 
Nigerians in the 17
th
 century and their encounter was primarily concentrated on slave trade 
and palm oil.
66
 The spread of culture and religion was second to the economic interest of the 





in 1861, Britain took advantage of the split up of the Oyo Empire following the Yoruba 
conflict and annexed Lagos as a Crown Colony of the British Empire, ultimately, extended its 
range to the Oil Rivers and the Middle Belt.
68
 While the Sokoto caliphate weakened by 
conflict and internal struggle, was defeated in 1903 by the British and embarked on the 
mission of integrating an ethnically, religiously and politically diverse society of people into a 
single political entity.
69
 Thereby, in 1914, the British amalgamated the two regions that were 
overwhelmingly different in terms of their history, ethnicity, culture and religion.
70
 As a 
consequence, the British decided to govern the country as distinct entities, aggravating the 
disunion between the north and the south.  
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1.4 The Amalgamation of Nigeria 
According to Hodgkin, Nigeria is a state of multiple pasts, not a singular past. It involves the 
socio-political and economic histories of different ethnic groups and civilizations together 
with various forms of cultural identities.
71
 This implies that Nigeria is home to many ethnic 
nationalities brought together through the mechanism of colonialism.
72
Notwithstanding, at 
different periods in history, these various ethnic nationalities have interacted with one another 
through various medium including commercial, religious, cultural, political and other forms 
of inter-group relations.
73
In spite of the position of Babawale that the various ethnic 
nationalities have had significant inter-group relations among themselves even before the 
period of colonization, it would be difficult to conclude that they (ethnic groups) have 
“peculiar values and orientations, idiosyncrasies and traditions, which in many instances were 
diametrical and antagonistic by modus vivendi and modus operandi.”
74
 However, these 
groups maintained their political independence aside their unique social and cultural 
identities. Put differently, these disparate ethnic nationalities enjoyed profound sovereignty 
but did not co-existed with one another.
75
 
The history of these ethnic nationalities was altered with the beginning of colonialism 
in the last decades of the 19
th
 century and early 20
th
 century. The most significant aspect of 
colonialism that is related to the present study has to do with the amalgamation of the hitherto 
two distinct regions – the Northern Region otherwise known as the Northern Nigeria 
Protectorate and the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria. It is significant to note that the decision 
leading to the amalgamation of the two geo-political regions was taken without consultation 
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with the native authorities.
76
 In fact, the action was meant to enhance effective administration 
of the Nigerian area considering the lack of British administrative personnel and deficiency 
of material resource.
77
 In other words, the facilitators of the amalgamation mission never took 
cognizance of the prospect of ethnic bickering among the various ethnic groups.78 
Historians of Nigerian extraction now referred to the lack of consultation of local 
authorities prior to the amalgamation as the ‘deliberation deficit’ which connotes “the 
absence from a given social formation of a common ethos that frames the debate on issues of 
general concern.”
79
The amalgamation ushered the various nationalities then living within the 
Nigerian area into a transition to a sort of nation-state, the kind that has existed in Europe 
since the Treaty of Westphalia.
80
Far away, from Nigeria, and Africa, in Europe many 
significant global events have taken place including the emergence of sovereign states in an 
international order in the aftermath of the Westphalian state system, and the Industrial 
Revolutions which resulted in the rise of modern industrial societies.
81
 All these events would 
later shape the development of African societies. 
Lest we forget, the decision to merge the two distinct geo-political regions in 1914 
was taken not only as a mechanism for colonial convenience but, essentially part of the 
national interest of the British Government as defined by Lord Lugard, the architect of the 
amalgamation himself.
82
 This goes to say that the British were not unaware of the eventual 
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 of the two distinct regions but it was determined to fulfill its 




The colonial amalgamation was seen as an ambition of Britain to build a formidable 
empire on which the “sun never sets”
85
 or an empire that would always have part of its 
territory in daylight.
86
 It is possible to argue that the desperation to build artificial nations
87
 
including Nigeria was part of the overall objective of Britain. Likewise, it is also very 
possible to note that “Britain never needed to compound the future by merging the two geo-
colonial entities at the time since each was already bigger than most European states and 
were already viable as contemporary states.”
88
 However, considering the nature of the 
relationship between the colonial authority and the colonized people, Britain had the privilege 
to be not careful to the future plight of the colonized people. The colony was meant to serve 
two important functions – on the one hand to promote British international diplomacy as well 
as support its military power and reach, and on the other hand to aid in its economic condition 
by serving as a “business facility for the resource declining British home industries in the 
aftermath of the second Industrial Revolution and the abolition of Trans-Atlantic Slave 
Trade.”
89
 Therefore, essentially, the forceful merging of the hitherto differing regions was not 
done out of the need for the objective building of a strong and constructive polity with the 
hope to organize the natives for their advancement within the world system. It was essentially 
undertaken for the very benefit of the colonizers against the colonized. 
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  Are such States whose political borders do not coincide with a division of nationalities desired by the people 
on the ground 
88





Realizing the crucial nature of the amalgamation and its importance to the 
advancement of British interests, the first task was to identify a competent official that would 
fulfill the objective of the mission.
90
 This was more so that the British officials had 
anticipated serious resistance from among the local population.
91
 
With such experience and credentials, the ground was cleared for the marriage of 
inconvenience between the Northern and Southern regions. Immediately after the 
amalgamation was concluded, the new nation was confronted by the twin evil of ethnicity 
and religiosity.
92
 Many scholars have traced the emergence of ethnicity and religious politics 
to the period of amalgamation.
93
 With amalgamation comes indirect rule policy which 
utilizes existing political institutions in place for colonial expediency.
94
 Since this period, 
Nigeria has been known as the theater of ethno-religious conflicts and other forms of negative 
identity politics.
95
 Throughout the colonial era, these forms of negative identity politics have 
continued to fuel mutual suspicion among the two antagonistic regions of the country.
96
 As 
noted by Oni, “ethnicity is the main impediment to the overall politico–economic growth of 
the country.”
97
 Since the amalgamation of 1914, the state stakeholders in Nigeria have 
consistently struggle with one task – the wild goose chase of nation-building. It was based on 
this note that Chief Obafemi Awolowo once asserted that “…that amalgamation will 
eternallybethe most painful injury British administration imposed on Southern Nigeria.”
98
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Many scholars are of the opinion that the manner in which the amalgamation was 
done essentially birthed ethnicity and religious intolerance in the national polity. One such 
opinion reads: “Lugardist reckless exploitation of ethnicity for colonial expediency was 
sanctified in the above context, and ever since, Nigeria has become a huge laboratory for 
political and other forms of social science.”
99
 In the following, an attempt is made to trace the 
beginning of bitter contestation among the ethnic groups that have been forced to remain 
together through the amalgamation of 1914. 
1.5 Attempts at Northern Separatism during the Colonial Period 
Three decades after the amalgamation of the two regions, ethnic clashes continue to 
characterise relations among the major ethnic groups.
100
 While the minority groups in the 
country’s Middle belt and the Niger/Delta region continue to cry of domination and 
marginalisation by the major ethnic groups.
101
 As noted by political 
scientists,includingRichard Joseph, these clashes became more pronounced during the quest 
for political independence where political parties were established on ethnic rather than 
ideological inclinations.
102
 In fact, many have traced the contemporary challenges faced by 
the state stakeholders in the quest for development to the effect of ethnic politics which have 
its root in the period under discussion.   
While ethnic division and clashes of civilisation was not entirely new to colonial 
Nigeria, the structure of political parties and their loyalties made it more difficult for 
resolutions to be reached virtually on all aspect of the national agitations; including the time 
frame for political independence.
103
 In effect, the major reason that started the quest by 
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Northern politicians to advocate for separation from the rest of the Nigerian state was the 
differences on how and to when to attain political independence. A famous Nigerian 
commentator avers that “the Southern Political parties continues to push for more effective 
power for African ministers and supported in opposition of the Northern stance, for grant of 
self-government in 1956.”
104
 It later took a major constitutional settlement for a temporary 
solution to be reached with the birth of the Lyttleton Constitution which “now made the 
regions to assume the aspect of states within a federation.”
105
 Bitter disagreement among 
party faithful became frequent such that debates were not undertaken without intense emotion 
and infighting.
106
 In one of the recorded debates in 1953, Northern elites in the parliament 
opposed the motion that was moved for Nigeria’s independence in 1956 for political motives 
and further jeopardised what would seem the national interest of Nigerians.
107
 In support of a 
decision to oppose the granting of self-rule by 1956, Sir Ahmadu Bello argued: “I rise to 
associate myself with the last speaker. The mistake of 1914 has come to light and I would 
like to go no further. I was referring to the amalgamation that took place in that year between 
the old independent governments of Northern and Southern Nigeria.”
108
 
On this note, Sir Ahmadu Bello elaborated further when he asserted more boldly: 
“We were all not only upset at our handling, but wronged that people who were so full of fine phrases 
about the unity of Nigeria should have set their people against the chosen representatives of another 
Region while crossing through their territory and even in our own. What kind of trouble had we let 
ourselves in for by sticking with such people? “Lord Lugard and his amalgamation were far from 
popular amongst us at that time. There were concern in favour of separation; we should set up on our 
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The point above shows the extent of division even among the educated elites not only on 
matters of principles but, also on issues of ethnicity and sometimes religion. However, 
Nigeria survived the winds of separation as eloquently captured by Ali Mazrui in the 
following words: “Nigeria’s amalgamation has outlived Northern secessionism after World 
War II when Northern Nigeria wanted to attain independence as a separate country from the 
South. Kwame Nkrumah, the Ghanaian leader, described Northern separatist at that time as a 
form of “Pakistanism” with the goal of religiously inspired separation. Yakubu Gowon was at 
the time a mere child and a Christian and was not involved in Muslim separation.”
110
 
In spite of the sharp division on the basis of ethnicity and religion, relative agreement 
exists among the elites exist on the need to maintain a federal system of government, giving 
powers to the subordinate regions.
111
 On this note, the leader of the Action Group (AG), the 
dominant political party in the Western Region, emerged as the most vocal advocate of a 
federally structured Nigeria in which the various regions would exercise substantial powers 
with a weaker centre. Awolowo documented his view of a Nigeria with a federal structure in a 
book entitled “The Path to Freedom” in which he noted the following: 
“Nigeria is not a nation. It is a mere geographical expression. There are no “Nigerians” in the same 
sense as there are English, Welsh, or French. The word “Nigerian” is merely a unique appellation to 
differentiate those who reside within the boundaries of Niger area from those who do not.”
112
 
The movement for Northern separation may not have succeeded but the embers of ethnicity 
and religiosity continue to burn such culminating into Civil War during the first decade of 
Nigeria’s political independence. The following captures the role of ethnicity and religion 
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leading to the war and how national cohesion remains one of the most significant challenges 
to national development.    
1.5.1 Attempt at Igbo Separation 
The history of British state-building during the colonial era up until the end of colonialism in 
1960 cannot be complete without the role of colonial military forces.
113
 The British colonies 
relied on the armed forces for conquest of societies that tried to resist colonial 
conquest.114Shortly before political independence, Nigeria’s security architecture was made to 
reflect Nigeria’s identity. This process has been described by social scientist as the 
“Nigerianization”
115
 of the armed forces, police and other security outfits. This entails the 
domestication of the security personnel handling strategic security details in the hands of 
Nigerians. But the attempt to handover the security architecture to the indigenous people on 
the eve of political independence could not rectify the deep-seated structural challenges of 
selective recruitment that have been entrenched by the colonialists. Scholars on Nigerian 
military including Mazrui, McNall, Scott G, Robin Luckhamobserved that inherited 
challenge(s) associated with selective recruitment and how that has impacted negatively on 
the performance of the military and fuelled military coups.
116
Immediately after the Second 
World War, the composition of the army was altered from a hausa dominated structure to that 
which had “artillery units and infantry battalions.”
117
The table below shows a tiny number of 
indigenous men within the officer corps of the Nigerian army. Even at that, all of the little 
number was drawn from within the lower Niger region of Nigeria. In other categories, mostly 
lower ranks, Igbo tradesmen and some other minorities within the Niger/Delta who have 
gained Western education appear to have an edge over the Northerners.  
                                                          
113
Dummar C. Fredrick The History of the Nigerian Army and the Implications for the Future of Nigeria (Biblio 
Scholar, 2012) 
114
 Miners Norman The Nigerian Army, 1956-1966 1
st
 Ed (Methuen, 1971) 
115




 Kirk-Greene and Anthony H Millard "A preliminary Note on New Sources for Nigerian Military History" 
(1964) 3(1) Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria, 129  
50 
 
1.5.2 Inventory of Nigerians accredited into the officer cadre in the period 1946-57 
 
As noted by one scholar, the colonial legacy of divide and rule continue to challenge the 
stability needed for the smooth operation of the armed forces after independence: “The irony 
is that, while the divisions that resulted from the flawed structure of the armed forces 
continued to serve Britain’s imperial cause well, even up until the last days of colonialism, it 
assisted to unclock Nigeria for political unsteadinessupon independence. The followingcase 
rightly corroborates the assertion about the benefits of the flawed composition of the armed 
forces to the imperial cause.”
118
 
Ejiogu went further to observe that “military coups d’état in Nigeria can be traced 
back to colonial and post-colonial recruitment patterns for military human 
resources.”
119
Again, Mazrui echoed similar opinion when he noted: “At independence 
amalgamation had given Nigeria an ethnically mixed single national army. But poor national 
integration had made ethnic consciousness a slight too strong within the armed forces. 
Amalgamation had made the Nigeria army strong enough to control both halves of the 
                                                          
118
AdemoyegaAdewale. "Why we struck: The story of the first Nigerian Coup" (Evan Brothers publishers, 1981) 
119
"Colonial Army Recruitment patterns and Post-Colonial Military Coups D'etat in Africa: The case of Nigeria, 
1966-1993" (2007) 35(1) South African Journal of Military Studies,  99 
51 
 
country, North and South. But ethnic divisions within the armed forces turned Nigeria’s first 
military coup in January 1966 into an ethnic massacre. The counter-coup which followed a 
few months later deepened the ethnic and provincial divide. The country remained 
amalgamated, but not satisfactorily integrated.”
120
 
The colonial legacy skewed the recruitment process of the armed forces towards 
certain ethnic groups depending on their loyalty to the British Crown. Elites led by the 
Northern politicians whose cultures and traditions were preserved as part of the preconditions 
for indirect rule,
121
 increased their numbers by lowering the entry qualifications into the army 
as noted: “When northern politicians held state power in 1960, they enacted legislations that 
increased the number of northerners in the corps.  As an example, they lessen the entry 
requirements, and significantlyreducedfailure rates in the selection assessment into the 
Nigerian Military Training College with the aim of attracting more northern recruits. One 
outcome of such preferential policies over the years in the army is that northern beneficiaries 
of those patron-client incentives regarded themselves as cohorts.  Events indicated that their 




While many studies have been written on the causes of the war and its effect on 
national development, the focus of the present study is to provide some details about how the 
national cohesion and ethnic politics played out during and after the war. This would help the 
reader to understand the foundation of ethno-religious conflicts and the rise of sectarian 
groups such as the Boko Haram in Nigeria’s North-Eastern region.  
To start with, one fundamental reason that instigated the Igbo secession in the 1960s 
was the rejection of the Unification Decree which was instituted by the AguiyiIronsi’s short-
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lived regime in May 1966.
123
 Remember that almost all the leaders of the political parties in 
Nigeria were in favour of a federally structured form of government that allows significant 
powers in the hands of the regional governments.
124
 As a result of the unification decree, 
“disturbances erupted all over the North, during which several hundreds of people, mostly 
Igbos (Ironsi’s tribe) were killed.”
125
 While the protests was ongoing on the streets of 
Northern Nigeria, the Northern military elites in conjunction with its bureaucrats within the 
civil service were plotting a counter coup to revenge the January 1966 coup that brought 
AguiyiIronsi to power.
126
 Eventually, Ironsi’s regime was brought to an end via a counter 
coup by Northern military officers on 29 July, 1966 with Yakubu Gowon (a Christian 
minority from Plateau State) as the Head of State. But the Northern elements within the army 
had wanted to secede away from the Nigerian state as contended by one scholar that: “The 
original intention of the July 29, 1966 counter coup leaders was to seize the reign of 
government and then announce the secession of the Northern Region from the rest of the 
country. This was in line with the general mood of the people of the North, whose clarion call 
during the May 29 disturbance in the North which claimed many Igbo lives was Araba or 
Aware (Hausa word for “secede”). In fact, the coup leaders instructed Northern elements in 
Lagos to leave the metropolis for the North giving a deadline within which to comply.”
127
 
It was this kind of ethnic politics that laid the foundation for military intervention 
leading to the quest for Igbo separation. One major consequence of a politicised armed forces 
were that professionalism was undermined and new crops of military elites became engrossed 
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in dirty politics that required them to protect their ethnic interest over national interest.
128
 The 
lack of professionalism became eminent during the Civil War when the Nigerian armed 
forces under General Gowon engaged in war crimes to punish the Biafran forces leading to 
the latter’s defeat. However, some observers such as Mazrui argued that Gowon as an 
individual who remained committed to the rules of engagement throughout the duration of 
the war:“ButYakubu Gowon was constantly aware that saving the territorial integrity of 
Nigeria was useless without simultaneously pursuing the national integration of its people. 
He was emphatic about a “code of conduct” and sensitive rules of engagement. He insisted 
that the so-called Biafrans should not be called “enemies,” but should be regarded as fellow 
Nigerians who needed to be won back into the national fold. He was a compassionate war 
leader who was against the so-called ‘quick kill’.  He could have made the illegal night-flying 
to Biafra dangerous for the aircraft. But for almost a year and a half he shut a blind eye to 
these night-flights of relief supplies to Biafra.”
129
 
Irrespective of the personal qualities of the war-time head of state, the Federal 
government had taken certain steps which can be categorise as war crimes including killings 
of children, women and armless civilians.
130
 In fact, the federal government had deliberately 
starved the Igbo people of basic food resulting in malnutrition, hunger and deaths.
131
 One 
major incident of war crime was the massacre of civilian population on the 5
th
 of October 
1967 when the Nigerian Army entered Asaba, a major town in the Mid-Western region and 
killed.132 
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It would be hard to argue that the federal troops did not involve in war crimes 
considering the huge number of those killed during the war – over one million lives lost, 
within two and half years.
133
 No doubt, many constructive steps were taken after the war with 
the hope to ensure greater integration; it would appear that the different regions, religions and 
peoples are meant to live separately. This is because of the numerous conflicts that continue 
to characterise their relations, especially from the later part of the 1980s when the structural 
adjustment programme was launched.
134
 The following section looks at the foundation of 
ethno-religious conflicts and state responses from the 1980s to the present. 
1.6 Ethno-Religious Conflicts in Nigeria 
Any in-depth study of Nigeria must first and foremost focus on the important and sensitive 
elements including; ethnicity and inter-group relations, religion and politics.
135
 This is 
because, these forces have often than not determined the pace of Nigeria’s development and 
in many respects challenges its growth and development.
136
 In other words, ethnicity, religion 
and politics have proven to be the fundamental challenge inhibiting efforts toward nation-
building and national integration - essential factors that determine growth and development. 
Following the country’s independence in 1960, Muslims and Christians have been at odds to 
define the roles of their respective religion in politics and governance.
137
 Likewise, 
unprincipled politicians have continued to exploit this vulnerability to gain power over their 
opponents, using provocative talking points resulting to violence in the diverse 
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 As a result, religion and ethnicity have become a convenient means for 
organising and voicing discontent by politicians to gain power.
139
 This artificial rivalry 
created between religious-ethnic communities for power has become part of Nigeria’s politics 
thereby, entrenching the problem for the future.  
Sociologically, a state’s development can be influenced by the degree of its 
legitimacy, hegemony and stability.
140
 This implies that if a state’s domestic structure is 
illegitimate and unstable, there is the likelihood of chaos arising from conflict of interest 
among its constituents. On the other hand, if the state is built on the foundation of fair play 
and all stakeholders are consulted and giving due regard, it is expected that such a state will 
experience less of domestic contradictions such as conflicts and intra-state wars. The case of 
Nigeria, according to one commentator, exudes the former as noted that: “The Nigerian 
situation is such that boycotted the due course of legitimization at formation and this posits 
serious consequences for its stability. The posture is however compounded by the current 
religious-political climate in the country, where ethno-religious crises are rampant. The idea 
of Nigeria as a simpleregionalphrase was engendered by the forceful enclosing by the 
colonial dictatorial order of reluctant settlements of various backgrounds and culture under 
the same country. As a result, relations and political behaviour of the people are characterized 
by mutual suspicion and undesirable relation since they are strange fellows, who were 
coerced into the nation-state throughamalgamation.”
141
 
That being said, the following sub-section would consider some of the violent 
conflicts that have raged Northern Nigeria with religious undertone.   
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1.6.1 The Maitatsine Uprisings 
The early 1980s witnessed the growth of religious extremism under the umbrella of a 
movement known as the Maitatsine,
142
 beginning in Kano, a major commercial city in 
Northern Nigeria. Muhammadu Marwa (Cameroonian citizen resident in Kano city), sparked 
a riot with his brand of extremist Islamic teaching centered on Islamic purification.
143
 A 
result of the dramatic tune he adopted in advancing his gospel, many young followers were 
attracted to him and the movement quickly spread to other Northern states including Kaduna 
(1982), Yola (1984), and Bauchi (1985).
144
The word Maitatsinestands for “the cursed.”
145
 
The man is a famous critic of the Nigerian state system and title of the movement is said to be 
derived from his constant attack of the political leaders whom he regarded as unclean in the 
face of God.
146
 Aside many other abstract qualities, he pronounced himself a prophet of God 
who objected to all forms of Western technology.
147
 Many researchers have drawn parallels 
between Maitatsine and the rise of Boko Haram that appears to match in terms of strength, 
organization and reach.
148
 Equally, the groups embraced obsessive values that are different 
from those held by majority of Muslims in the country.
149
 They deliberately engaged violence 
to confront the country and impose their version of interpretation of Islam.
150
Falola notes the 
Maitatsine uprising as “a result of Islamic extremism on the one hand, political decadency 
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and economic difficulties of the 1970s on the other.
151
 The uprising occurred by chance, with 
the oil boom in Nigeria which sparked social revolution that displaced several local 
merchants. However, the economic prosperity was characterized by high rate of 
unemployment, raging corruption and general restlessness in the country. Most of his 
followers were poor and unemployed that were ruined by the economic decline. Marwa 
supported them with assistance he received from the wealthy followers and members of the 
community. The unprecedented number of his followers within a short period is testimony 
both to Marwa’s personality and to the bleak economic condition at the time. He purportedly 




Explaining the economic factor that drives the emergence of the Maitatsine riot: “the 
anger in terms of economic dilemma and income disparities, but with links to Islam; he sees 
the Yan Tatsine, the followers of Marwa, as belonging to the traditional Hausa class known 
in Kano as gardawa. These were purportedly the students or followers of the mallams, who 
coach, lecture, and manage to continue the traditional northern Nigerian societal expression 
of Islam, characterized by the availability of koranic teachers, whose teaching and 
followership are anticipated to reinforce and advance the reach of Islam and maintain its hold 
on society. These gardawa, according to him, were mostly temporary migrants from the rural 
areas to the cities and urban areas, where they pursued part-timebasic Qur’anic schools under 
the guidance of their chosen teachers, but at the same time were available as seasonal labor in 
such traditional urban occupations as dyeing, cap making, embroidering, market portering, 
and mud building and repairing. While these migrations relieved the strain on village grain 
supplies, these mallams—“knowledgeable middlemen, who understood the interplay of 
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While not objecting to the economic-distress explanation of Lubeck, another school of 
thought noted that the “Yan Tatsine was not really made up of the gardawa, but rather yan-ci-
rani, economic opportunists who seek the golden pavements of the big cities for what they 
can glean from them.”
154
 Whatever the true perspective would be, the fact remains that the 
group exudes elements of extremism akin to the Boko Haram. Predictably, Aghedoreferred to 
the Boko Haram as the reincarnation of the Maitatsine movement; “an oil wine in new 
bottle.”
155
 Again, the success of Marwa’s movement was due to political rivalries and police 
incompetence which allowed him to expand his sect without any effective government 
control. Security forces explicitly admitted their fright of the group who were alleged to have 
“magical powers to resist bullets.”
156
 His followers were alleged to have outnumbered the 
police in Kano state with better morale and arguably better trained and armed. Confronted by 
the Nigerian police on December 8, 1980, in the Shahuci play ground in Kano; where they 
often went to lecture the public, theMaitatsine overwhelmed the strong police force and 
burned down about 13 police vehicles in the clash.
157
 
Considering the high level of injustice in Nigeria, especially during the era of military 
rule, the movement had many followers who felt disenchanted with the system. After all, 
almost all extremist groups exploit the failure of the state system to perpetuate their message 
of hope through “violent and radical transformation of the society.”
158
However, the 
fundamental question which forms the locus of the present study has to do with the response 
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of the state and the challenges of enforcing international humanitarian law. From the 
experience in the 1980s, it is becoming increasingly clear that the fragile nature of the 
Nigerian state has often provide the fundamentalist groups (not excluding the Maitatsine 
group) a fertile group to thrive. This understanding is derived from the Weberian conception 
of the state being the sole guarantor of lives and property; “monopoly of the use of legitimate 
force in its territory and as such ensure law and order as well as prevent both internal and 
external threats of violence against its inhabitants.”
159
 Again, what is similar between the 
Maitatsine riots of the 1980s and the Boko Haram movement? The following sub-section 
attempts to elaborate on this and how the Nigerian state, has so far, responded to the threat 
posed by the Boko Haram armed group. 
1.7 The Evolution of Boko Haram and State Response 
According to historians including Salleh and Shehu, the Islamic sect commonly referred to as 




 In reality, 
the group’s original name is Jama’atAhl us-Sunnah li’d-Da’wahwa’l-JihadArabic for “the 
Group of People of distinct method for Preaching and Struggle.”
161
 However, those who 
observed the nature of operations, and to a large extend, their antecedents, termed them as 
“Boko Haram.”
162
 Literally, “Boko” is a Hausa word for Western education or civilization 
while “Haram” is an Arabic word for sin or a forbidden act.
163
 These two combine to mean 
“Western education is forbidden.”
164
 While no specific date has been given for the birth of 
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the group, many scholars have traced its origin to the emergence of Mohammed Yusuf as the 
leader of the group in the year 2002.
165
 However, for the purpose of this study, the 
evolutionary history of the group can be divided into two different phases namely, the first 
and second phases. In the following, these two phases are explained taking into cognizance 
the main factors differentiating them.  
1.7.1 The First Phase of the Evolution of Boko Haram 
As noted in the introduction to the evolution of the group above, Boko Haram has been traced 
to the early 2000s when Mohammed Yusuf, its pioneer leader began a series of radical 
teachings leading to his expulsion in two major Mosques in Maiduguri.
166
 Mohammed’s 
teachings were nothing short of radicalism and his followers appear to be indoctrinated into 
believing his approach to Islamic evangelism. Like the Maitatsine movement of the 1980s, 
the group offers the harshest critic against the Nigerian state and its corrupt elites.
167
 This 
radical teaching of Yusuf was said to have increased following his expulsion. As a result of 
his expulsion, he built a place of worship called the Markazwhere his followers received 
instructions as well as perform religious duties including worship.
168
The Markaz was large 
enough to accommodate many poor Muslim followers who were groomed in purely radical 
Islamic views.  
Other scholars gave a more detail history of the group. First, Solomon observed that 
unlike what is known about the group’s recent history, it actually began at least a decade 
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before the year 2002.
169
According to this school of thought, the sect may have started its 
activities under a title “Shabaab Muslim Youth Organization” then led by MallamLawal who 
later left for further studies in Madina.
170
 However, it was only during the leadership of Yusuf 
that the group became popular, with large followers who were thirsty for radical teaching. 
From 2002 up till 2009, the sect recorded only one militant confrontation in 2003 at a place 
known as Kanamma where lives were lost.
171
 
With increasing radical teachings and indoctrination of the group’s followers, it would 
soon lose its peaceful identity.
172
 Confrontation with the government security agencies, 
particularly the Nigerian Police started in 2009 when it tried to enforce a Borno State law 
prohibiting the riding of motorcycles without helmet.
173
After the incident, Yusuf wrote and 
demanded the government meet certain conditions including a settlement plan with the 
government within a speculated period of forty days without which the group would launch a 
jihad.
174
 The government did not meet nor take the group’s threat seriously and this would 
mark the beginning of a series of confrontations between the security forces and the group.
175
 
This would mark the end of the first phase of the evolution of Boko Haram and usher in 
beginning of the second phase of evolution of the sect.  
1.7.2 The Second Phase of the Evolution of Boko Haram 
The year 2009 marked the evolution of the second phase of Boko Haram. Unlike the first 
phase, this phase witnessed bloodletting as a result of clashes between the Nigerian security 
forces and the sect. This started when the Nigerian security forces allegedly launched an 
offensive against the group’s leader leading to the killing of many of his followers and ending 
                                                          
169
Hussein Solomon “Nigeria’s Boko Haram: Contesting Ethnic, Religious and Regional Identities” (2015) 
Terrorism and Counter Terrorism in Africa, 85 
170




Agbiboa E Daniel "Peace at Daggers Drawn?: Boko Haram and the State of Emergency in Nigeria" (2014) 
37(1) Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 41 
173
Comolli Virginia Boko Haram: Nigeria's Islamist Insurgency ( London: Hurst and Company, 2015) 
174
Supra, note 164 
175
Walker Andrew What is Boko Haram? Vol. 17 (Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace, 2012) 
62 
 
his life. This offensive which took place on 28 July 2009 recorded over 1000 deaths with 
Maiduguri loosing over 700 lives in one day. This unprofessional offensive played into the 




Since then, the group has maintained a hard stand against the Nigerian state; preaching 
jihad and soliciting assistance from other terrorists’ groups. After the killing of Mohammed 
Yusuf, a more radical leader emerged – AbubakarShekau. Shekau devised new tactics to gain 
popularity including attacks on soft targets and abduction of vulnerable populations. What 
remains a mystery to the world is the circumstance leading to Yusuf’s dead while in police 
custody. It is this tendency to abuse international humanitarian law that this study intends to 
investigate. But before we investigate the various abuses of human rights and violations of 
IHL rules in the conflict, we would first review how Boko Haram has evolved under its new 
leader AbubakarShekau and the different dynamics the conflict took over the years. 
1.7.3 Leadership of Abu Shekau and his Command Structure 
After the death of Mohammed Yusuf in 2009, the group retreated for about a year, meanwhile 
appointed Abu Shekau, Yusuf’s deputy as its new leader and revised its approach to achieve 
its objectives.
177
Shekau supposedly married one of Yusuf’s wives and also took custody of his 
children.
178
 Both Yusuf and Shekau belong to the same ethnic clan-Kanuri; lineage of the 
once Kanem-Bornu Empire that spread throughout northern Nigeria, Chad, Niger and 
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 Under his leadership, Shekau made a fairly advanced media campaign, distributing 
videos and leaflets proclaiming war against the secular enemies of the group.
180
 Such enemies 
are religious leaders, security forces, churches and mosques, schools, market places, banks, 
politicians; became Boko Haram’s primary targets over the next 9 years.
181
 Through the years, 
Boko Haram has adopted strategies such as suicide bombings, improvised explosive devices, 
drive-by shooting and targeted killings across northern Nigeria.
182
 For example, Shekau 
released a video clip in 2010 commanding his followers to launch attacks on all the security 
forces and other traitors.
183
 After this proclamation, Nigeria witnessed high increase in drive-
by shootings attacking police stations and the armed forces in Borno and Yobe states, with the 
attacker coming on motorbikes and attacking their victim by surprise.
184
This modus operandi 
reflects the strategies adopted by Boko Haram during the reign of Mohammed Yusuf, thereby 
dismissing rumors that the group had effectively rearmed. They attacked more than 100 banks 
in Borno, Yobe, Adamawa, Bauchi, Katsina and Niger robbing them with an estimated 
amount of 7 million US dollars.
185
 Consistently, they attack police stations, military barracks 
and security check-points because these are all reliable sources of getting military hardware 
with easy access for them, this as well signifies the strength or otherwise of the state.
186
 
 The command structure under Shekau comprises of groups functioning across the 
country. According to Jacob Zenn, the sect is ruled through a shura council headed by Abu 
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Shekau comprising of a representative for each group.
187
 The body deliberates on issues that 
are essential to the strategy and coordination of the sect’s activities.
188
 For example, in April 
2013, the Nigerian government offered clemency to the Boko Haram members but the shura 
council in declining the offer through its alleged spokesperson, Abu Dardam, resolved that 
democracy is not in conformity with the clear objectives of their movement, and thus, they 
would not accept any offer made by the government.
189
 The organizational structure allows 
Boko Haram to plan and execute attacks in an organized and coordinated way.
190
 In addition, 
each group commander has full autonomy to carry out attacks without first informing the 
central command.
191
 This strategy has made it very difficult for the government and its 
security forces to weaken the threat of Boko Haram.
192
 However, such strategy by Shekau has 
led to the split over of Boko Haram into different groups within the leadership as proved by 
the appearance of the Ansaru faction in 2012.
193
 
1.7.4 The Split-Over of Boko Haram and Links with other Terrorist Organizations 
As mentioned earlier, Shekau’s strategy was not fully accepted within the shura council on 
concerns over unnecessary atrocities and the attack of Muslims led to the split over of Boko 
Haram.
194
 A new faction with the slogan Jama’atulAnsaruMuslimina fi Biladis Sudan which 
translates as (Warden of protecting Muslims in Black Africa) was established in January, 
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 The new group publicly declared its formation by sharing flyers in Kano city 
portraying their group as tolerant in contrast to Boko Haram led by Shekau.
196
 The faction’s 
primary targets are the security forces and Christians and would only attack Muslims in self-
defense.
197
 In June 2012, the self-imposed leader Abu Ansari - a nom de guerre for Boko 
Haram member Khalid Al-Barnawi, explained the ideological view of the group and reasons 
for its break up with Boko Haram.
198
 
Even though they are ideally the same with Boko Haram, the Ansaru group mostly 
focused on activities of kidnappings.
199
 The Nigerian government stated that the group’s 
original name was “Al Qaeda in the Land beyond the Sahel” and has been in existence since 
around 2011 when it kidnapped two European expatriates in a construction site in Kebbi.
200
 
The Ansaru’s tactics are presumably a reflection of the scheme of its new leaders who are 
considered to be Yusuf’s initial deputies-Khalid al-Barnawi and MammanNur.
201
 Both of 
them were once together with Abu Shekau and believed to have received training overseas. 
MammanNur purportedly escaped to Somalia after the crackdown of Yusuf’s dent in 2009 
and trained with Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and Al Shabaab militants.
202
 
While Khalid Al Barnawi allegedly had connections with AQIM in Algeria and oversaw 
kidnappings and smuggling activities alongside Mokhtar Belmokhtar, leader of the renowned 
In Amenas hostage operation in 2013.
203
 According to reports, al Barnawi left Shekau over a 
                                                          
195
Country Reports on Terrorism 2017-Foreign Terrorist Organization: Jama’atuAnsarulMuslimina fi Biliadis 










 Monica Mark “Nigeria’s Militant Islamist Adopting a Disturbing Tactics” Available at: 
 https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/mar/08/nigerial-hostage-killings-boko-haram. 
201
Jacob Zenn “Boko Haram’s Conquest for the Caliphate: How Al Qaeda Helped Islamist State Acquire 
Territory” (2020) 43(2) Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, p 89 
202
Jacob Zenn “Demystifying Al Qaeda in Nigeria: Cases from Boko Haram’s Founding, Launch of Jihad and 
Suicide Bombings” (2017) 11(6) Perspectives on Terrorism, p 173 
203
Jacob Zenn “Cooperation or Competition: Boko Haram and Ansaru after the Mali Intervention” (2013) 6(3) 
Combating Terrorism Center at West Point,  1 
66 
 
ransom of about 40 million naira (250,000 dollars) he donated to Boko Haram in 2011 but 
Shekau refused to share among its members.
204
 
The break-up of Boko Haram was basedonAnsaru’s claim to protect Muslims around 
West Africa and Africa in general as opposed to Boko Haram’s activities within Nigeria and 
isolated attacks around neighboring states. The Ansaru faction has so far launched two attacks 
only on Nigerian soil; attacked a prison in Abuja in November 2012, and another attack on 
Mali-attached Nigerian soldiers around Kogi in January 2013.
205
 They justified their later 
action as a vengeance against Nigeria’s armed forces involvement in Mali. Surprisingly, the 
rise of Ansaru occurred when Shekau travelled to Goa in northern Mali in 2012 regardless, 




1.8 The Establishment of Multi-National Joint Task Force 
In the past ten years, Boko Haram has metamorphosed from an internal uprising to a regional 
threat, undermining the security of Nigeria’s neighbors with several cross-border attacks. The 
group’s connection with other terrorist organizations such as the Islamic State and Al Qaeda, 
has placed them on the same level of global jihadi movements, and hence of instant and direct 
interest to the United States and its allies.
207
 Acknowledging the immediate need to truncate 
the expansion of the group, and the incapacity of the Nigerian security forces to adequately 
handle the uprising, the African Union eventually rallied in 2015 to contain the threat.
208
 In 
March of that year, the African Union Peace and Security Council agreed to deploy 7,500 
MJTF for a period of 12 months, subject to renewal. The MJTF is mandated to carry out 
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military operations, coordinate at interstate level, patrol borders, prevent the flow of weapons, 




  The MJTF was initially launched in 1998 to counter transnational organized criminal 
activities in the region of Lake Chad Basin, and was revived in 2012 to counter the security 
threat posed by Boko Haram.
210
However, the lack of a clear legal framework for the cross-
border operations seriously affected communication strategy between them, and in January 
2015, the headquarters of the MJTF located in Baga, northeast of Nigeria was attacked by 
Boko Haram and outgunned the MJTF, compelling them to abandon their base.
211
 Thereafter, 
the Lake Chad Basin states, with the assistance of the AU and their allies, resolved to set up a 
collective military force, an initiative that was commended by the then chair of the AU 
commission NkosazanaDlamini Zuma who claimed that “collective, creative and decisive 
response” was necessary to contain the threat of Boko Haram.
212
 Similarly, the initiative was 
applauded by the former UN secretary general Ban Ki-moon who explained that “those 
terrorists should be tackled with a regional and international support.”
213
 Even though Nigeria 
has refused the presence of UN peacekeeping on its soil,
214
 the MJTF which comprises of 
forces from the Lake Chad Basin Commission (Chad, Cameroon and Niger) along with Benin 
Republic, is generally funded by UN-sourced special funds. The United States has 
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 whereas the UK and France are coordinating an 
“intelligence fusion cell” with the Nigerians.
216
 
 However, another area of concern for Nigeria has been about the lead commander of 
the MJTF. Obviously skeptical of foreign troops in the country, just like his predecessor 
Goodluck Jonathan, President Buhari also pushed on permanently retaining the leadership of 
the military coalition instead of the six-month rotational period of the command.
217
 Following 
extensive discussions, the sponsors of the troops agreed that a Nigerian would hold the post of 
force commander pending the mission.
218
 Whereas, a Cameroonian would hold the post of 
deputy force commander and a Chadian would be appointed as chief of staff for the first 
period of 12 months.
219
 In June 2015, President Buhari renewed the pledge made under 
former President Jonathan to donate $100 million to cover the main cost of financing the 
MNJT.
220
Michael Nwankpa, a visiting fellow at the Baker Institute, expressed that the 
collective venture is responsible for reclaiming the communities from Boko Haram’s control 
and killing many of them.
221
 
1.8.1 Nigerian Territory under Boko Haram Control 
Most damning for the Goodluck Jonathan administration is certainly the occupation and 
continues expansion of territory by Boko Haram in 2014.
222
 Initially, the group settles in 
villages in the northeast of Borno state where there was scare presence of security 
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Most of these settlements are so sprinkled that there is “not a friendly fenced town 
within a week’s trip.” This huge uninhibited area provided an ideal opportunity for Boko 
Haram to easily claim territory and consolidate its position. Village to village, the group 
amplified their grip throughout Borno state and parts of Yobe and Adamawa, gradually 
moving into areas where government forces were literally absent.
224
 
 Basically, Boko Haram was able to successfully acquire a vast territory for two 
reasons: First, convenient access to weapons enhanced their capability to launch terrible 
attacks, and secondly, the absence of the armed forces in these areas and the overall resistance 
to the progress of the terrorist group.
225
 Boko Haram members were able seize some lethal 
weapons such as rocket launchers, armored vehicles or according to some sources allegedly 
purchased small arms that includes automatic weapons, rifles, grenades and mortars from the 
Nigerian military which completes a whole arsenal for them.
226
 Similarly, the black market 
that spread over West Africa and the Sahel to the Mediterranean makes it easy for Boko 
Haram to get access to weapons.
227
 
 Accordingly, the Nigerian armed forces have consistently dumped one post after 
another, including one in Bama town around September 2014, which is the second largest 
town in Borno and just 40 miles away from Maiduguri.
228
 A Chatham House report published 
in 2015 stated that the Nigerian military suffered from “lack of clear directive… lack of 
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 The United States Congressional Research Service added 
“mismanagement of the security segment and corruption” to the extensive list of weaknesses 
portraying the armed forces.
230
 
 The establishment of Boko Haram state in the mountainous border town of Gwoza, 
Borno State, in August 2014 was a landmark success for Abu Shekau’s goal.
231
 In September 
2014, Abu Shekau declared himself as the ruler of an Islamic caliphate in Nigeria and claimed 
to be the West African branch of ISIS.
232
 This adjustment from the regular hit-and-run method 
to status of warfare was a dangerous game and proof of Shekau’s illusionary state. However, 
in 2015, the Nigerian armed forces purportedly reclaimed the town of Gwoza and pushed 
them out from their garrison.
233
 In the meantime, Abu Shekau aimed to expand his territorial 
claim through the borders of Chad and Cameroon along the Lake Chad region.
234
 This added 
misjudgment by Abu Shekau helped in uniting the military coalition between the neighboring 
states. 
 The rise and successes of Boko Haram in 2014 clearly revealed that it had the 
intention and ability to establish a sectarian state in northeast Nigeria. This is not surprising 
because Abu Shekau has for a long time have been making reference to the Sokoto Caliphate 
headed by Usman Dan Fodio in the 19
th
 century, which he wanted to emulate.
235
 Now that it 
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had adequate troops, Boko Haram was able to change from irregular warfare to a blend of 
guerilla and terrorist strategies, conducting offensives on large cities and military barracks.
236
 
In the meantime, as Boko Haram continues to expand its territory, and enhances its 
workforce by coercing men and boys into its militia while women and girls as hostages and 
sex slaves.
237
 Boko Haram was able to record such success because of the degradation and 
demoralization of the Nigerian security forces and the government temporarily weakening any 
opposition to the group’s territorial invasions. Abu Shekau was therefore able to exaggerate 
the public view of Boko Haram’s strength and capabilities and raise its credibility in the midst 
of like-minded groups such as Al Qaeda and ISIS.             
1.8.2 Is Boko Haram a Nigerian Problem? 
For some researchers, Boko Haram emerged as a result of identity politics and division within 
communities that have characterized the country since the colonial period.
238
 It is seen to be 
an effect to the endemic corruption apparently encouraged by the educated elites and their 
cohorts in power.
239
 Similarly, the government’s refusal to note the gross inequalities between 
the north and the south of the country has exacerbated existing feelings of political 
alienation.
240
 Therefore, it is difficult for the country to avoid any violent social movement by 
a society that feels disenfranchised of continuous suppression. A study by Freedom Onuoha 
on youth radicalization appears to corroborate this opinion as poverty, joblessness, illiteracy, 
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For some, the too aggressive response of the security forces may have aggravated the 
situation.
242
 Merited or not, the Nigerian police has a standing reputation for being fanatical 
with social and political unrest
243
 as confirmed in its management of the Maitatsine armed 
conflict in the 1980s.
244
 Amnesty International has reported cases of torture, extra-judicial 
killings and rape perpetuated by both the police and soldiers.
245
 Principally, Boko Haram 
launches vengeance against those that it regards as an adversary such as the Nigerian 
police.
246
 The Nigerian police became their primary target when the police force raided the 
Boko Haram headquarters and the subsequent killing of its leader Mohammed Yusuf in its 
custody in 2009.
247
 In the periods of 2009 to 2013, about 90 percent of Boko Haram’s attacks 
in the northeast were aimed at police stations and the armed forces.
248
 These lend credence to 
the suggestion that the failure in defeating Boko Haram is as a result of the state’s 
unprofessional management of the insurgency. However, Onuoha’sfindings conclude that the 
alleged unrestrained actions of the security forces are the least driving forces of youth 
                                                          
241
 Freedom Onuoha “Why Do Youth Join Boko Haram? (Washington, DC: United States Institute for Peace, 
2014) 
242
YahayaYakubu “State and Conflict Management: Evaluating Nigeria’s Response to Boko Haram Insurgency” 
(2018) 2(6)  International Journal of Research and Innovation in Social Science, 63 
243
Usman A Ojedokun “Contributing  Factors to Police Homicide in Nigeria” (2014) 87(1) The Police Journal: 
Theory, Practice and Principles, 41  
244
AdemolaAdesoji “Boko Haram Uprising and Islamic Revivalism in Nigeria” (2010) 45(2) Africa Spectrum, 
95  
245
Amnesty International “Nigeria’s Torture Chambers Exposed in New Report” Available at: 
https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2014/09/nigeria-s-torture-chambers-exposed-new-report/ (Accessed 
30th January, 2020).  
246
Heidi Schultz “Nigeria’s Boko Haram: Who are they and what do they want?” Available at: 
https://www.nationalgeographic.com/news/2014/5/140507-boko-haram-nigeria-borno-state-maiduguri-
mohammed-yusuf-abubukar-shekau-goodluck-jonathan-world/ (Accessed 30th  January 2020) 
247
OsaretinIdahosa “Boko Haram and the Nigerian State: A Different Perspective” (2015) 3 Journal of Culture, 
Politics and Innovation, 2  
248
SuranjanWeeraratne “Theorizing the Expansion of the Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria” (2017) 29(4) 
Journal of Terrorism and Political Violence, 610 
73 
 




For a while, Boko Haram was depicted as a phenomenon of northern Nigeria 
particularly the northeast, supported and sustained by politicians who allegedly hold against 
the former president Goodluck Jonathan.
250
 This sequence of events dominated the Nigerian 
media for a while until the president sought for international support to overcome the terrorist 
threat.
251
 The present regional impact of Boko Haram is unquestionable but, its international 
reach is certainly debatable.
252
 The manner in which Boko Haram is depicted... as a local 
insurgency, a terrorist group or a sociopolitical movement-can influence the manner in which 
it is tackled but, also gives it credibility to promote its agenda and hunt for coalition with like-
minded  terrorist organizations within or without the country.
253
 To a large extent, this has 
shaped the evolution of the insurgents, regardless of whether it began as a Nigerian problem.        
1.9 Conclusion 
Any leader in Nigeria will encounter the problem of governing a multi-ethnic and religiously 
divided nation. To avoid the threat of sectarian insurgencies and separatist ambitions, the 
president must address and cater the demands of every citizen, which starts with reducing the 
north – south divide. Disparity is a catalyst for anger, envy, frustration, and violence. While 
the military forces can thwart uprisings to a degree, a committed investment in the 
infrastructure and education of all regions in Nigeria is crucial to make a nation out of all 
these people. Religious frictions have also been exacerbated by environmental degradation 
and competition for wealth and power. Modernity and the infiltration of new ideas are often 
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threatening to groups of people who find themselves trapped between two worlds, 
desperately searching for their bearings to maintain a sense of identity. This, together with 
scarcity of economic opportunity and educational outreach, has exacerbated the hostile 
situation of the country.   
The emergence of Boko Haram in northeast Nigeria is broadly similar to other 
terrorist organizations across the world. Unable to grapple with the transformations of the 
contemporary world and left behind by the accelerated economic and cultural changes 
occurring in their environment, an increasing proportion of the population, particularly 
youths, have become easy targets for extremists groups. While Boko Haram may remain a 
Nigerian problem, understanding the dynamics of the insurgency can help inform government 
authorities and how to respond to the increasing threat of radical groups in the country.  
 














Legal Framework of International Humanitarian Law 
2.0 Introduction 
International humanitarian law (IHL) or the jus in bello (law in war) is one of the oldest 
bodies of international law, and aims to govern the actions of States and individuals taking 
part in an armed conflict, and to protect people and property. The law aims at balancing two 
objectives: the demands of the armed forces of a State (or non-State armed group) to 
prosecute the armed conflict, and the humanitarian requirement to protect persons who do 
not, or cease, taking direct part in the conflict (also called hors de combat or “out of 
combat”).
254
 Originally, the law only governed the actions of States in international armed 
conflicts; at present, the law regulates the actions of States and non-State actors, in 
international and non-international armed conflicts, and consists a wide range of rules, drawn 
from treaties, Statutes, customary international law and other sources, covering weapons, 




As noted above, the essence of IHL is to regulate actions in armed conflicts. On the 
face of it, such aim would appear senseless – how can one govern warfare? How can you 
proscribe certain types of killings, wounding and destruction of properties, while allowing 
other types of violence? Indeed, this sentiment was stated by Admiral Lord Fisher, First Sea 
Lord of the Royal Navy: “the humanizing of war! You might as well talk of the humanizing 
of Hell … As if war could be civilized! If I’m in command when war breaks out I shall issue 
mu order – ‘The essence of war is violence. Moderation in war is imbecility. Hit first, hit 
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hard, and hit everywhere.’
256
 However, counter to Fisher’s grim picture, history has 
demonstrated that over the years many societies, from diverse parts of the world, have sought 
to put restrictions on conduct in situations of armed conflicts.
257
 In fact, IHL, in its 
contemporary incarnation, is basically pragmatic in its approach – even though the resort to 
force by States is proscribed by the world community as enshrined in the UN Charter, armed 
conflicts will unavoidably occur. IHL aims to restrict the severity of the conflict, imposing 
limitations and standards on those who engage or participate in the armed conflicts.
258
 In 
response, Solis has argued that “the idea of conflict as indiscriminate violence suggests 
violence as an end itself, and that is antithetical to the fact that war is a goal-oriented activity 
directed to attaining political objectives.”
259
 
In order to achieve its objectives, IHL is regulated by certain fundamental principles, 
reviewed in the second half of this chapter. However, there are certain rules of IHL that needs 
to be examined regarding the dichotomy of armed conflicts.  This will help us understand the 
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2.1 Legal Basis and Review of Related Literature 
This section examines the literature on the subject of laws governing armed conflicts and 
enforcement of international humanitarian law with a view to ascertaining the current state of 
the law on the subject matter and to determine the value this study would add to the legal and 
institutional redress system regarding the focus (Boko Haram) of the research. It further 
presents information on the various laws regulating the different forms of armed conflicts, 
showing its impact on human dignity, and the polity in itself. The relevant literature to 
thisresearch is the debate on the legal framework to armed conflicts; the nature of armed 
conflicts, including international armed conflicts, non-international armed conflicts and 
transnational armed conflicts.  
Furthermore, the section juxtaposes the reviewed legal framework applicable in 
armed conflicts with the reality. Specifically, the case of Boko Haram armed conflicts in the 
North-Eastern region of Nigeria and the Polasrio Front of Western Sahara were analysed in 
order to understand the specific place of Boko Haram armed conflict under IHL and how the 
challenge of enforcing IHL by the Nigerian government requires further scrutiny. There is a 
growing awareness on the subject of transnational armed conflict which does not consist of 
the formal dualistic approach of international and non-international armed conflicts. From the 
review below, I discussed the transnational element of Boko Haram armed conflict and the 
applicable law under IHL to assist in analysing the challenge of enforcing IHL, with a 
specific focus on sexual violence in the Boko Haram conflict in North Eastern Nigeria. The 
section is divided into sub-themes and they are considered - hereunder in that order.  
2.2 International Armed Conflict 
As earlier stated, the law of armed conflict does not apply to all situations where armed force 
or violence is used; it applies to only certain types of conflict. In general terms, the full 
collection of IHL rules, apart from Additional Protocol II, will apply in an international 
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armed conflict, while a non-international armed conflict will be subject to Common Article 3 
of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, the Second Additional Protocol of 1977 to the Geneva 
Conventions, customary international humanitarian law. 
Even though the term ‘international armed conflict’ is widely used, it is not defined in 
any IHL treaty; in fact it does not appear in The Hague or Geneva Conventions, emerging for 
the first time in Additional Protocol I in 1977. As reviewed below, international armed 
conflicts now involve not only those between States, but also situations where territory is 
occupied, and conflicts between government armed forces and national liberation 
movements.  
2.2.2 Common Article 2 Armed Conflicts 
Article 2 Common to the four Geneva Conventions stipulates that the Conventions would 
apply in possibly three different circumstances: declared war (with or without actual 
confrontations), inter- State armed conflict, and where territory is occupied:  
Article 2 – In addition to the provisions which shall be implemented in peacetime, the present 
Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise 
between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by one 
of them. 
The Convention shall also apply to all cases of partial or total occupation of the territory of a 
High Contracting Party, even if the said occupation meets no armed resistance. 
2.2.3 War vs. Armed Conflict 
The initial treaties on the Laws of Armed Conflict applied between States, and only in war 
situations. For instance, in this light, the 1899 Hague Regulations, provided that “the 
provisions contained in the Regulations stated in Article 1 are only binding on the 
Contracting Powers, in case of war between two or more of them.”
260
 This latter condition 
provided no difficulties when States formally declared war on each other, but there were 
several situations of military actions that were similar to war, yet had not been preceded by 
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any declaration – such as Japan’s actions in China in the 1930s, as well as Italy’s invasion of 
Ethiopia in 1935.
261
 In the absence of any definition of war, states could easily, if they 
wanted, describe their conflicts as involving forcible measures short of war, and thereby 
avoid the legal consequences of being at war such as the application of the LOAC.
262
 
Thereby, with the establishment of the United Nations in 1945
263
 the global 
community came to an arrangement to proscribe the use of armed force
264
 in inter- State 
relations, unless it is authorized by the UN Security Council
265
 or in Self-defense.
266
 Since 
then, no State could declare war (unless in the limited situations of lawful self defense) 




The States conference in 1949 to conclude the texts of the Geneva Conventions took 
account of these events and decided that the Conventions would apply not just to “all 
situations of declared war” but also to “any other armed conflict which may arise between 
two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by one 
of them.”
268
 This formulation ensures that the Conventions apply following any declaration 
of war, even if there is no actual fighting, as well as to any armed conflict between States, 
irrespective of whether a war is declared or recognized.
269
 The other instances in which the 
Conventions apply are reviewed below. 
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2.2.4 What is an Armed Conflict? 
According to the ICRC, an armed conflict exists as soon as there is “resort to armed force 
between two or more States.”
270
 This wording follows the ICTYTadicJudgment
271
 and is 
highlighted by the ICRC as meaning “recourse to armed force [by one state] against another 
State, irrespective of the reasons or the intensity of this hostility.”
272
 Likewise, the 
Commentary to the Geneva Conventions, also expounds that an armed conflict is “any 
difference arising between two States and leading to the intervention of armed forces 
[irrespective] of how long the conflict lasts, or how much slaughter takes place.”
273
 In line 
with this, the ICRC explains that an armed conflict exists whenever one State uses armed 
force against another, and that the duration and intensity of the conflict are immaterial.
274
 
Some legal scholars refer to this as the “first shot” theory, whereby an armed conflict exists, 
and as a result IHL applies, once force is employed.
275
 
 The International Law Commission (ILC) also adopted the Tadic wording in its 2011 
Draft Articles on the effects of armed conflicts on treaties, characterizing international armed 
conflict as “a situation in which there is resort to armed force between States.”
276
 No 
threshold necessity is suggested by the ILC, but in any case the commentary to the Draft 
Articles clearly states that the use of this definition is for the purposes of treaty law, which is 
the subject of the Draft Articles, and not aimed to affect the rules of IHL.
277
 While other 
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scholars believe that isolated cases or minor skirmishes, even involving armed forces, do not 
constitute armed conflict, and that minimum requirements of duration, intensity and the 
intention of the parties, must be fulfilled. The UK Ministry of Defence, for instance, states 
that an accidental bombing or unintentional border invasion would not amount to an armed 
conflict.
278
Dinstein and Solis considered that a border incident would not constitute an armed 
conflict as long as it is over soon and neither of the parties intends to involve in armed 
conflict.
279
 In 2010, the International Law Association (ILA) noted that “State practice, 
judicial opinion, and majority of writers uphold the position that hostilities must attain a 
certain degree of intensity to qualify as an armed conflict.”
280
 The ILA attempted to resolve 
the issue that this approach would leave a legal vacuum where inter-State violence was not 
regulated by IHL, indicating that in practice, IHL can be and is on occasion applied by States 
even without armed conflict.
281
 This is not a comprehensive response, however, since it 
appears to leave the application of the law to the discretion of the States concerned. 
 Yet other scholars seek to reconcile these positions. They favor the opinion that an 
armed conflict exists when there is resort to armed force between States, in order that there 
can be no legal gap in the period between that moment and the confrontations attaining the 
threshold requirements explained above.
282
 They view that there is no reason why IHL should 
not be applicable in all situations. However, they noted that in practice only the rules of IHL 
are important to the particular situations will apply. Therefore, in a nutshell, minor border 
incidents; very few rules of IHL will be relevant; however, if during the incident a member of 
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the opposing armed forces are held prisoner, the rules on prisoners of war will regulate that 




Aside from declared war and actual armed conflict, Common Article 2 extends the Geneva 
Conventions to all cases of belligerent occupation – situations where territory is occupied by 
a foreign troop, whether or not the occupation is confronted. If territory is occupied during 
armed confrontations, the situation is covered by the first paragraph of Common Article 2 – 
declared war or other armed conflict.
284
 Sometimes, however, territory is occupied without 
any accompanying confrontations. The States discussing the Geneva Conventions were 
mindful that during the 2
nd
 World War territories such as Denmark had chose not resist 
German occupation, considering resistance to be pointless. In drafting the Geneva 
Conventions, hence, the second paragraph was added to Common Article 2 to rule out the 
likelihood of an occupying power rejecting to adhere to the laws and customs of war on the 
ground that the occupation was not part of a war or other armed conflict.
285
  
2.2.6 National Liberation Movements and the Laws of Armed Conflict 
As discussed above, Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions builds upon Common 
Article 2 and applies the Convention as well as the Protocol not only to armed conflicts as 
provided in that Article, but also to:  
“1(4) Additional Protocol I … armed conflicts in which peoples are fighting against colonial 
domination and alien occupation and against racist regimes in the exercise of their right of self-
determination, as encoded in the Charter of the United Nations and the Declaration of Principles of 
International Law regarding Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the 
Charter of the United Nations.”  
When Additional Protocol I was passed in 1977, these types of hostilities – conflicts of 
national liberation – had been dominant since the late 1940s as colonies fought for 
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independence from their hesitant colonial powers.
286
 Such conflicts had conventionally been 
regarded to be ‘internal problems’ for the colonial powers involved, not international 
conflicts, and hence to a large extent, beyond the reach of IHL. In the prolonged negotiations 
resulting in the 1977 Additional Protocols, however, emerging States succeeded in having 
these conflicts categorized as international in AP I, as a consequence of which the rules of 




There are several States that opposed this development.
288
 The major disagreements 
were that the formulation of Article 1(4) was ambiguous and that it created subjective and 
political concepts into international humanitarian law, thereby rooting the law’s application 
on the motives or drives of the armed group.
289
 The considerable differences between the 
negotiating countries worsened when a vote was called on this provision, and instead of 
following the conventional pattern of consensus adoption or approval, this flagrant lack of 




While over time most countries have adhered to the Protocol, considerable number of 
countries are not parties; including Indonesia, India, Sri Lanka, Myanmar, Nepal, Thailand, 
Iran, Israel, Pakistan, Turkey and the United States, most of which were or are facing 
secessionist conflicts.
291
 Furthermore, several countries have also made reservations to 
multiple provisions in the Protocol.
292
 The Protocol does not just apply in a war of national 
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liberation: its application requires fulfillment not just of the conditions in Article 1(4) 
mentioned above but also those in Article 96 (3) of the Protocol.
293
 This stipulates that the 
leadership or authority that is acting on behalf of the relevant people (those fighting the war of 
national liberation) may forward a declaration to the Swiss authority as depository of the 
Protocol, committing to employ the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol I in their 
conflict. Where such a declaration is made, the leadership or authority making it instantly 
becomes a party to the conflict and liable to all the rights and obligations of those 
agreements.
294
 Although not explicitly provided in AP I, most view is that an Article 96 (3) 
declaration is a sine qua non for the application of AP I to an Article 1(4) conflict.
295
 Under 
Article 96 (3), national liberation movements have the right to select whether or not to abide 
with IHL, as far as it goes beyond customary law.
296
 Therefore, where a declaration is not 
made, the Geneva Conventions and AP I would not apply to the conflict.
297
 
However, an additional condition of Article 96 (3) requires that the State against 
which the war is being fought must be a party to the Protocol.
298
 If the State is not party to the 
Protocol, the declaration may (potentially) as a result, lead to a unilateral commitment by the 
national liberation movement to the responsibilities encoded in the Geneva Conventions and 
the AP, but will have no effect on the State.
299
 Since all the countries to which Article 1(4) 
was principally likely to apply either did not become parties until after the conflict was over, 
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or are still not parties, its probable scope of application was and remains restricted.
300
 As 
expected,ahandful of Article 96 (3) declarations has been made and most were rejected or not 
considered as effective by the depository.
301
 A good example in this regard is the declaration 
made by the National Democratic Front of the Philippines in 1996,
302
 when it was not a party 
to the Protocol, and as such, the declaration was rejected by the depository.
303
 Another issue 
for the NDFP was that it is widely recognized that Article 1(4) does not apply to every type of 
secessionist or revolutionary movement; the list of types of conflict in Article 1(4) is 
extensive and limited to those surely in the minds of the negotiating States in 1977: those 
against colonial domination, foreign occupation and racist regimes.
304
 For all these grounds 
some scholars reject Article 1(4) as outdated,
305
 but others observe that its future application 
is by no means impossible: colonies still exist, and foreign occupation or a racist regime 
might be established somewhere.
306
 To this day, there are arguably hostilities that are covered 
by the scope of Article 1(4) of AP I.
307
 
However, in the event where the Conventions and Protocol do not apply to the 
hostilities, the consequence is that such a conflict will not be subject to the customary and 
treaty obligations regulating international armed conflict. This is due to the fact that it is only 
through Articles 1 (4) and 96 (3) that conflicts of national liberation can be characterized as 
international armed conflicts. However, this does not imply that the armed conflict is not 
regulated by IHL, rather, there is the possibility to characterize the conflict as NIAC, and will 
be subject to the growing of both treaty and customary law applicable to such hostility.   
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2.3 Non-International Armed Conflict 
Like all concepts in legal scholarship, practitioners and scholars have had extended 
arguments about all forms of armed conflicts including non-international armed conflict. But 
there is little evidence as to the point of agreement on the definitional framework that is 
acceptable to all. This statement is particularly relevant to the concept of non-international 
armed conflict defined by the Appeal Chamber as "protracted armed violence between 
governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups within a 
State."
308
 The view expressed by the Appeal Chamber in its conceptualisation of non-
international armed conflict is not consistent with the position of Geneva Convention’s 
Common Article 3. Again, it does not fit into the specific notion of non-international armed 
conflict contended in the Second Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions.   
In an attempt to rationalise the inherent differences in the definitions, Kritsiotis 
explicitly notes that Common Article 3 is limited and does not extend the application beyond 
“each party”
309
 to a non-international armed conflict.”
310
 To further rationalise the importance 
of “each party” as emphasised in the definition provided by Common Article 3, Kritsiotis 
notes the following: 
“An important stipulation, one not to be underestimated because it raises the question of whether 
governmental armed forces that suddenly turn on the civilian population-with no other "party" in sight-
-can properly be said to have instituted a non-international armed conflict. As Trial Chamber I of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda said in respect of Common Article 3 in Prosecutor v. Jean-
Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTY-96-4-T (Sept. 2, 1998): "The term 'armed conflict' in itself suggests the 
existence of hostilities between armed forces organized to a greater or lesser extent. This consequently 
rules out situations of internal disturbances and tensions. For a finding to be made on the existence of 
an internal armed conflict in the territory of Rwanda at the time of the events alleged, it will therefore 
be necessary to evaluate both the intensity and organization of the parties to the conflict.”
311
 
Conversely, the Second Additional Protocol is limited to specific forms of non-international 
armed conflicts, in other words ones: 
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“Which take place in the territory of a High Contracting Party between its armed forces and dissident 
armed forces or other organized armed groups which, under responsible command, exercise such 
control over a part of its territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military 
operations and to implement this Protocol.”
312
 
Similar to the elaborate explanation provided to rationalise the use of the term “each party” to 
the non-international armed conflict in the Common Article 3, Kritsiotis offers the following 
rationalisation for the words used in the Second Additional Protocol relating to specific forms 
of non-international armed conflicts: 
“This qualification is important not only because of its relation with Common Article 3 of the Geneva 
Conventions-but because it acts as a qualification of the statement, also found in Article 1(1), that the 
Second Additional Protocol "shall apply to all armed conflicts which are not covered by Article 1 of the 
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949." The Second Additional Protocol 
was therefore not intended as a default mechanism for all of those armed conflicts not coming within 
the provenance of the First Additional Protocol.”
313
 
A close review of these two legal instruments (Common Article 3 and the Second Additional 
Protocol) suggests an attempt by the drafters of the Second Additional Protocol to build up 
specific stipulations that were absent in Common Article 3.
314
 Particularly, this new approach 
(Second Additional Protocol) attempts to provide a clear identification of the participants 
(actors) in the non-international armed conflict. These actors include “armed forces [of the 
High Contracting Party] and dissident armed forces or other organized armed groups")," but 
also in terms of dissident armed forces or other organized armed groups it is directed toward 
(those "under responsible command, [which] exercise such control over a part of its territory 
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In any case, the dictum in theProsecutor v. DuskoTadicnotedthatthe most fundamental 
issue is that the rules of IHL apply to both instances of international and non-international 
armed conflicts.316 
Another angle through which the Tadicjurisprudence has been helpful is in its 
definition of, and qualification of the nature of armed conflicts; specifically, the extent to 
which a conflict can be qualified as an internal armed conflict is where the judges opined that 
all conflicts occurring within a state qualifies as non-international armed conflict. However, it 
noted this only when such conflict is characterised by “protracted armed violence.”
317
 More 
specifically, the Second Additional Protocol noted that the term does not include smaller 
scales of uprising within a state –“shall not apply to situations of internal disturbances and 
tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a similar 
nature, as not being armed conflicts.”
318
 
Again, the Tadic Appeal Judgment did not specify the actors that will need to be 
involved to qualify for a non-international armed conflict. In other words, all of the 
qualifications highlighted in the Second Additional Protocol are not attached to any specific 
group of actors to define the existence of an internal armed conflict. By this, the ICTY sought 
to provide the customary law definition of non-international armed conflict. The TadicAppeal 
Chamber noted that protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and 
organized armed groups or protracted armed violence between such groups within a State 
will suffice as non-international armed conflict.
319
 In essence, if the criteria are not met by a 
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situation, there is no armed conflict. Banditry, unorganized or short lived uprisings or terrorist 
activities are thereby excluded from the applicability of the 1949 Conventions.
320
 
The customary status of the Tadic definition is supported by its incorporation in the 
Statute of the International Criminal Court,
321
 although the definition is still termed in the 
abstract, and whether a situation is stated as an armed conflict, satisfying the requirements of 
Common Article 3, is to be decided upon a case by case basis.
322
 In respect of Article 8(2) (f) 
the Pre-Trial Chamber II of the International Criminal Court in Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre 
Bemba noted that: “In the view of the Chamber, this is ultimately a limitation on the 
jurisdiction of the Court itself, since if the required level of intensity is not reached, crimes 
committed in such a context would not be within the jurisdiction of the Court.”
323
 Regardless, 
it appears to be customarily accepted that when organized armed groups take part in 
hostilities attaining a certain level of intensity, the rules of non-international armed conflict 
will come into force.
324
 
2.4 Trans-national Armed Conflicts 
Legal scholars have often noted that the conventional boundary separating international and 
non-international armed conflict is the territory on which the conflict takes place. In other 
                                                          
320
Dinstein, YoramNon-International Armed Conflicts in International Law (Cambridge University Press, 2014) 
321
 Article 8 (2) (f) “Paragraph 2(e) applies to armed conflicts not of an international character and hence, does 
not apply to situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence 
or other acts of a related nature. It applies to armed conflicts that take place in the territory of a State when there 
is protracted armed conflict between government forces and organized armed groups or between such groups.” 
In this regard, Noelle noted that the change of the term “armed violence’ in the Tadic judgement to “armed 
violence” in the ICC Statute could suggest the raising of the threshold of application but it is difficult to discern 
the relevance in practical application. Noelle Quenivet “The Applicability of International Humanitarian Law to 
Situations of a (counter-)terrorist Nature, in Roberta Arnold, Pierre-Antoine HildbrandInternational 
Humanitarian Law and the 21
st
 Century’s Conflicts – Changes and Challenges (Edis, 2005) 35 
322
Prosecutor v. Rutaganda Case ICTR-96-3 (Judgement, 6 December 1999) para 91 
323
Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gambo Case N0 ICC-01/05-01/08 [June 15, 2009] (Decision Pursuant to 
Article 61 (7) (a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges Against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gambo) at para 225 
324
 ICRC Commentary of 2016 Article 3: Conflict not of an International Character stated that: “In any case, the 
criteria of intensity and organization must be present cumulatively in order for a situation of violence to reach 
the threshold of a non-international armed conflict. Depending on the circumstances, however, it may be 
possible to draw some conclusions from one criterion for the other. For example, the existence of highly intense 
armed confrontations between State authorities and non state armed groups, or between several non-state armed 
groups, may indicate that these groups have reached the level of organization of a Party to a non-international 
armed conflict.” para 434 
90 
 
words, as argued by Crawford, the delineating factor that has been employed by practitioners 
and researchers in differentiating international and non-international armed conflicts is in the 
simple understanding of the “different context”
325
 of their operation. But as stressed by Kress, 
the nature of contemporary trans-boundary armed conflicts has been noted to differ from 
these two broad dichotomies in that violent attacks sometimes occur short of the participation 
of “states on both sides.”
326
 When this type of conflict takes place, it appears to question the 
sharp categorisation between international and non-international armed conflicts as it shares 
similar characteristics of both types – trans-boundary armed conflict and the involvement of 
non-state armed groups.  
Following from this perspective, academic literature on the changing phenomenon of 
conflict with transnational character is reviewed below. This will help to locate the specific 
case of Boko Haram armed conflict considering its changing dynamics. 
2.4.1 Between International Humanitarian Law and Transnational Armed Conflicts 
Some academic scholars held the opinion that the entire body of international law does not 
cover all armed conflicts and thus cannot be applied to violent conflicts that do not fall within 
the definitional boundaries of the orthodox conceptual framework of international and non-
international armed conflicts. In this category is Richard Baxter, who famously argued that 
“the first line of defence against international humanitarian law is to deny that it applies at 
all.”
327
 To maintain their position, they hold firmly to the strict literary or textual stipulations 
of the Geneva Conventions of 1949. In line with this reasoning, the law of international 
armed conflicts is limited toward the regulation of conflicts between two hostile states. 
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Accordingly, the concept of non-international armed conflict can only be applied toward the 
regulation of armed conflicts fought within the boundary of a state considering it to be 
“armed conflict not of an international character.”
328
 Based on the formulation above, 
whenever trans-boundary conflicts take place between non-state groups there is insufficient 
justification for the application of the rules of jus in bello.
329
 
To this end, Dinstein argues that whenever a State decides to take military actions to 
counter the threat of a non-state group, particularly within the territorial boundaries of 
another state, such actions may be termed as “extra-territorial law enforcement.”
330
 In such 
situations, Dinstein argues that, the State must not be bound by the rules of humanitarian law 
as it will be only optional or at best, a choice derived from its policy. This also means that 
any state undertaking extra-territorial enforcement may chose not to observe the fundamental 
norms of IHL.
331
 No doubt, the position of these scholars can be understood within the 
purview that the application of the rules of IHL in the circumstances explained above can 
lead to a situation where insurgent groups (non-state actors) are accorded legitimacy and 
status. However, these legitimate concerns can lead to a situation where victims of armed 
conflicts, specifically those who became victims by conflicts that spilled over the territory of 
other states (such as the case of Boko Haram spilling to neighbouring states) being denied the 
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Furthermore, Schondorf argues “if [it is] not armed conflict, then it is unworkable and 
artificial – the law simply does not square with reality.”
333
 The basis on which armed 
conflicts that are defined as non-international in nature (i.e. within a single state or territory) 
would suddenly descend into a lacuna simply because of it crossed over to another territory is 
unimaginable. At the very least, this form of reading of the law may actually refute the 
fundamental principle of jus in bello.
334
 After all, the fundamental principle of international 
humanitarian law is to offer protection to victims of violent conflicts that have the attributes 
of armed conflicts.
335
Lietzau provides a clearer response to this issue when he notes that 
“Even if one accepted that the conventional rules of Common Article 3 and Additional 
Protocol II cannot apply to such situations, at the very least customary humanitarian law 
would continue to provide protection.”
336
 
Again, the question posed by Schmitt resonates well; one wonders why a violent 
conflict that has been measured to be equal to armed conflict as provided for in the rules of 
jus in bellocannot be seen in the same light even when it qualifies as armed conflict simply 
because it involves a transnational element.
337
 The present practice is in direct opposition – 
the quest to widen the extent of application of humanitarian law by state both state actors and 
international organisations.  
2.5 Internationalized and Transnational Armed Conflicts 
The requirements for categorizing conflicts as international or non international as reviewed 
above are clearly the most basic to apply when the hostility is between two or more countries, 
or within a country. Also, as discussed above, assuming the threshold requirements are 
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fulfilled, a conflict between the forces of two or more states is characterized as international, 
while those within a state’s territory between the state forces and non-state armed groups are 
generally characterized as internal armed conflicts.
338
 However, recent conflicts have 
exhibited that such cannot be easily classified: amongst many other possibilities, a conflict 
may spill across a state’s border, as seen in the Boko Haram armed conflict in Nigeria; an 
armed group might be fighting in one state but based in another; or a government might be 
overtly or covertly supporting one of the parties in civil war time in another country. A good 
example in this regard is the armed conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), at 
one point referred to as “Africa’s world war.”
339
 The conflict has involved state forces from 
Angola, Rwanda, the DRC, Namibia, Sudan, Uganda and Zimbabwe, together with host of 
armed groups with different objectives, nationalities, State support and areas of operations.
340
 
In some cases where there is transnational element, the conflict could be international 
or non-international or both. In some instances, there could be an international armed conflict 
between particular parties to the conflict and non-international between others fighting 
simultaneously. Or a conflict may change from international to non-international or vice 
versa in time, as happened in Afghanistan from 2001.
341
 This section largely concentrates on 
conflicts involving state and non-state parties, and especially the legal effect of foreign 
interference in an internal armed conflict. These circumstances are usually discussed under 
two main headings, even though the wording is not ever consistent and there is some overlap 
between the two. The first is ‘internationalized’ armed conflicts, where an internal armed 
conflict may change into an international armed conflict through the involvement of another 
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state. The second is ‘transnational,’ ‘extra-state’ or ‘extra-territorial’ armed conflicts, which 
reflects on the legal effect of internal armed conflict spillover to anothercountry. 
This section is particularly relevant to this research because of the dynamic nature of 
the Boko Haram armed conflict in Nigeria- splitting over to neighboring countries, including 
links with other terrorist organizations such as Al Qaeda and ISIS. This dynamic nature 
requires us to examine and locate the position of the law regulating the Boko Haram armed 
conflict.    
2.5.1 Internationalized Armed Conflicts 
An internal armed conflict can be internationalized in one of two ways: If (1) a foreign state 
get involved in that conflict using its forces, or (2) if either party(s) to the conflict act on 
behalf of that other state.’ Both situations are demonstrated below.    
2.5.2 Military Intervention by a foreign State in a NIAC 
If there is an internal armed conflict between a State and an armed group fighting within a 
state, for example Nigeria and Boko Haram armed group, fighting within the territory of 
Nigeria, fulfilling all the conditions of non-international armed conflict- such as intensity and 
organization, the lingering question is - what is the legal effect of military intervention by 
another state(s)?  
2.5.3 Irrespective of which side the intervening State supports, the conflict becomes IAC 
Here, some scholars hold the view, as the ICRC in the past,
342
 that whether an external State 
gets involved in the conflict to assist the territorial State or the armed group, the entire 
conflict becomes an international armed conflict because an international factor has been 
included- thus from this point onwards, the conflict is not anymore between a single State and 
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an armed group, or between armed groups.
343
 The judicial precedent of the ICTY is often 
cited in support of this view, such as Rajic, Blaskic and Kordic,
344
 however, whether these 
cases support such argument is debatable.
345
 Each of them concern the complex conflicts that 
started in Bosnia and Herzegovina after its declaration of independence in 1992, Croatia’s 
military support of Bosnian Croatian soldiers in their conflict with the Bosnian government 
forces. Number of observations by the Tribunal are to the effect that any intervention of 
external troops makes a situation of an internal armed conflict international, for instance in 
Blaskic: “an armed conflict which explodes in the territory of a single State and which is thus 
at first sight internal may be considered international where the troops of another country 
intervenes in the conflict….”
346
 However, even though the circumstances in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina were exceptionally complex, with various parting entities declaring statehood 
and forming their own armed forces at various times, the external intervention in question in 
each case was in support of the opposing side of the government at the time - not in support 
of the government side, or of both sides.
347
 As demonstrated below, it is generally agreed that 
external military intervention in support of a non-state party to a conflict renders such conflict 
international.    
2.5.4 In the event that the foreign State assists the territorial State, the conflict remains Non-
International 
 
In the event that another State intervenes to assist the territorial State, the general view is that 
the conflict remains internal in character, based on the fact that there is no conflict between 
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two or more States but only between a single State assisted by another, and an armed 
group.
348
 However, there is the question of what law would apply, because while Common 
Article 3 applies to all situations of non-international armed conflicts, Additional protocol II 
could not possibly apply because based on its literal wording it is limited to conflicts between 
the armed group and the armed forces of the territorial State (the State on which the conflict 
is taking place). However, scholars have argued that the words ‘its armed forces’ in Article 1 
of Additional Protocol II should be read widely and extensively as understood to include any 
State supporting the territorial State.
349
 At the very least, the rules of customary international 
law applicable to non-international armed conflicts would apply.  
2.5.5 Where the foreign State assists the armed group, the conflict between such foreign State and the 
territorial State is international while that between the armed group and the territorial State 
remains internal 
 
In a situation where an external State intervenes through its troops in an internal armed 
conflict in support of the armed group, the Appeal Chamber in the Tadic case noted that in 
such situation, there are two parallel conflicts.
350
 An internal armed conflict between the 
territorial State and the armed group, and an international armed conflict between the 
territorial State and the intervening State.
351
 This is also how the ICJ seemed to have 
examined the situation in the Nicaragua case: the conflict between the insurgent contras and 
Nicaragua was internal, whereas the military action between the United States, which was 
assisting the contras, and Nicaragua was categorized as international armed conflict.
352
 This 
suggests that if for example, a foreign country(s) intervenes through its troops in support of 
Boko Haram armed group in the territory of Nigeria, going by the above analysis, there 
would be two parallel conflicts in Nigeria: one non-international armed conflict between the 
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Nigerian forces and the Boko Haram armed group and an international armed conflict 
between Nigeria and the foreign State assisting Boko Haram.  
2.5.6 Where the external State supports the armed group, the entire conflict becomes 
international 
 
This is similar to the analysis in (A) above, although is restricted to external military 
assistance in support of the armed group only, and is a more widely advanced view.   
As explained, the views expressed at (B) and (C) are the most generally recognized 
and accepted at the moment: that external intervention through its troops to support the 
territorial State does not change the status of a non-international armed conflict, while the 
support of an insurgents would likely create parallel international and non-international 
armed conflicts.
353
 However, in some cases the opinion at (D) could indeed be most suitable, 
where for instance the connection between the external State and the armed group is very 
close that there is effectively one conflict, with the external State and the armed group as one 
party and the territorial State as the other.
354
 
For exhaustiveness, a fifth class of intervention could be discussed: where a country 
intervenes in a non-international armed conflict between two or more armed groups, to assist 
one armed group against another. In such a situation, the legal effect is generally determined 
by the response of the territorial State; if the territorial State consents or acquiesces in the 
foreign States’ activities in its territory, there is no conflict between two opposing States and- 
if the opinion at (C) above is adopted, the conflict remains non-international in character. But 
if the territorial State objects the intervention, then within the framework of international law, 
force is employed in the territory of another State without its consent, even where such force 
is not aimed at the State itself.
355
 However, if the territorial State does not react by military 
force, then there may be no armed conflict of any sort between the two countries because the 
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relevant threshold has not been reached. This is the position held by the ICRC that: an armed 
conflict arises once there is “resort to armed force between two or more States.”
356
 However, 
if the territorial State responds by military force, any subsequent conflict between the two 
States will clearly be an international armed conflict.
357
 
2.5.7 Where either of the parties is acting on behalf of a foreign State 
This is the second principal means in which an internal armed conflict can be 
internationalized through the intervention of another State (the first instance is the direct 
intervention by the troops of another country as explained above).
358
 History has shown that 
repeatedly, external States have interfered in another State’s internal conflicts either directly 
or indirectly, but the question is: what degree of interference will legally constitute an armed 
conflict between the foreign country and the territorial country? The question has surfaced in 
several international cases where the court had to identify the connection between an armed 
group and a foreign State. This led to difference of opinions between the International Court 
of Justice and the ICTY, analyzed below. 
2.5.8 The Nicaragua Case - Effective Control Test 
The 1986 Nicaraguacase
359
 stems from the UnitedState’s intervention alongside the contras, 
an insurgent group engaged in an armed conflict to overthrow the leftist Sandinista 
government in Nicaragua in the early 1980s. Nicaragua filed an action against the United 
States in the ICJ, accusing the United States of violating international law in several ways, 
including by employing the use of force against Nicaragua openly and covertly through the 
contras. Nicaragua also claimed that the United State be held accountable in international law 
for the violations of international humanitarian law rules reportedly committed by the 
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 It further claimed that the link between the United States and the 
Contras was close that the activities of the contras were fundamentally the activities of the 
US.
361
 In analyzing Nicaragua’s allegations, the Court observed that the United States had 
encouraged and assisted the contras in the past years in several ways:362 
Even though the Court found that there was no ‘direct and crucial combat assistance’ 
provided to the contras, it did find that the contras were to a ‘large extent financed, trained, 
equipped, armed and organized’ by the United States.
363
 In reviewing whether in general, the 
contras could be viewed as an organ of the United States government, for the purposes of the 
law of State responsibility,
364
 the Court observed otherwise: 
…despite the heavy subsidies and other support provided to them by the US, there is no clear evidence 
of the US having actually exercised such a degree of control in all fields as to justify treating the 
contras as acting on its behalf.
365
 
The Court agreed that the United States obviously exercised some control over the contras, 
however, the issue was the degree of that control, and this was essential to assert that the 
United States was responsible for the contras’ alleged breaches of IHL.
366
 The Court put in 
place a very high threshold for this.367 
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Based on the evidence before it, the Court was not convinced that such effective 
control was used by the United States.
368
 However, the ‘effective control’ test was 
overlooked by the ICTY in 1995 in the Tadic case, examined below. 
2.5.9 The Tadic Case - Overall Control Test 
The extent of control became an issue in the Tadiccase because the allegations against 
Tadicincluded serious violations of the Geneva Conventions where, crucially, the victims of 
the crimes were individuals ‘in the custody of a party to the conflict … that are not 
citizens.’
369
 The victims were Bosnians held by the Bosnian Serb forces (VRS), and thus 
evidently excluded from the above provision. However, if the VRS could be compared in 
some legal way to the forces of another country-Serbia and Montenegro (FRY), the 
confrontation would be considered international and the charges could stand. The ICTY 
Appeals Chamber in 1999 examined the level of control that would have to be employed by a 
country over a military troop for this to occur, and found that:  
In order to assign the activities of a military or paramilitary group to a country, it must be proved that 
the country wields overall control over the group, not only by equipping and financing the group, but 
also by coordinating or assisting in the general planning of its military activity.
370
 
The Court clearly stated that this test, which it summed up briefly as “generally to regulate or 
assist in planning the military group’s activities,
371
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The Appeals Chamber was convinced with the evidence presented before it that ‘the 
(VRS) were to be considered as operating under the overall control of and in the interest of 
the FRY. Consequently, the hostility in Bosnia and Herzegovina between the Bosnian Serbs 
and the central government of Bosnia and Herzegovina should be characterized as an 
international armed conflict.
373
 Therefore, while the ICJ effective control test demanded the 
external State to be in a reasonably direct control of each operations, the ICTY overall control 
test required only on a general role in planning and organizing the group’s activities. 
 The ICJ got the chance to reply to the Tadicdecision in 2007 in the Bosnian Genocide 
case. In that case,
374
 the issue was similar- the link between the VRS and FRY- but with the 
aim of identifying whether the genocide conducted by the VRS at Srebrenica in 1995 could 
be attributed to the FRY, the defendant in that case.
375
 This also turned on the degree of 
control employed, and the Court took as its basis the customary rule of state responsibility as 
enshrined in Article 8 of the International Law Commission’s articles on state responsibility, 
relating to conduct ordered or carried out by a State.
376
 The Court reaffirmed its ‘effective 
control’ test from Nicaragua, and refused the Tadic rationale, on the basis that while the 
‘overall control’ test might be suitable in the framework of determining whether or not an 
armed conflict is international, it was clearly not appropriate for determining concerns of 
State responsibility.
377
 The Court therefore, applied its “settled jurisprudence” on state 
responsibility and ruled that the FRY did not use effective control over the activities in the 
context of which the genocide was committed; ‘the resolution to kill the adult male 
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population of the Muslim community in Srebrenica was decided by some members of the 
VRS main staff, but without orders from or effective control by the FRY.’
378
 
However, the ICTY has retained the correctness of its ‘overall control’ test, and has 
employed it in various cases since Tadic;
379
 it has also been adopted by the International 
Criminal Court in the Lubanga case for a similar reason- ascertaining whether or not an 
armed conflict is international.
380
 Since then, it is increasingly recognized that the overall 
control test is in fact appropriate for this purpose. Also, the ICJ itself has observed that there 
is no rational explanation as to why the test should be the same for both issues that are 
significantly different: one is evaluating the international character of a conflict, while the 
other is ascertaining whether a State is responsible for a particular act committed in that 
conflict.
381
 However, the ICJ has stressed that the overall control test was not right for the 
latter purpose, given that this would overly widen the scope of State responsibility, the main 
principle of which is that a State should only be responsible for its own actions.
382
 
2.5.10 Transnational - Armed Conflicts 
Beside an armed conflict becoming internationalized because of external intervention, as 
explained above, complexities may occur when an internal armed conflict involves the 
territory of one or more countries. The various ways in which this may arise are examined 
below. It is important to bear in mind the relevant phrases of Common Article 3 and 
Additional Protocol II setting out their application:  
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Common Article 3 applies to non-international armed conflicts “occurring in the 




Additional Protocol II applies to non-international armed conflicts with several 
conditions: 
- “which takes place in the territory of a High Contracting Party;” 
-“between (that State’s) armed forces and (organized armed groups) etc;” 
-“(the group must) exercise… control over a part of (that State’s) territory…”
384
 
The formulation of Common Article 3 does not seem to obligate that the conflict must take 
place on, or only on, the territory of the State party to the conflict. While that of Additional 
Protocol II, however, read literally, requires that: 
… the conflict occur on the territory of the State party to the conflict; that State must 
be a party to the Protocol; and the armed group must have control of territory in that State.  
Therefore, Additional Protocol II would easily apply to situations where the conflict 
occurs wholly within the boundaries of a State party to the Protocol without any interference 
by an external State; however, such as the case of Boko Haram, recent internal armed 
conflicts are very complex with foreign countries getting involved in internal conflicts and 
armed groups spread across borders. The following hypothetical examples are some of the 
complexities that occur in practice; it would be seen that in several instances the law is not 
settled and that there are diverse views in terms of what the law is and ought to be. In each 
instance, country A is in military confrontation with armed group Z, and it is assumed that 
armed group Z is not subject to the control of any foreign country because as explained in 
section 1 above, control by a foreign country could render the conflict international, and 
likewise, no actual military confrontation between States, because this will as well make the 
conflict an international armed conflict.  
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2.5.11 Hostilities between Country A and armed group Z based in Country A and fighting in 
Country A 
 
This is the easiest type of non-international armed conflict, mentioned here for 
exhaustiveness and as a reference point. This comprises a classic armed conflict that is 
entirely within the territory of Country A. The law that applies in this type of conflict is 
Common Article 3 and customary international law, and if Country A were party to 
Additional Protocol II and armed group Z has fulfilled the conditions of territorial control, 
then Additional Protocol II would also apply. 
2.5.12 Hostilities between Country A and armed group Z based in Country B, fighting in 
Country A 
 
This is somewhat slightly different type of non-international armed conflict from the one 
noted above. Here, the hostility is between Country A and armed group X and the 
confrontations occurs in country A, but armed group Z bases in neighboring country B, for 
instance around the border area- for example, Boko Haram basing in Nigeria and engaging 
the forces of the neighboring countries. From this place in country B, group Z crosses into 
country A and confronts the armed forces of country A there. Notwithstanding the crossing of 
State border by armed group Z, the general view here is that this is still a NIAC because 
internal armed conflicts are distinguished by the parties involved and not the geographical 
location of the conflict.
385
 
In addition, Articles 1 and 7 of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 
extend the jurisdiction of that Court- required enforcing, inter-alia, the law of NIAC, to the 
neighboring countries. MarcoSassoli also argued that it really does not matter that group Z 
operates from across the territory of country B because the hostility is still restricted to 
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country A – for instance, Nigeria in this study.
386
 For example, in the early 2000s, the FARC 
troops were stationed at the Colombia/Ecuador territory, and the Colombian soldiers crossed 
the border into Ecuadorian territory to engage the FARC troops that are based there. 
Likewise, the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) had a base in South Sudan and would cross the 
border into Uganda to launch attacks. Years earlier, during the Algerian war of independence, 
the Armee de Liberation Nationale (ARL) had stations in Tunisia, where they launch attacks 
against French soldiers in Algeria.
387
 In spite of the cross-border elements of those conflicts, 




2.5.13 Hostilities between Country A and armed group Z, fighting in A spills across border 
into Country B or even more 
 
The confrontation between country A and armed group Z might possibly spill into 
neighboring country B, or could probably have a base in country B and followed there by 
country A. Here, in view of the fact that the conflict has crossed an international border, such 
type of conflict have been classified as ‘transnational’ or ‘extraterritorial’ non-international 
armed conflict.
389
 However, there are several opinions regarding the legal consequences.  
First, Dietrich Schindler observed that the consequences largely depends on the nature 
of country A’s military activity in country B: if its actions are restricted to confronting armed 
group Z and its structures only, then the conflict shall remain non international in character 
because there is no military confrontation between countries A and B.
390
 But where country 
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A’s attacks are against country B’s military structures, the entire war becomes an 
international armed conflict because now there is a conflict between two States.
391
 
The second opinion is identical, but turns on whether country B has consented to, or 
at the very least agrees country A’s military operations in its territory. If it has, then the 
character of the conflict remains non-international for the same reason explained in the 
preceding paragraph that there is no hostility between the two countries. However, if country 
B denies its consent, then the situation is that there are two parallel armed conflicts: an 
internal armed conflict between Country A and group Z, and an international armed conflict 
between countries A and B.
392
 This is the view expressed by the ICRC in the conflict between 
Israel and Hezbollah in 2006: that there exist a non-international armed conflict between 
Israel and Hezbollah, who were operating from Lebanon, and an international armed conflict 
between Israel and Lebanon.
393
 
In all cases, if the hostility is regarded as non-international, the fact that it is not 
geographically restricted to a particular country is largely found to be unnecessary, regardless 
of the phrases set out in Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II noted above. Legal 
scholars have admitted that this wording seems to restrict an NIAC to the territory of a 
particular country, but noted that this would be a wrong interpretation; what is significant, 
they argue, is not the territorial factor but rather the character of the parties to the conflict.
394
 
There are several examples of internal armed conflicts spilling over territorial borders 
including the case of Boko Haram armed conflict in Nigeria spilling over to neighboring 
countries of Chad, Cameroon, Niger and Benin, and engage their forces. However, based on 
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the foregone analysis, one can argue that the spilling over of the group does not change the 
status quo of the conflict as non-international armed conflict, because all the countries 
involved have supported by the African Union Peace and Security Council (PSC) jointly 
signed an agreement to fight the group together.
395
 A recent example is that of Islamic State 
in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) which has since 2013 also taken control of vast territory in 
Syria and Iraq.
396
 Another example that is often cited is the activity of the FARC against 
Columbia where the NIAC character of the conflict is generally agreed.
397
 
 Accordingly, the rules of Common Article 3 and customary international law would 
apply.
398
 With regards to Additional Protocol II, scholars have argued that provided certain 
aspect of the conflict occurs in country A (and supposing A is a party to the Protocol), then it 
should equally apply to that part of the conflict in country B. That where the Protocol is 
applicable to one party to the conflict, it equally applies to all.
399
 
The third opinion observed is the situation where the conflict between country A and 
armed group Z does not squarely fit into either categories of armed conflicts i.e. international 
or non-international. The conflict is not international because it is not between two countries 
and neither could it be non-international because another country and its territory are 
involved. Advocates of this opinion argue that another type of armed conflict should be 
developed and that rules should be drafted exclusively for such situations.
400
However, Marco 
Sassolicriticised the quest to name an entirely new category of armed conflict and stated that 
“a third type of armed conflict would add to the existing objective challenges in categorizing 
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circumstances under humanitarian law and involve the chance that States faced with the other 
two types invoke the existence of the new third category, especially if, as one may fear, the 
latter provides limited protection to the enemy.”
401
 
2.5.14 Hostilities between Country A and armed group Z based in neighboring Country B, 
fighting in B only 
 
The major difference between this and the preceding review is that there is no conflict 
occurring in country A at all and there is no spillover or spread of an ongoing hostility. 
Regarding the conflict between country A and armed group Z, some have argued that since 
the character of the conflict would be non-international if the conflict is shifted to the 
territory of country A (on the same reasoning as explained in (iii above), then there is no 
rational explanation for not categorizing it as non-international while in country B. However, 
there is still the issue of territory at least for the potential application of Additional Protocol 
II. This is because it is difficult to comprehend on how Additional Protocol II could apply to 
any part of the conflict, even if both countries A and B are parties to the Protocol. The 
conflict is going on within the territory of B, but not between “its” armed forces and armed 
group Z. On the contrary, the conflict is between armed group Z and country A’s forces, but 
not the territory of country A. 
2.5.15 Global War on Terror: Hostilities between Country A and armed group Z based in 
Country C and other places, fighting in different Countries 
 
This is the most complex analysis of the above reviews. In this case, a country is involved in 
a conflict with an armed group that has several foreign bases while the conflict is going on in 
different countries. This is essentially relevant within the framework of international 
terrorism and the US- led declared ‘war on terror’ mainly against, Al Qaeda.
402
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Al Qaeda is a loose network of radical fanatics that was declared a terrorist 
organization by the United Nations and other international bodies.
403
 It operates, or has 
associates, in several countries, and since the 1990s, it has been liable for many serious 
terrorist attacks around the world, most terribly those in USA on 11 September 2001.
404
 In 
2002, the US started to refer ‘war on terror’ against Al Qaeda.
405
 Since then, it has on 
different occasions categorized this as an armed conflict that was neither international nor 
non-international; a non-international armed conflict, or just put it as a global armed conflict 
without identifying its nature.
406
 However, the US Supreme Court in its 2006 decision in 
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld
407
 considered it as a non-international armed conflict, fundamentally 
because it was not an armed conflict between States. 
There are several arguments on the legal status of the continuing hostility between Al 
Qaeda and its associates on one hand, and the US and its allies, on the other. Two crucial 
questions were raised: first, whether Al Qaeda is an armed group, and secondly, whether its 
actions qualify as an armed conflict. One of the challenges in reaching a sound decision is the 
blurry and switching nature of the organization, as well as the absence of credible evidence 
on the correct relationship between the diverse branches that every now and then come out 
and claim to be affiliates of Al Qaeda.
408
 Like always, much depends on the true events. 
Thus, SandeshSivakumaran argued that if the United States is right and there is single global 
armed conflict between the United States and Al Qaeda, then the numerous assaults and 
adverse reactions in various places could be combined to determine whether the intensity 
requirement for the qualification of an armed conflict is fulfilled.
409
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The majority of opinion, however, is that there is legally no such thing as global war 
on terror, or global armed conflict, except a variety of split situations, all of which has to be 
examined independently.
410
 On this ground, the ICRC noted that ‘the war on terror is a phrase 
used to depict variety of measures and operations aimed at avoiding and combating more 
terrorist attacks. These measures could include “armed conflict.”
411
 Therefore, the 2001 US-
led assaults on Al Qaeda and the Taliban, the then de facto government of Afghanistan, was 
an international armed conflict;
412
 after the Taliban de facto government was toppled and 
defeated, the continuing hostilities with Al Qaeda turned to non-international armed 
conflict.
413
 The US-led attacks on Al Qaeda locations along the border areas of Pakistan 
could be considered as an overspill of that non-international armed conflict.
414
 However, 
other cases cannot be considered as armed conflicts but acts of terrorism only. This is the 
position of the United Kingdom (and many others) in its reservation when ratifying 
Additional Protocol I in 1998, noting that the term armed conflict of itself and in its context 
means a sort of situations that is not constituted by the commission of ordinary crimes 
including terrorist acts whether concerted or in isolation.
415
 Similarly, the ICRC has 
questioned ‘whether these groups and networks can be characterized as party to any type of 
armed conflict, including transnational.’
416
 
Even though some situations are recognized as non-international armed conflicts or 
terrorist acts, at either end of the spectrum, in the centre is a growing number of cases of 
conflicts between the United States and its allies, and Al Qaeda and its associates in places 
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such as Yemen, Somalia, Syria etc. There is no geographical link between these countries and 
the United States, which raise the question of whether these types of conflicts can truly be 
‘non international.’ To answer this, many scholars including SandeshSivakumaran, however, 
argued that there is no difference in principle between this case and the review in (iv) above- 
whether the place of the conflict is a neighboring country or on the other side of the world 
from the State party to the conflict, they argued that what is important is the nature of the 
parties involved in the conflict and not the geographical location.
417
 
2.5.16 The Application of International Humanitarian Law in Transnational Armed Conflicts 
Based on the above critical analysis, and from the body of existing literatures on the subject 
of transnational armed conflicts, it can be argued that the available rules governing IHL can 
be administered to resolve the complex nature of this type of conflict. The basic reading of 
this form of conflict is that transnational conflicts can also be regarded as non-international 
armed conflicts. This is so because in international law, the territorial border is not much 
important factor as the identity of the parties involved in the conflict.
418
 Following this 
fundamental understanding, once the hostility does not involve State parties – or is between 
the armed forces of States, or between insurgent groups that have been proven to be under the 
effective control of a State, then such can be said to be a non-international armed conflict, 
especially when the intensity of such conflict measured up to armed conflict.
419
 
Yet, available literature also point to the fact that both types of conflicts (international 
and non-international) can take place at the same time in a parallel form. This follows that a 
state can intervene in civil war against the insurgent group in the territory of another state and 
                                                          
417
Supra, note 295 at 234; Michael Schmitt “Charting the Legal Geography of Non-International Armed 
Conflict” (2014) 90 International  Law Studies, 6; Supra, note 385 at 136 
418
Orna Ben-Naftali and Keren Michaeli, Public Committee against Torture in Israel v. Government of Israel” 
(2007) 101 American Journal of International Law, 463 
419
See generally the 2016 ICRC Commentary,  paras: 402-5 
112 
 
such can still be regarded as non-international armed conflict.
420
 But when it intervenes 
against the forces of another state, or intervenes without the consent of the territorial state, it 
qualifies it as an international armed conflict.
421
 In a scenario where both factors explained 
above take place at the same time then both types of armed conflicts (international and non-
international) can be said to exist – parallel.”
422
 
Under the definitive framework of transnational armed conflicts, the consent of a 
given state regarding intervention is of less importance in the characterization of the conflict. 
However, consent is the most important factor in determining occupation. For instance, if a 
given state without seeking consent occupied and exercised authority over a section of 
another country, then such scenario automatically qualifies as international armed conflict 
even where there are no hostilities within the meaning of Common Article 2.
423
 There may be 
a situation where the intervening state may be said to be engaged in both international armed 
conflict (with the state in which it occupied its territory) and non-international armed conflict 
(with the insurgent groups of the state in which it intervenes).
424
 
However, it has become increasingly clear that basic rules of war as provided under 
customary international law are not too different whatever the classification of the 
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This has been made clear in Article 75 of the Additional Protocol I where the 
parties to any form of conflict are oblige to apply basic rules of humane treatment.
426
 
Following from the above view on the application of the rules of IHL to transnational 
armed conflict, a review of two case studies – Polisario Front and Boko Haram would help to 
explain the degree of practicability of this legal framework to our study.    
2.6 Case Studies 
As a means of juxtaposing the contemplated legal framework with reality, the following 
section will examine two contemporary conflicts where both transnational element and 
international are present. 
2.6.1 The Polisario Front 
Morocco has been occupying Western Sahara since 1975. Morocco is resisted by the Frente 
Popular para la Liberacion de Seguia el Hamra y de Rio de Oro (Polisario Front), a national 
liberation campaign birthed in 1973, and acknowledged as representing the people of 
Western Sahara by the UN in 1979.
427
In pursuit of self-determination for the people of 
Western Sahara, the Polisario Front set up the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) in 
1976.
428
 However, the issue of whether or not the SADR is a State as established by 
international law is still contentious.
429
 Morocco controls two-thirds of the area while the 
Polisario Front controls the rest of the area. In 1991, the UNSC under Resolution 690 set up 
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the United Nation Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara in order to monitor the 
post-conflict situation, including end to hostilities and cutback of military personnel on the 
territory, and to foster a freely-held referendum on the fate of the province.
430
 
2.6.2 Military Occupation of Western Sahara by Morocco 
Until when the process of colonial emancipation began in the 1960s, the Western Sahara 
province was a Spanish protectorate called the Spanish Sahara.
431
 After enlisting the province 
on the inventory of Non-Self Governing Territories under Chapter XI of the UN Charter, the 
UNGA have repeatedly affirmed in a number of resolutions
432
 that the people of Western 
Sahara have the right for self-determination in accordance with UNGA resolution 1514 
(XV).
433
 In November 1975, Spain, Morocco and Mauritania signed the Madrid Accords, 
outlining the eventual withdrawal of the Spanish colonial government from Spanish Sahara, 
as well as splitting the administration of the province between Morocco and Mauritania. 
However, the Madrid Accords could not handover sovereignty over the territory of Western 
Sahara to Morocco. This is because, as the ruling colonial authority, Spain itself does not 
enjoy sovereignty over the territory thus, could not have singlehandedly handover 
sovereignty to Morocco and Mauritania.
434
 
Supported by Algeria, the Polisario Front began what turned to be a 16-year 
revolutionary battlein opposition to the presence of Mauritanian and Moroccan soldiers. 
Following the withdrawal of Mauritania from the conflict in 1979, Morocco annexed the area 
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that was initially allocated to Mauritania.
435
 Soon after, in UNGA resolution 34/37, the UN 
lamented on the continued occupation of Western Sahara by Morocco; calling on Morocco to 
cease the occupation, and recommended to include the Polisaria Front- the representative of 
the people of Western Sahara in seeking a solution.
436
 In September 1991, a ceasefire 
agreement was signed between the government of Morocco and the Polisario Front, 
effectively ending the 16-year of active hostilities but the occupation continues.
437
 The 
conflict is now stalled, even though there is still underlying tension because both parties 
control different parts of the territory, with no foreseeable resolution. In February 2017, 
Morocco declared that it would pull out its forces from the United Nations buffer zone in 
order to reduce the military pressure in the region.
438
 
In 1991, the UNSC 690 created the United Nation Mission for the Referendum in 
Western Sahara to support the referendum on the fate of Western Sahara.
439
 Since then, the 
directive has been reiterated severally; the most recent is the 2018 Security Council 
Resolution 2440 which approves six months extension of MINURSO until April, 30
th
 2019, 
asking both parties to the conflict to engage in a meaningful dialogue during the scheduled 
discussion at the end of 2018 to figure out a fair, lasting and mutually agreeable solution that 
will envisage the possibility for the autonomy of the people of Western Sahara.
440
 For the 




 of December 2018, in accordance with UNSC 
Resolution 2440, an initial panel session was held between stakeholders from Morocco, 
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Algeria, Mauritania and the FrentePolisario, led by the Personal Envoy of the Secretary-
General for Western Sahara, Horst Kohler.
441
 Following the end of the initial session, the UN 
envoy indicated that more discussions are arranged for early 2019 and that it is expected that 
the outcome of the discussion(s) will be positive.
442
 
2.6.3 The Polisario Front’s Deposition to apply the Geneva Conventions and AP I 
In June 2015, the Polasario Front deposited a unilateral declaration under Article 96(3) AP I 
to the 1949 Geneva Conventions with the Swiss federal government. Pursuant to this 
declaration, Polisario Front has committed itself to apply the Geneva Conventions and 
Additional Protocol I in its war with Morocco. The Swiss federal government - the depository 
for the Geneva Conventions and its Additional Protocols, acknowledged the declaration and 
informed other state parties of the new development. This declaration can only be made by an 
authority on behalf of its people involved in a conflict covered by Article 1(4) Additional 
Protocol I. Its approval unquestioningly recognizes that the conflict situation between the 
Polisario Front and Morocco falls within the purview of Article 1(4) AP I, that is, an armed 
conflict in which peoples are fighting against colonial domination, alien occupation or racist 
regimes.   
2.6.4 Statehood of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic 
In February 1976, the PolisarioFront declared the formation of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic 
Republic (SADR). However, whereas the right to self-determination of the people of Western 
Sahara has been recognized,
443
 the statehood of the SADR remains a contentious issue. 
Anthony Pazzanita argued that a persuasive case for regarding SADR a State since it has 
substantially fulfilled each of the requirements set out in Article 1 of the 
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MontevedeoConvention on the Rights and Duties of States.
444
 The SADR has gained 
recognition from several countries however; some have either withdrawn or frozen 
recognition. General international law assesses whether an entity possesses statehood. It is 
still a debated issue of whether recognition is a criterion. Talmon noted that recognition by 
the international community could be decisive in some situations.
445
 The ICRC expressed that 
effectiveness also determines who represents the state. That is, the capacity to exercise state 
responsibilities both internal and external, such as administration of state institutions as well 
as control over a territory are used to evaluate the effectiveness of a government.
446
 Although 
the SADR does not have observer status with the United Nations, it became a member of the 
Organization of African Unity (OAU), at present the African Union, in 1984.
447
 Opposing the 
entry of SADR to the AU, Morocco withdrew from the organization on the 12 of November 
1984.
448
 However, in January 2017, after about 33 years of leaving the organization, Morocco 
got reinstated as a member of the African Union.
449
 However, the re-entry of Morocco to the 
AU does not affect the classification of the conflict.
450
 
2.6.5 The Position of Polisario and Morocco and the views of the International Community 
While Morocco is still insisting to have sovereign right over the territory of the region, the 
ICJ dismissed its claim stating that it does not have legal ties of territorial sovereignty on 
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 In particular, the United Nations General Assembly, the International 
Court of Justice and the European Court of Justice all recognized the right to self-
determination of the people of Western Sahara and the General Assembly characterized the 
situation as an occupation.
452
 
In view of this, the dispute regarding the legitimacy of Fisheries Agreement and 2013 
Protocol signed between the European Union and Morocco, the European Court of Justice’s 
Advocate General put forward an opinion in January 2018 that reiterates the right to self-
determination of the people of Western Sahara.
453
 Thus, according to the Advocate General, 
the Fisheries agreement is void because it infringes the right to self-determination of the 
people of Western Sahara and because the manner and way it was concluded does not 
conform with the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources or IHL applicable 




Consequently, Morocco being a party to the four 1949 Geneva Conventions and 
Additional Protocol 1, and the declaration of the Polisario Front under Article 96(3) to apply 
the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol I were accepted by the Swiss Federal 
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2.6.6 The Boko Haram Armed Group 
The present leader of Boko Haram is AbubakarShekau. He became the leader of the group 
after the death of its founding leader, Mohammed Yusuf, in July 2009.
456
 In June 2011, the 
Nigerian government established a Joint Task Force (JTF) with a clear mandate to ‘restore 
law and order’ in the north-eastern part of the country.
457
 With the civilians mostly affected 
by the conflict, vigilante groups started to emerge around 2013.
458
 Subsequently, the Nigerian 
government noticed their ability in terms of intelligence gathering and manpower and for this 
reason; the government employed their services and enlists them under the supervision of the 
Joint Task Force.
459
 Ever since, they became known as the Civilian Joint Task Force and 
have contributed greatly in the fight against Boko Haram.
460
 Attacks launched by the group 
continue to have devastating effects on civilians and constitute significant challenge for the 
Nigerian government. For example, in 2017, numerous Boko Haram suicide bombers have 
targeted market places, university of Maiduguri and other tertiary institutions, as well as 
internally displaced camps.
461
 Specifically, on 25 July 2017, Boko Haram attacked an oil 
exploration team from the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation in MagumeriBorno 
State, killing no less than 69 people and abducted at least 7 people.
462
 These series of attacks 
continued throughout 2018, targeting both civilians and the Nigerian security forces along 
with their counterparts from the MNJTF. While the Nigerian government expressed that it 
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has weaken the groups’ capacity and destroyed several of their camps, but the groups’ ability 
tolaunch attacks signals their strength.
463
 
Through 2019, the group has remained strong and unwavering, especially in Borno, 
Yobe and Adamawa states of north-eastern part of Nigeria. For instance, just prior to the 
February2019 presidential elections, there were about 73 attacks with almost 406 related 
casualties. In January 2019, the group attacked Rann village in Borno State which led to 
damaging all civilian buildings, killing about 60 people who attempted to escape and as a 
result, over 30,000 people were displaced.
464
 In early 2020, hostilities between the security 
forces and the Boko Haram armed group have significantly intensified in the northeast.  
To effectively destroy or at least weaken the Boko Haram armed group, the Nigerian 
government has procured many strong military hardware to fight the group. For instance, in 
July 2017, the Nigerian government procured $593 million worth of combat equipment from 
the United States, including Super Tucano A-29 surveillance and assault planes.
465
 In April 
2018, the Nigerian President, Muhammadu Buhari approved the procurement of $ 1 billion 
worth of arms in order to fight the Boko Haram armed group.
466
 Meanwhile, Boko Haram’s 
military assets and arsenal includes improvised explosive devices, AK47s, grenades, mortars, 
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Hilux trucks and petrol bombs.
467
 In addition, it is alleged that Boko Haram also operates 
with rocket-propelled grenades and also have the capacity to manufacture weapons.
468
 
The intensity of the hostilities is further indicated by the number of fatalities and 
displaced persons. Since the conflicted started in 2009, Boko Haram alone is accountable for 
the death of more than 30,000 lives.
469
 The Council on Foreign Relations indicated an 
aggregate of 37.530 deaths linked to Boko Haram in Nigeria between May 2011 and July 
2020.
470
 Amnesty International has also reported that thousands of women and girls have 
been abducted by the group and about 2.5 million people are internally displaced and about 
244,000 people are taking refuge in neighboring countries of Chad, Cameroon and Niger; 
more than 7.1 million people are in dire need of humanitarian assistance in Borno, Yobe and 
Adamawa states of north-eastern part of Nigeria.
471
 
Over the past years, Boko Haram was able to gain control of substantial amount of 
territory in northeastern region of Nigeria. AbubakarShekau declared the area as his caliphate 
and from this base he launches attacks against his targets in Nigeria and in neighboring 
States. Even though the group has sustained significant losses in terms of manpower, as of 
July 2020, the group is still in control of substantial portion of Nigerian territory, particularly 
the areas surrounding the Sambisa forest, the Mandara Mountains and the Islands of Lake 
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 Since 2014, Boko Haram has remarkably retained the capacity and ability to engage 
in devastating attacks and has maintained a consistent level of activity since then.  
2.6.7 The Al-Ansar Splinter Group 
As discussed in chapter 1, Boko Haram was founded by Mohammed Yusuf who was the 
leader of the group until he was killed in July 2009 by the Nigerian police. In July 2010, 
AbubakarShekau became the new leader of the group and was responsible for launching 
attacks on worship places, security forces, and schools as well as using young children as 
suicide bombers.
473
 In January 2012, a faction known as Al Ansar (The Vanguard for the 
protection of Muslims in Black Africa) seceded from Boko Haram over dispute of 
indiscriminate attacks of Muslims by Shekau.
474
 The faction’s leader, Khalid al Barnawi was 
reportedly trained with Al Qaeda’s regional group, AQIM.
475
 The splinter group which 
operates in northern Nigeria, declared itself as a ‘humane’ alternative to Boko Haram and that 
it would only focus on targeting the Nigerian government and Christians in “self-defense.”
476
 
In November 2012, the group attacked police station in Abuja, killed police officers and freed 
some detained terrorists from the police cell. The group was also involved in several 
kidnapping activities especially foreign nationals. The group has reportedly kidnapped a 
French engineer in late 2012 and in early 2013; the group has again reportedly kidnapped and 
killed about seven foreign contractors.
477
 
However, security experts have stated that the two groups have remained 
operationally connected with each other. Jacob Zenn, a security analyst has maintained that 
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the Ansaru group acts as an ‘external unit’ of Boko Haram.
478
 While David Otto, another 
analyst, also noted that the two groups work together “towards a common goal.”
479
 In April 
2016, Khalid al Barnawi was allegedly arrested by the Nigerian government and charged him 
with the abduction and murder of ten foreigners. Although the Ansaru faction purports to 
identify itself with Boko Haram’s campaign objectives, it has however, blamed and 
condemned the group for targeting Muslims. At the time of writing this thesis, the leadership 
structure of the group remains unclear and the intensity of their activities is not sufficient 
enough to conclude with certainty that there is an ‘armed conflict between the Ansaru and 
Nigerian government. Also, the exact number of its members is still unknown and it is not in 
control of any part of Nigeria’s territory. Therefore, without any credible information, it is 
impossible to unequivocally conclude that the Ansaru faction meets the required intensity of 
protracted violence, organization, as well as territorial control as set out in Common Article 3 
and Additional Protocol II of the 1949 Geneva Conventions.   
2.6.8 The Islamic State of West Africa Province “ISWAP” 
In March 2015, the leader of Boko Haram AbubakarShekau pledged his allegiance to the 
Islamic State ‘ISIS’ and thereafter renamed its group to ‘Islamic State in West Africa 
Province “ISWAP.” In August 2016, about a year and half later, ISIS recognized Abu Musab 
al Barnawi as the new leader of the group. AbubakarShekau quickly denied the change in 
leadership and referred to ISIS’s decision as a coup against him. According to U.S Marine Lt. 
General Thomas Waldhauser, ISIS replaced Shekau because he refused to obey ISIS’s orders 
to stop targeting Muslims, and not to use children as suicide bombers.
480
 This led the group to 
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split into warring factions: one loyal to AbubakarShekau, and the other to the ISIS appointed 
leader Abu Musab al Barnawi. The group led by AbubakarShekau retained the name Boko 
Haram, whereas, the faction led by the ISIS appointed leader Abu Musab al Barnawi retained 
the name ISWAP.
481
 According to some reports, the two factions have clashed in the 
following months. However, these events of clashes between the two groups have remained 




 It has been reported that between 2018 and 2019, internal dispute in the ISWAP 
faction led to the change in leadership: MammanNur, a ranking member of the faction was 
reportedly executed because he was found to be too lenient, and Abu Musab was overthrown 
and Abu Abdallah allegedly became the new leader of the ISWAP group.
483
 The group is 
reported to have been settling among the civilian population in the surrounding villages of the 
Lake Chad islands. Their close relationship with the villagers was crucial for them to buy 
food and medicine as well as carry out its businesses of selling charcoal, fish, hides, and 
cattle. The group might have succeeded in gaining the trust of the civilian population may be 
due to its tactics, different from that of Boko Haram. While the latter attacks civilians, 
ISWAP focuses mainly on military objectives and only targets civilians suspected to be 
informers to the government.
484
 But at present, there is no report or information that the 
group is exercising any territorial control in Nigeria.  
 Initially, ISWAP restricted its activities around the shores of Lake Chad but of recent, 
the group has started extending its range. In particular, on 23 February 2019, the group 
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launched its first assault in Maiduguri, the capital city of Borno state. Thereafter, on 12 
January 2020, the group engaged with the Nigerian forces in the Lake Chad area, killing 
about 4 ISWAP members.
485
 However, at the time of writing this thesis, aside from the 
isolated and sporadic attacks demonstrated above, there is no concrete and credible evidence 
which suggest that the degree of intensity of the violence is high and protracted to conclude 
that there is a non-international armed conflict between Nigeria and ISWAP; however, it is 
worth mentioning this development and to continue monitoring the evolution of the situation.    
2.6.9 International Interventions in the Boko Haram Armed Conflict 
Since January 2015, the Multinational Joint Task Force has been assisting Nigeria in the 
battle against Boko Haram. The task force involves squads from five neighboring countries, 
including Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon, Niger and Benin.
486
 The task force operates under the 
authorized African Union Security Council’s mandate with the sole objective of eradicating 
Boko Haram, and the action is also supported by the United Nations Security Council. 
In 2018, the Multinational Joint Task Force successfully rescued about 1,000 Boko 
Haram abductees, mostly women and children, along with some number of men that were 
forcefully recruited by Boko Haram.
487
 However, because the Multinational Joint Task Force 
has intervened in Nigeria with the consent of the Nigerian Government, its intervention does 
not affect the classification of the conflict under international humanitarian law.     
In conclusion, it is indisputable that there exists a protracted armed violence between 
the Nigerian armed forces and the Boko Haram armed group on the territory of Nigeria. The 
ability of the group to plan and execute sustained military operation under Abu Shekau has 
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demonstrated that the group has satisfied the test of organisation. The group also exercises 
control of territory significant part of Nigerian territory in the north-eastern region of the 
country. As noted above, the Ansaru group has aligned with Boko Haram group while there 
has been disagreement between Boko Haram and ISWAP armed group, the conflict is rather 
sporadic and isolated to suggest that there is non-international armed conflict between the 
two groups. Again, the hostility between ISWAP and Nigeria is not high and protracted to 
simply conclude that there is internal armed conflict between the group and Nigeria. The 
groups’ structure is unknown and there is no credible evidence which suggest that the group 
is in control of territory – they settle around the Lake Chad region of Borno State and not in 
control. In addition, the character of the conflict does not change because of crossing 
borders.
488
 Similarly, reading through the systematically reviewed legal framework on 
classification of armed conflicts above, suggests that the law of non-international armed 
conflict apply to the conflict between Boko Haram and Nigeria because Nigeria does not 
have effective control over Boko Haram, it is not a State organ and does not belong to any of 
the multi-national forces. Except where any one of the States comprising the multi-national 
joint task force exercises control over the territory of, or any portion of the countries 
involved, then technically, the existing non-international armed conflict will metamorphosed 
to international armed conflict between such country and the occupied State.
489
 But this 
happens only in the absence of consent of the State on whose territory military offensives are 
carried out.  
Having investigated the notion of non-international armed conflict, below we will 
consider the substantive law that regulate the conduct of such conflict, including the 
applicable scope of that law. 
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2.7 Scope of Application of IHL Rules in an Internal Armed Conflict 
Before reviewing the fundamental rules of an armed conflict, it is important to determine the 
circumstances in which the rules apply. This section largely seeks to demonstrate on the 
situation of armed conflict established as non-international armed conflict, an issue that was 
reviewed above. Further to the existence of non-international armed conflict, other crucial 
issues have to be reviewed, namely; the geographical and temporal application of the rules. In 
essence, there is a need to establish to whom the law applies, both the persons that enjoy its 
protection and those who are bound by it, the geographical extent of the law, in addition to its 
temporal limitations. 
2.7.1 Geographical Application of International Humanitarian Law of Non-International 
Armed Conflict 
 
The first question that stems from the scope of application of the law of non-international 
armed conflict deals with the geographical boundaries within which the law applies. 
Common Article 3 provides, ‘in the case of armed conflict not of an international character 
occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting parties, each Party to the conflict 
shall be bound to apply as minimum, the following provisions.’ Reference to the territory of a 
High Contracting Party is also made in the scope of application clause of Additional Protocol 
II.
490
 In this regard, Stewart noted it is possible that these referrals suggest that the relevant 
provisions apply in the whole territory of the state engaged in the conflict.
491
 Similarly, the 
Appeals Chamber of the Criminal Tribunal of the former Yugoslavia in the TadicDecision on 
Interlocutory Appeal holds that ‘international humanitarian law continues to apply in … the 
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whole territory under the control of a party, whether or not actual combat takes place there. 
492
 
However, it appears highly unlikely that international humanitarian law should at all 
times apply in the territory of the state in which the conflict takes place. This is because, an 
armed conflict that is restricted to a limited portion of a large country such as the case in 
Nigeria, should not make international humanitarian law applicable across the whole country. 
In this regard, it was expressed in the 1972 Conference of Government Experts that it was 
‘inconceivable that, in the case of a disturbance in one specific part of a State, whole territory 
of the State should be subjected to the application of the Protocol.’
493
 Certainly, in some non-
international armed conflicts, it could be entirely right for international humanitarian law to 
apply in the entire state if the conflict roars across the country. However, this will be different 
if the conflict is restricted to territorially enclosed region.
494
 For example, the armed conflict 
between Nigeria and Boko Haram is limited to the North-Eastern region of the country.  
It is important to understand that the geographical focus would require a specific link 
between the conduct as an issue and the applicable law. The wording of Additional Protocol 
II has noted such nexus: the ‘Protocol shall be applied… to all persons affected by an armed 
conflict.’
495
 Also, the ICRC Commentary clarified by noting that the applicability of the 
Protocol follows from a criteria linked to individuals, and not places,’
496
 and takes into 
account the criticism made at the 1972 Conference of Government Experts relating to 
violence in a small part of a state’s territory.
497
 
                                                          
492
Prosecutor v. Tadic, IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on the Defense Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on 
Jurisdiction, 2 October, 1995, Para 70 
493
 Conference of Government Experts on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian 
Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, volume 1 (1972) 68 Para 2.59 
494
 Gabor Rona “Interesting Times for International Humanitarian Law: Challenges from the on Terror” (2005) 
17(1) Journal of Terrorism and Political Violence, 157 
495
 Article 2(1) Additional Protocol II  
496
Sandoz Y, Swinarski C and Zmmermann B Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the 
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 (ICRC, 1987) Para 1360 
497




This view was noted under Article 5 of Additional Protocol II where it states that the 
international humanitarian law rules on ‘persons whose liberty has been restricted’ apply only 
to those deprived of their liberty ‘for reasons related to the armed conflict.’ Similarly, the 
provision on panel prosecution also applies to criminal acts ‘related to the armed conflict.’
498
 
This also applies to the displacement of the civilian population, which ‘shall not be ordered 
for reasons related to the conflict.
499
 So long as relief civil societies are concerned, they may 
provide their services ‘in relation to the victims of the armed conflict.’
500
 On its part, the 
Kayishema Trial Judgment provides that: “Violations of these international instruments 
(common Article 3 and Protocol II) could be committed outside the theatre of combat. For 
example, the captured members of the RPF (Rwandan Patriotic Front) may be brought to any 
location within the territory of Rwanda and could be under the control or in the hands of 
persons who are not members of the armed forces. Therefore, every crime should be 




In summary, the scope of application of the rules outside the main combat region will 
have to be determined on a case by case basis which would be more difficult in its application 
on the ground. However, it is argued that the nexus based approach to the application of the 
law surpass the difficulty faced in the implementation. Location will remain to be an essential 
factor, however, and it may affect the substance of a rule.
502
 
2.7.2 Temporal Scope of Application of the Rules 
The second question that is likely to arise relates to the temporal scope of application of the 
rule of non-international armed conflict. That law changes the applicable law of peace time 
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once there is an outbreak of non-international armed conflict.
503
 When the law should cease 
to apply is somewhat more complicated. The conventional rules again did not provide any 
guidance on this issue. 
However, the ICRC Commentary on Additional Protocol II states that the law will no 
longer be applicable ‘after the end of hostilities.’
504
 It is not very clear whether this is 
referring to the cessation of active hostilities, customarily by means of a cease fire agreement 
or the total close of hostilities, generally through a peace agreement. The ICRC 
recommended to the 1972 Conference of Government Experts that the draft Additional 
Protocol ‘shall cease to apply at the end of hostilities, that is when a general cease fire is 
declared;’ but, a similar recommendation made for the application of international 
humanitarian law to ‘cease to apply following a general cessation of military operations’ at 
the 1974-7 Diplomatic Conference was not adopted.
505
 Considering that several ceasefire 
agreements specially provide for the continued enforcement of international humanitarian 
law,
506
 in reality, the law of non-international armed conflict continues to apply even after the 
cessation of active hostilities. 
 Accordingly, the functions of some specific aspects of IHL after the end of active 
hostilities uphold this conclusion.
507
 Otherwise, the application of IHL would cease to apply 
following the total shutdown of hostilities, in that case, a peaceful relation returns between 
the parties. This is normally done through peace agreement. For this reason, the 
TadicAppeals Chamber noted that the “law extends beyond the cessation of hostilities until… 
a peaceful settlement is achieved.
508
 Marco also expressed that the enforcement of 
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international humanitarian law rules of non-international armed conflict would terminate 
following a full military victory by either of the parties to the conflict.
509
 
The essential principle is that the cessation of armed conflict simultaneously ends the 
application of those aspects of IHL that regulates conduct of non-international armed conflict. 
While the end of an armed conflict should not be treated lightly, with military activities 
having to end with stability, any analysis of the presumably honest question of whether an 
international or non-international armed conflict have actually ended will at least to a degree 
be determined by the international community and the implications of any finding regarding 
termination. Likewise, these rules may be simple to state, they can be very complex to apply 
in practice, and that, at least, unavoidable.  
2.7.3 Protection of Civilians and Persons Hors de Combat in Internal Armed Conflicts 
Here, we focus on the rules concerning the protection of civilians and persons hors de combat 
in internal armed conflicts. Application of these rules has since been established and 
acknowledged in history, and was listed in the instructions of General Dufour published 
during the Swiss civil war in 1847, and are to be provided in the Tratado de Regularizacion of 
1820 completed during the Colombian war of independence.
510
 These rules were similarly 
listed in the first methodical regulation of internal armed conflict, specifically Common 
Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions.  Presently, there are many rules that relate to the 
treatment of civilians during armed conflict but, this study will concentrate on the principle of 
humane treatment and certain rules arising from it. 
2.7.4 The Principle of Humane Treatment 
The principle of humane treatment is the essential principle that guides IHL concerning the 
treatment of persons in the hands of an enemy party, whether such persons are civilians or 
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hors de combat. The provision of Common Article 3 states that persons who do not take 
active part in hostilities ‘shall in all circumstances be treated humanely.’
511
 Accordingly, 
Additional Protocol II sets out an entire part on ‘humane treatment,’ outlining essential 
assurances concerning such persons.
512
 Additionally, the principle is also recognized as a 
norm of customary international law.
513
 The requirement to treat persons humanely has also 
been expressed in ad hoc, ceasefire, and peace agreements.
514
 
Comprehensive exposition of the principle of humane treatment had been criticized as 
‘pointless’ for want of being self-evident and ‘dangerous’ for the concern of enforcing 
unexpected limitations.
515
 However, David Elder expressed that lack of exposition may result 
to affording excessive freedom to the parties to the conflict.
516
 In view of that, a cordial 
middle ground that would guide the parties to the conflict is paramount while not unduly 
restricting the scope of the principle. 
2.7.5 Violence to Life and Person 
Violence to life and person against individuals in the custody of an adverse party is 
prohibited both in conventional and customary international humanitarian law.
517
 Similarly, 
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conducts such as cruel treatment, mutilation, murder, torture, scientific experimentation, and 
corporal punishment are also proscribed.
518
 Generally, the fundamental protection under this 
principle is that of physical integrity. This was noted by the UN General Assembly 
Resolution 2675 (XXV) where it submitted that ‘civilian populations, or individual members 
thereof, should not be the object of… assault on their integrity.’
519
 This applies to both the 
physical and emotional well-being of the individual concern.
520
 Scholars in the field of 
humanitarian law were careful not to go into too much into specifics - taking into 
consideration that ‘the more specific and thorough a list tries to be, the more restrictive it 
becomes.’
521
 In view of this, even though the language of ‘violence to life and person’ is 
perhaps not adequately clear for international criminal law purposes, thus, the VasiljevicTrial 
Chamber acquitted the defendant on that charge,
522
 its manner of open ended nature is 
important for the law of armed conflict. 
2.7.6 Outrages upon Personal Dignity 
Outrages upon personal dignity are also proscribed in both conventional and customary 
international law.
523
  In this regard, the Aleksovski Appeal Chamber stated that outrages upon 
personal dignity are primarily part of the broader prohibition on inhumane treatment.
524
 The 
Trial Chamber in Furundzjia case observed that the proscription is ‘intended to protect 
persons from outrages upon their personal dignity, whether such outrages are conducted by 
illegally attacking the body or by humiliating and demeaning the honour, the self-respect or 
the mental health of an individual.’
525
 In spite of the suggestion of the ICTY, the proscription 
on inhumane treatment and the proscription on outrages upon personal dignity are of different 
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types. While inhumane treatment circles around notions of integrity of the body and mind, 
outrages upon personal dignity relate to notions of protection from ‘public curiosity.’
526
 
Similarly, the offence of rape and enforced prostitution are also considered as 
outrages upon personal dignity. They are likewise connected with, and often described as, 
humiliating and degrading treatment. Thus, Common Article 3 proscribes ‘outrages upon 
personal dignity, especially, degrading and humiliating treatment.’ The ICTY Trial Chamber 
in Kunarac case defined acts or omissions that cause humiliating, degradation, or attacks on 
human dignity.
527
 Likewise, the Aleksovski Trial Chamber also noted that the acts or omission 
does not necessarily need to result in actual harm; rather, it is sufficient that they cause 
pain.
528
 The prohibition is assessed both objectively and subjectively by the courts. 
Objectively, the Kunarac Trial Chamber noted that the act should cause humiliation, 
degradation, or an attack on human dignity,
529
 and will be determined by factors such as the 
“form, severity and duration of the violence and the intensity and duration of the physical or 
mental pain.’
530
 Subjectively, a person’s ‘temperament or sensitivity’ should be included
531
 as 
well as the ‘cultural background’ of the victim.
532
 In the Kunarac case, the Trial Chamber 
noted that ‘there is no least temporal requirement;’ the humiliation must be more than 
‘fleeing’ yet must not be ‘lasting.’
533
 Further, for the reasons of criminalizing the crime of 
committing outrages upon personal dignity, the humiliation must be grave.
534
 
2.7.7 Sexual Violence 
Rape, enforced prostitution, indecent assault, and threats thereof are all proscribed in Article 
4(2) (e) and (h) Additional Protocol II. These prohibitions are now regarded as rules of 
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customary international humanitarian law.
535
 Even though it is listed under the category of 
outrages upon personal dignity, as noted above, the proscription is a subset in itself under the 
wider category of humane treatment. This is now recognized, with the Rome Statute citing 
rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, and other 
forms of sexual violence as war crimes independent of each other, instead of being a sub 
category of the proscription on outrages upon personal dignity.
536
 
2.7.8 Fundamental Principles Regulating the Conduct of Hostilities in Internal Armed 
Conflicts 
 
The question of whether international law governs the conduct of hostilities in internal 
international armed conflicts has been a subject of debate among international law scholars. 
Antonio Cassese, a distinguished scholar of international law sought to interpret the 
provisions concerning conduct of hostilities from the protection provided by Common Article 
3.
537
 Likewise, certain judicial pronouncements and consequential authorities have taken a 
similar opinion.
538
 This emanates at least, partly, from the perception maintained by some 
that the provisions concerning the conduct of hostilities forms part of the requirement of 
humane treatment. For instance, in 1949 during the Diplomatic Conference, the USSR 
offered a suggestion based on the principle of inhumane treatment that the principle should be 
reviewed to include ‘measures such as ‘the prohibition on’ the destruction of property not to 
be rendered crucial by military operations.’
539
 However, other scholars offered a different 
opinion, arguing that Common Article 3 does not include provisions on conduct of 
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 This approach was endorsed by some courts and consequential institutions. In 
the same vein, objections emerged with regards to Additional Protocol II, with some agreeing 
with the analysis that the legislation regulates the conduct of hostilities,
541
 while others 
expressed different opinion.
542
 This reflects the different opinions that were voiced at the 
1974-1977 Diplomatic Conference, with some countries sceptical about whether ‘combat 
rules’… were suitable in a Protocol to be applied specifically within the territory of a single 
State.
543
 However, it has been argued that Additional Protocol II contains provisions on the 
conduct of hostilities, and that other conventional legislations that govern the conduct of 
hostilities were broadened to include non-international armed conflicts within their scope of 
application.
544
 In fact, with regards to the provisions governing the conduct of hostilities, 
some argued that it is really irrelevant to differentiate between international and non-
international armed conflicts in this respect.
545
 The fundamental aim of international 
humanitarian law is to strike a balance between military objectives and unnecessary infliction 
of harm to civilians and their objects during military confrontation.
546
 
The asymmetric nature of contemporary conflict particularly the Boko Haram 
conflict, has no doubt led to many issues as it relates to the application of IHL rules.
547
The 
Boko Haram armed group had presented itself as a group which strives to wage war against 
“adulterated Muslims,” and the state of Nigeria to create a “pure” Islamic state to be 
governed by “Sharia law.” The group pursues these objectives by bombing religious place of 
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worships without discrimination between Christians and Muslims as well as between military 
and non-military objectives.
548
 Acts ranging from kidnapping, sexual violence, starvation 




Below we will discuss some of the fundamental principles on the conduct of 
hostilities, starting with a review of distinction, then the principles of proportionality and 
precaution in that order.        
2.7.9 The Principle of Distinction 
The basic principle that regulates the conduct of hostilities is distinction: ‘the parties to the 
conflict shall at all times distinguish between the civilian population and combatants and 
between civilian objects and military objectives.’
550
 This is widely embraced as one of the 
fundamental principle of international humanitarian law.
551
 As a result, ‘the civilian 
population and individual civilians shall enjoy general protection against the dangers arising 
from military operations.’
552
 In fact, protecting the civilian population during hostilities, 




The tenet of universal protection is confirmed in several ad hoc undertakings. For 
instance, the agreement between the Government of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic 
Liberation Front (MILF) stated that ‘the parties reconfirm their obligations under 
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humanitarian law and human rights law to take constant care to protect the civilian population 
and civilian properties against the dangers accruing in armed conflicts circumstances.’
554
 
Similarly, the 2002 agreement between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s 
Liberation Movement (SPLM) noted that the ‘parties reconfirm their obligations under 
international law, including Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, to take 
constant care to protect the population, civilians and civilian objects against the dangers 
arising from military operations.’
555
 In the same vein, the Chief of the National Liberation 
Army (NLA) who was involved in the former Yugoslavia Republic of Macedonia, 
summarized: ‘I reminded the brigade commanders of their duty to respect civilians and their 
property. I reiterated that the war is between uninformed sides, and that civilians are not part 
of this war. These directives were included into service regulations and were notified both 
orally and in writing.’
556
 The wording of these agreements and affirmations suggests that the 
parties were basically reconfirming a prior obligation instead of developing a new obligation 
through the agreements and affirmation. In light of the Boko Haram armed conflict, Amnesty 
International reported allegations of extra judicial killing of civilians by the Nigerian Armed 
forces in 2014 and 2015.
557
 It is important to state that by Section 4 items 161 (a-d) of the 
Traditions, Customs and Ethics of the Nigerian Army, 2005, the Nigerian armed forces are 
clearly, and in strong terms, prohibited from carrying out attacks against non-military targets, 
all civilian persons and objects, and objects which do not form part of the mission. It further 
emphasized that the army must in combat operations, attack military targets only, spare 
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civilian persons and objects, and restrict destruction to what the mission requires.
558
 In further 
asserting the rule of distinction, it states that where civilian enemies fall into the hands of the 
armed forces, they must be respected, treated with humane, protected against ill treatment, 
vengeance and taking of hostage, civilian properties must be respected and not in any way 
damaged, and they must not be compelled to give information.
559
 
Drawing from this fundamental principle of universal protection, some concrete 
provisions can be discerned. Hence, Additional Protocol II stated that ‘the civilian population 
and individual civilians shall enjoy general protection against the dangers arising from 
military operations. To give effect to this protection, the following rules shall be observed in 
all circumstances.’
560
 Principally, the civilian population and individual civilians shall not be 
made object of attack. Again, indiscriminate attacks are proscribed. These provisions show 
the two main risks encountered by civilians during hostilities.
561
 There are provisions on 
evading or minimizing incidental losses, and on taking precautions. Notwithstanding the 
proscription and the protections, civilians may still face challenges arising from the military 
confrontations. The existence of losses of life, damage to civilian objects, and the enormous 
difficulties does not in and of itself suggest that the rule has been violated.     
2.7.10 The Principle of Proportionality 
Even where a target is legitimate and the attack is discriminate, such an attack may not 
necessarily be lawful. An evaluation of the circumstances has to be made to know whether 
the strike ‘may be anticipated to cause incidental loss of life, injury to civilians, destruction of 
civilian properties or both, which would be extreme in proportion to the expected military 
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As such, combatants and military commanders are refrained from arranging and 
executing indiscriminate attacks.   
Even though the principle is not reflected in Additional Protocol, it is however, 
reflected in other conventions that are applicable in internal armed conflicts.
563
  The rule is 
recognized as one of the universal principles applicable across all conflicts,
564
 and it likewise 
forms part of the principle of distinction or at the very least, its purpose.
565
 Therefore, in spite 
of the conflicting statements, its exclusion from major texts cannot be construed to mean its 
inapplicability to internal armed conflicts.
566
 Without doubt, there is much approval for the 
application of the provision to internal armed conflict, and it is deemed a norm of customary 
international law.
567
 For instance, while giving remarks on the last phase of the Sri Lankan 
conflict in 2009, the United States noted that ‘the customary rules of armed conflict also 
require all parties to a conflict to adhere with the principles of distinction and proportionality 
during military confrontation.
568
 Similarly, in 1988, the FMLN of El Salvador declared that it 
had ‘suspended some actions because of having anticipated that they may destroy civilian 




However, the principle of proportionality has been criticized by some scholars. 
Kristen Dorman criticized the principle for equating two things that has no standard of 
comparison.
570
 Also, Duff criticized the rule for neglecting the ‘notion of bringing a 
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preponderance of authority to carry on a military target.
571
 Be that as it may, Dinstein 
expressed that there is actually no serious substitute.
572
  In what way, thus, is the principle to 
be applied?  
First, the tangible and direct military advantage expected from the attack must be 
evaluated. As maintained by most states, the military advantage here is concerned with the 
expected advantage from the attack in general and not from isolated parts thereof.
573
 In 
addition, the notion of ‘advantage’ should be considered with its ordinary meaning and 
should not be restricted to doctrines such as ‘ground gained’ doctrines that are not always 
applicable in internal armed conflicts.
574
 Thus, the military advantage is of the type that is 
expected; the one whose actual results could serve as a guide to that which was expected, but 
cannot be anything other than a guide. 
Second, it must be reviewed whether the attack will lead to loss of civilian life, injury 
to civilian population, destruction of civilian properties or a combined effect of all. 
Customarily restricted to the proximate effects of an attack, it is now agreed that sustained 
period effects have to be considered, such as deaths arising from the consequences of the 
destruction of civilian property.
575
 Actually, after the 1990-1 Gulf war, it is no longer 
reasonable to assert that effects arising from destruction of civilian property are not quite 
predictable.
576
 That the scope of this indirect harm could depend on the victim party is 
insignificant, because the issue is the harm and damage expected and not the actual outcome. 
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 When the two opposing criteria have been determined, the test is whether or not the 
anticipated harm would be ‘excessive’ against the military advantage expected.  
The principle of proportionality does not consider unlawful, any accidental damage 
arising from an otherwise lawful attack. Thus, heavy losses to the civilian population or 
substantial destruction of civilian objects do not necessarily render an attack illegal. All else 
is on whether an attack is excessive. Therefore, excessive has been depicted as meaning 
‘severe’ or ‘extensive.’
578
 However, each of these depictions alters the equilibrium inherent in 
the test. In this regard, James Kilcup explained that effects from an attack can be severe or 
extensive without being excessive, because excessive is a relative concept while extensive is 
definite.
579





 and no proportionality at all
582
 should likewise 
be bypassed for want of increasing the required limit. Accordingly, the commitment in the 
2009 Agreement on the Civilian Protection Component of the International Monitoring Team 
between the Government of the Philippines and the MILF to ‘avoid acts that would cause 
adverse effect to civilians’ goes beyond current standards, because it would prohibit any 
consequential damage either excessive or not.
583
 The notion of ‘excessive’ is such that any 
interpretation, even that which is intended to clarify the test, may have the effect of distorting 
instead of clarifying the meaning.      
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2.7.11 Precautions in Preparing and Launching Attacks 
Neither Additional Protocol II nor the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court has 
set-out rules on precautions. However, the omission does not suggest that the obligation to 
take proper and necessary precautions is not applicable to internal armed conflicts. This is 
because according to the Galic case, it applies through the rules of distinction and 
proportionality.
584
 Therefore, regulations on precaution may be inferred from the provisions 
on the protection of civilian population, and from the proscription of targeting civilians. It is 
also derived from the principle that ‘the civilian population and individual civilians shall 
enjoy the general protection from the dangers of hostilities.
585
 In addition, provisions on 
precautions are also located in relevant conventions applicable in internal armed conflicts,
586
 
and in customary international law.
587
 For instance, the United States has noted that under 
customary international law, parties in hostilities must take all feasible precautions, bearing in 




There is also a practical example on this by states and non-states armed groups 
involved in non-international armed conflicts. For example, in the course of the Spanish civil 
war, the United Kingdom expressed that ‘reasonable care must be taken in targeting… 
military objectives to ensure that no civilian population within the neighbourhood is 
carelessly bombed.
589
 Likewise, the League of Nations suggested that ‘any attack on 
legitimate target must be conducted in a manner that civilian population around the area are 
not negligently bombed.
590
 Similarly, in recent years, the 2009 Code of Conduct of the 
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Taliban of Afghanistan incorporated a declaration that ‘the Provincial and Local authorities, 
Group leaders and all other Mujahideen should take maximum measures to avoid civilian 
deaths and casualties, and the loss of their vehicles and other objects.’
591
 In its Eid message 
2011, the Taliban announced that ‘the Mujahideen must take all appropriate measures to 
protect civilian lives and properties in accordance with their religious responsibility...’
592
 
However, Juergen noted that the Taliban continues to use improvised explosive devices, 
which the United Nations mission in Afghanistan observed concerning the Eid message, 
leads to a large percentage of civilian fatalities.
593
 In Nigeria, Boko Haram also utilizes 
improvised explosive devices (IEDs), as well as car bombs, and suicide bombers to attack 




Another factor to consider is the commitment to put in place precautionary measures 
which also are found in ad hoc arrangements reached between the warring parties. In a 2002 
mutual agreement reached between the Government of Sudan and the SPLM, the parties 
‘reiterated their responsibility under international law, as well as Common Article 3 of the 
Geneva Conventions, to take constant care to protect civilian population and their properties 
against the dangers resulting from hostilities.’ This extends to taking every precautionary 
measure feasible to avoid incidental loss of civilian life, harm to civilians, as well as 
destruction of civilian properties.’
595
 
Accordingly, provisions of higher specificity have been deduced from the general rule 
that feasible precaution should be adopted. First, relevant actors must ‘do everything feasible 
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to confirm that the objectives to be targeted are military objectives.’
596
 Second, warring 
parties must do everything feasible to certify whether or not the attack is disproportionate.
597
 
These provisions were both derived from other regulations, specifically the proscription on 
attacks against civilian objects and the proscription on disproportionate attacks. In essence, 
they are of customary status.
598
 Consequently, in the framework of the United States war with 
Al Qaeda which organs of the US administration have considered it as non-international 
armed conflict, the legal Adviser to the State Department states that ‘great care is taken to 
stick to these rules of distinction and proportionality both in planning and execution, to 
ensure that only legitimate objects are attacked and that consequential damage is maintained 
to a bare minimum.’
599
 
Third, ‘an attack must be cancelled or deferred if it becomes clear that the target is not 
a legitimate objective or is covered by special protection, or if the anticipated harm to 
civilians as well as the anticipated damage to civilian properties would be excessive with 
regards to the anticipated direct military advantage.’
600
 This provision is derived from the two 
earlier principles of distinction and proportionality that prohibits attacks against civilians and 




Fourth, ‘when a rational choice between methods or means employed in an attack 
exits for achieving similar military advantage, the method or means anticipated to mitigate 
the harm to civilians and civilian properties must be selected.’
602
 Here, factors to be 
considered include considerations such as ‘timing of an attack’ as well as ‘the approach of the 
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 Thus, the capabilities of the warring parties have to be taken into account, because 
just like Boko Haram armed group, not all parties to armed conflicts are able to employ 
thorough evaluations. Fifth, ‘when a logical choice is obtainable between some military 
objectives for achieving similar military advantage, the objective anticipated to mitigate the 
harm to civilians and civilian properties must be selected.’
604
 These two rules are clear 
evidence of the principle on precaution, specifically minimizing civilian death and 
destruction of civilian properties. They too are of customary status.
605
 
Sixth, an ‘effective and prior notice must be given whenever circumstances permit.’
606
 
Here, circumstances are connected to ‘cases of assault, where surprise could be of the 
essence.’
607
 This, also, has reached customary status.
608
 The notice should, if the situation so 
permits, give sufficient time for the civilian population to take adequate and relevant 
measures, for instance, to move out of the area. The obligation to give prior notice has been a 
norm of internal armed conflict since the period of the Lieber Code.
609
 
2.8 Arbitrary Treatment of Civilians in the Boko Haram Conflict 
Since the beginning of the Boko Haram insurgency, millions of inhabitants of the North-
Eastern region of Nigeria that has served as the hotbed of the conflict have been forcefully 
displaced, argues Salleh et al.
610
 Observers have offered conflicting figures of the victims 
who are displaced forcefully. For example, while Maiangwa et al.,
611
 and Alobo and 
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 noted that over 4 million persons have been 
forcefully displaced as a result of the conflict. According to UNCHR, the displacement of 
innocent civilian populations has given rise to the worse humanitarian crisis in the history of 
Nigeria since the Civil War (1967-1970).
615
 There are two issues arising from this: first, the 
government did not take the precautionary steps before displacing the people. Second, they 
are being abused by the very people that are meant to protect them in the IDP camps. 
Furthermore, Nigeria’s security forces have reportedly engaged in arbitrary detention 
of civilian population under the guise of fighting insurgency.
616
 Usually, when security forces 
engage in this kind of unprofessional acts, its training processes requires close scrutiny, 
argues Solomon.
617
Weeraratne noted that the security forces in its desperate attempt to 
contain the group have instead ‘mounted aggressive pursuit and crackdown of civilian 
population.”
618
Agbiboa observed that the state has unleashed excessive force on innocent 
civilians, noting that such actions are not only counter-productive but abusive of the 
fundamental human rights of the citizens.
619
 While the above positions are true, the state has 
hurriedly enacted the Terrorism Prevention Act (2013) that legalised its arbitrary detention of 
mere suspects up to a period of 90 days in the first instance and another 90 days while 
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investigation continues. One may argue that such a law is against the principles of other 
international treaties which the country has entered into that recognised the personal liberty 
of citizens and their rights including right from arbitrary detention and mass arrest. 
2.8.1 Pre-judicial Killings 
The requirement of international humanitarian law to the effect that civilians not directly 
participating in the conflict should be protected by combatants have been violated by both 
sides to the conflict. For example, the insurgent group has taken responsibility for the 
numerous attacks on children, mothers and aged, an act that directly violates Article 4(3) of 
Additional Protocol II. According to Amnesty International, in 2015, it attacked 
Bagacommunity of Bornu State and massacred 2,000 civilians among whom are children and 
women.
620
 Beside the loss of lives, properties including shops, shelter, and schools etc. on 
which the community depends has not been spared. On its own, as reviewed above, the 
destruction of the means of livelihood of non-participating civilian population by armed 
groups in non-international armed conflicts violates IHL rules. No doubt, these acts constitute 
egregious violations of international humanitarian law. 
While it is understandable that the group which has shown itself not to commit to IHL 
standards, and thus, continue to attack civilian populations and killing in thousands, it is 
rather unfortunate that the security forces which swore an oath to defend the population have 
also join in this barbaric which practice of killing armless civilians in the name of fight 
against Boko Haram. Apart from the numerous local and international media reports pointing 
to the abuse of privileges by the security forces, Amnesty International has on various 
occasions indicts the armed forces and police for human rights violations and IHL.
621
 
According to Ekwueme, in clear contravention of the “principles of distinction, 
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proportionality and military necessity, the armed forces has been reported to have bombed a 
village, killing civilians, used firearms where there was no imminent threat of death or 
serious injury.”
622
Among various cases of prejudicial executions were the unfortunate 
killings of 640 people behind the University of Maiduguri by the soldiers after the insurgent 
group attacked the Giwa Barracks.
623
 Such a practice when committed against helpless 
civilian populations is considered as War Crimes by the Statutes of the International Criminal 
Court as seen in the Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia. In response to numerous cases of 
these violations, the Office of the Prosecutor to the International Criminal Court has called 
upon the international community to treat the conflict within the understanding of non-
international armed conflict.
624
 The same report argued that since about 2013, crimes 
committed against the civilian population in the North-Eastern region of Nigeria should 
henceforth be treated within the scope of article 8(2) (c) and (e) of the statute.
625
 
While the different forms of violations analyzed above have attracted the attention of 
scholars, violations related to sexual violence have not receive equal attention. Even those 
who attempted to study sexual violence in relations to the armed conflict between the 
Nigerian state on the one hand and Boko Haram on the other hand did not go deep into the 
details as with other forms of violations. For example, Sverdlov contended that the case of 
sexual violence in the North Eastern part of Nigeria have not amounted to any serious form of 
violation akin to the cases in other parts of the world or in other conflicts.
626
 While it is 
arguable that sexual violence in North Eastern part of Nigeria cannot be compared to the case 
against the Yazidis in the Middle East where ISIL have committed all the three forms of 
                                                          
622
Ekwueme, Celestine "A Critical Evaluation of The Nature Of Boko Haram Armed Conflict In Nigeria: An 
International Criminal Law Perspective" (2016) 1 African Journal of Criminal Law and Jurisprudence, 148 
623
 Nigeria: No Justice for the 640 Men and Boys slain by Military following Giwa Barracks attacks, available 
at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2016/03/nigeria-no-justice-for-the-640-men-and-boys-slain-by-
military-following-giwa-barracks-attack-two-years-ago/ (Accessed May 2020) 
624
 ICC Report: Situation in Nigeria, available at: https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/PIDS/docs/SAS%20-
%20NGA%20-%20Public%20version%20Article%205%20Report%20-%2005%20August%202013.PDF 




Supra, note 237 at 334 
150 
 
violations associated to sexual violence (war crime, crime against humanity, and genocide), 
this conclusion that suggest the absence of serious sexual violations betrays the victims of 
Boko Haram armed conflict.  
2.8.2 Systematic abuse of Women and girls in Armed Conflicts 
Until recent times, the consequences of armed conflicts on women, girls and young children 
received very little attention. However, since the establishment of the International Criminal 
Tribunals for Rwanda and Yugoslavia, there has been a growing awareness and compassion 
in both public consciousness and legal and political elites, of the magnitude and need to 
address the rape of women and girls in armed conflicts. Commenting on the prevalence of 
rape during conflicts, Maj. Gen. Patrick Cammaert, former Commander of the UN 
Peacekeeping missions in Democratic Republic of Congo, expressed that ‘it is now more 
dangerous to be a woman than to be a soldier in modern conflict.’
627
 The rape of women and 
girls has been employed as an instrument of terror in hostilities since the beginning of wars. 
Catherine noted that it seems to go through about three principal phases: First, rape is a 
routine and expected reward to the conquerors. Secondly, rape takes place due to indiscipline 
of the military forces. Third, rape happens as a military method to weaken the opposition.
628
 
Rape has been used as a tool of war for centuries. In the systematic rape of Nanking in 
1937, Japanese forces massacred about 300,000 Chinese, and at least 20,000 women and girls 
were raped.
629
 In the Second World War, sexual humiliation and rape were routinely 
employed against the Jewish population. Rape occurred in prison camps, including brothels 
set up by the German forces.
630
 Similarly, Bosnian women were intentionally raped and 
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impregnated as a part of ethnic cleansing,
631
 and during the conflict for Bangladesh 
independence in 1971 from Pakistan, a staggering number of 200,000 women and girls are 
projected to have been raped.
632
 Some of these women and girls died as a result of gang rape, 
while others committed suicide. In the Rwandan genocide of 1994, rape was used in a 
widespread fashion,
633
 and rape has been utilized in the current conflicts in Darfur
634
 and the 
Congo
635
 since 2000. In the DRC, where the incidence of rape is portrayed as the worst in the 
world, with a single estimate putting the case of rapes in 2011 alone at 433,785.
636
 Although 
the ICTY described rape as a crime against humanity, and as result opposed the conventional 
understanding of rape as an inevitable consequences of war. Today, women’s’ bodies are 
becoming battlegrounds or territory to be conquered.
637
 In Nigeria, the Boko Haram armed 
group has kidnapped more than 4000 women, girls and young children in northeast Nigeria 
since 2009, and perpetrated myriad of physical and mental abuses against them.
638
 
While the various forms of violations in the Boko Haram armed conflict have 
attracted the attention of scholars, violations related to sexual violence have not receive equal 
attention. Even those who attempted to study sexual violence in relations to the armed 
conflict between the Nigerian state on the one hand and Boko Haram on the other hand did 
not go deep into the details as with other forms of violations. For example, Sverdlov 
contended that the case of sexual violence in the North Eastern part of Nigeria have not 
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amounted to any serious form of violation akin to the cases in other parts of the world or in 
other conflicts.
639
 While it is arguable that sexual violence in North Eastern part of Nigeria 
cannot be compared to the case against the Yazidis in the Middle East where ISIL have 
committed all the three forms of violations associated to sexual violence (war crime, crime 
against humanity, and genocide), this conclusion that suggest the absence of serious sexual 
violations betrays the victims of Boko Haram armed conflict.  
In addition, literatures on sexual violations in the North East were overtly one-sided. 









 among others. They treat the subject of rape and sexual violence squarely 
within the insurgent group. While the temptation to reduce the violation associated to sexual 
violence to the insurgent group can be high considering the various cases of kidnappings and 
all, scholars must not shy away from the various cases of violations associated with the 
security forces that are meant to protect the victims. It is the conviction of the researcher that 
a nuanced study is needed to fill in this huge gap in other to have a balanced understanding of 
the situation in a region that has attracted global attention for the wrong reason. It is within 
this angle that the usefulness of the present study can be ascertained. This and other forms of 
violations will be considered to ascertain the challenges that continue to inhibit the effective 
enforcement of international humanitarian law in Nigeria’s war against Boko Haram armed 
conflict.  
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2.9 Enforcement of IHL through the International Criminal Court and the Hybrid Tribunals 
The challenge of enforcing international humanitarian law, especially in Africa has largely 
been limited by multiple factors, of which weak states and less democratic political 
environments contributes to the question at hand. The continuous occurrence of conflicts has 
exposed a sizable percentage of its civilian population to gross violations such as genocide, 
inter-ethnic conflicts, war crimes, sexual violence, massive killings and the rest of all forms 
of abuse.
644
Although, Robin Gneiss argued that most of the heads of states or individuals who 
have been reported to have committed atrocities, are high level citizens who in most instances 
are close to the corridors of power.
645
 
In most cases, the domestic courts do not have the mechanism to withstand pressure 
from the political elite. This way, justice is presented to suit the case of the state or its friends. 
This explains why international or hybrid courts are better placed to dispense justice.
646
 
Moreover, atrocities committed against civilians constitute international crimes that can at 
best be treated in international courts.
647
 Even with this development, the international courts 
have not been effective in dispensing justice due to certain challenges beyond its power, such 
as lack of states cooperation in prosecuting offenders, or provide documentary evidence, and 
issues of sovereignty etc.
648
 Nonetheless, there are court decisions and ongoing cases that will 
be the focus of the following reviews. 
  According to Cassese, the creation of the United Nations International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda otherwise known as ICTR became eminent when it was clear that the 
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international system could no longer control the egregious violations of IHL.
649
 However, the 
legality or even legitimacy of the tribunal soon became a source of worry as many questioned 
its legality.
650
 However, trial began in 1997, and by 2009, “79 suspects have been arrested, 23 
of whom are on trial, 8 are awaiting trial, 16 are serving their sentences in Italy and Mali, 6 
have been acquitted, and 7 are awaiting the outcome of their appeals.”
651
 While many 
observers argued that the tribunal was unable to provide justice because of the pressure from 
the government of the day, it can also be said that the tribunal pioneered the provision of 
justice at the international level. Until 2009, the tribunal set up in 1997 could only deliver 
judgment in the most popular Bagosoracase, 
652
also known as the “mastermind” of genocide 
in the country of Rwanda. In the end, Bagosoraand three others were convicted of war 
crimes, and crimes against humanity based on records of egregious violations of IHL during 
the Rwanda conflict of 1994.
653
 However, many legal practitioners perceived the later 
acquittal of all the four accused of conspiracy to commit genocide to mean that indeed 
genocide was not committed.
654
 The challenge of justice dispensation has thus hindered the 
efficiency of the tribunal in dispensing justice and fairness.  
 Bangamwabo argued that the tribunal was selective in its prosecution of the accused 
persons. The legitimacy of their decisions was queried by popular opinion in Rwanda and the 
international community as a whole.
655
 The prosecution was bias against the Hutu ethnic 
group and even when incriminating evidence presented against Tutsis, the tribunal decided to 
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remain silent. Thus, the tribunal was criticized for being what one author described as 
providing “victor’s justice.”
656
Another major institution in respect to gross violations of IHL 
is the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL), which tried those accused of grossly violating 
IHL and committed war crimes. After trial which was adjudged to be fair, five leaders of the 
Revolutionary United Front (RUF) were indicted and many others were sentenced to some 
years’ imprisonment. Members of the Armed Forces Ruling Council (AFRC) were also 
convicted and sentenced to many years behind bars.
657
 
The same challenge which constrained the effective dispensation of justice by the 
Tribunal for Rwanda resurfaces with similar effect on the case in Sierra Leone; the 
government of the day had overwhelming influence over the rulings of the tribunal. In some 
cases, those who ought to be imprisoned have since gone underground and the special court 
remains largely helpless in such situations. Praising the outcome of the tribunal, Patricia 
Sellers, argued that against all odds, the tribunal facilitated the “prosecution and bringing to 
justice of those responsible for acts of genocide and other violations of international 
humanitarian law.”
658
 One might argue that perhaps the tribunal has opened the doors for 
other cases of violations of IHL to be investigated and prosecution of same. 
Similarly, the trial of the former president of Liberia, Charles Taylor is one the most 
controversial cases in international criminal court. The SCSL had indicted Taylor but he fled 
Liberia and was granted asylum in neighboring Nigeria.
659
 But once the atmosphere was 
tense and Taylor was extradited back to Sierra Leone to face Trial. ChachaBhoke contended 
that it is worthwhile to note that during the war in Sierra Lone, Charles Taylor was accused of 
                                                          
656
Schabas, William A. The UN International Criminal Tribunals: The former Yugoslavia, Rwanda and Sierra 
Leone (Cambridge University Press, 2006) 
657
Kendall Niles “SCSL Appeals  chamber upholds judgement for Charles Taylor” (2013) The Human Rights 
Brief, 3 
658
Sellers, Patricia Viseur The Prosecution of Sexual Violence in Conflict: The Importance of Human Rights as 
Means of Interpretation (2007) 1 Women's Human Rights and Gender Unit, 4  
659
Bhoke, Chacha. "The trial of Charles Taylor: Conflict Prevention, International Law and an Impunity Free 
Africa" (2006) Institute for Security Studies, 20 
156 
 
serious cases of egregious violations of IHL such as the use of child soldiers and force 
marriages. No matter the deficiency of the SCSL and the various cases presented before it, it 
has recorded huge successes. Glasius, Marlies, and Timled in this line of thought when they 
presented the success of the SCSL to include its pioneer role in ensuring that egregious 




Nowhere has this been clearly articulated than in the words of Giulia Bigi “the first 
time ever that an international court had ruled on charges relating to child soldiers or forced 
marriages, and that an international court had delivered a guilty verdict for the military 
conscription of children.”
661
BBC News joined in the trumpeting the precedential value of the 
case against Charles Taylor.
662
 However, some scholars argued whether the change of venue 
has tempered with the dispensation of justice and met with the expectations of the public.
663
 
No doubt, the venue was moved to The Hague on grounds of security knowingly well 
that Charles Taylor was reputable for sponsoring mercenaries in both Sierra Lone and 
Liberia, the substance of the judgment in his case remains valid and the legality as well as the 
legitimacy of the courts should not be the primary concern in the case.664 
In the case against Charles Taylor, the idea of individual responsibility becomes pronounced. 
In the Prosecutor v Charles Taylor case, the court noted Article 6(1) of the Statute of the 
Special Court for Sierra Leone which explicitly contended that “A person, who planned, 
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ordered, committed or otherwise aided and abetted in the planning, preparation or execution 
of a crime… shall be individually responsible for the crime.”
665
 
   It is important to note that the international criminal court (ICC) has the powers to 
investigate and prosecute issues relating to gross violations of IHL. As early as 1998, the 
Rome Statute of the ICC has been adopted by the UN in respect of the formation of the ICC 
which became effective only in 2002 “after the magic number of 60 ratifications was reached 
on 11 April 2002.”
666
 Subsequently, the crimes over which the court exercises jurisdiction 
were later adopted and since then it has continued to entertain serious cases of violations of 
IHL.  
Of all the regions of the world, the ICC has decided more on violations of IHL on the 
African region than any other.
667
 Yet, the judgment of the ICC has always provoked outrage 
over what one scholar describes as “bias judgment”
668
 against Africans states. Whatever the 
position of African leaders on ICC, it has the power to investigate and prosecute cases of 
serious violations of IHL, but “only when national jurisdictions are unwilling and/ or unable 
to do so.”
669
 At best, as argued by Marisa Bassett, the ICC performs a complementary role 
that further confirms the pessimistic views of its critics who stated that “prosecution of 
international crimes rests squarely on domestic legal frameworks.”
670
 In any case, the 
International Criminal Court and the hybrid tribunals have contributed in the enforcement of 
grave violations of international humanitarian law. The seminal Tadic case is one example of 
significant contribution of the ICTY in this field. 
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Although customary international law is still developing, there exist yet some differences in 
the law applicable to international and non-international armed conflicts. This difference is 
especially noted in relation to the conventional rules applicable to armed conflicts. It is 
therefore important to identify the nature of an armed conflict, and this will in turn determine 
the specific rules that apply to the conflict. This chapter has identified and explained the tests 
by which the two types of conflicts can be identified.  
The classification of non-international armed conflicts is specifically very complex. 
There are some degrees of uncertainty as well as strong legal opinion on virtually all aspect 
from the meaning of ‘armed conflict’ (which also includes international armed conflicts). 
Therefore, an armed conflict which seems, at first glance, to be non-international, may 
become international armed conflict in two possible ways. First, conflict against colonial 
domination, alien occupation, and racist regimes are generally regarded as international in 
character. Second, the most classical way in which a conflict a non-international armed 
conflict will metamorphose into an international armed conflict is through an intervention by 
an external state. This method is divided into two: through military intervention by an 
external state and external state control over a non-state armed group. With regards to both 
types of intervention, the factual reality will prove decisive. 
Recently, a third type of armed conflict have been discovered, one that is characterized 
as transnational armed conflict. Advocates of this type of conflict hold the view that such 
conflicts are neither international armed conflict because they do not occur between a state 
and a non-state armed group, nor they are non-international armed conflict because they cross 
a state boundary. However, such conflicts are at the very least, a subset of non-international 
armed conflicts. Conventional ‘internal’ armed conflicts such as the case of Boko Haram, 
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have in recent years had some sort of cross-border element, with armed group located on the 
territory of a proximate state, or their kind of ‘overspill.’  
Yet, in reality the serious problem is not the conflicting framework of legal 
classification of armed conflicts, but the blatant disregard to comply with even the basic 
consideration of humanity during hostilities. The overwhelming majority of grave violations 
of IHL could be avoided if States only applied the basic rules of non-international armed 
conflict. However, that does not mean that there is no need to distinguish between 
international and non-international armed conflicts. While effort was made to study the 
enforcement of international humanitarian law in Nigeria, it did not cover the experience in 
North Eastern region focusing on effective enforcement of IHL rules to the ongoing armed 
conflict in the region. For example, the many literatures have explained at general level the 
changing face of idea and practice of IHL and human rights in general and how the 
international system has continued to reflect this changing dynamics. However, there is still 
scarceness of materials on the level of enforcement of IHL at the State level, especially in the 
Boko Haram armed conflict. The generalized approach has proven to be unclear and unable 
to provide cogent answers to the challenges of effective enforcement of IHL rules in the 
Boko Haram conflict. Also, most of the available literatures focus more on non-state actors as 
the only party that violate IHL rules, especially as it relates sexual violence in the Boko 
Haram conflict. The idea that state forces have also perpetrated some grave violations, 
particularly sexual violence is largely unpopular in the literatures.  
It is thus, the conviction of the researcher that a nuanced study is needed to fill in this 
huge gap in other to have a balanced understanding of the situation in a region that has 
attracted global attention for the wrong reason. It is within this angle that the usefulness of 
the present study can be ascertained. This and other forms of violations will be considered to 
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ascertain the challenges that continue to inhibit the effective enforcement of international 



























                    Chapter Three 
                Research Methodology 
3.0 Introduction 
The research deals with the critical analysis of the contemporary challenges of enforcing 
International Humanitarian Law (IHL) in Nigeria with specific focus on the Boko Haram 
conflict, thus, I adopted doctrinal/field based methodology. The adoption of this methodology 
is premised on the fact that while very few scholarly literatures have been written on the 
Nigerian Boko Haram conflict, - there is, arguably no literature, as at the time of conducting 
this research, specifically on the challenges facing the effective enforcement of IHL in the 
ongoing Boko Haram armed conflict. The field methodologyinvolves person-to-person 
interviews and listening to the main actors, players and scholars in the field.On the other 
hand, the doctrinal approach is aimed at ascertaining existing international rules regulating 
armed conflicts, especially those that principally relate to this study. This is also withtheview 
to ascertain the specificlegal instruments that apply in conflict situation – international and 
non-international armed conflicts, including extraterritorial conflicts. Various international 
principles and theories were analyzed while considering the arguments for and against. 
This chapter outlines the research philosophy, the ontological and epistemological 
approach, the data collection process, the research findings and the analytical method used in 
the study. As a piece of socio-legal research, it seeks to explore and assess the challenges that 
continue to inhibit the effective enforcement of international humanitarian law in the Boko 
Haram armed conflict. The research used an empirical legal research that entails a mixed 
method of empirical and doctrinal research approaches. Most traditional legal research 
involves a doctrinal method which is primarily concerned with a detailed and systematic 
analysis of the rules governing particular legal issue(s), the relationship between the 
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rules,thedifficult aspects of the law, and perhaps future developments.
671
However, when a 
piece oflegal research relates to social phenomena, such as in this study, the doctrinal method 
of research is usually supplemented with empirical data.The aim of collecting empirical data 
in this study is to produce reliable notion which best explain the relationships between the 
social phenomena and the legal doctrine. It generally helps in producing a unique, original 
and more reliable research output on a specific subject matter such as the threat posed by 
Boko Haram and the willingness/ability of Nigeria in responding to the threat. 
The research uses qualitative data sources, which include field observational data, 
memoir, and most importantly, an in-depth interview with a carefully purposive and 
theoretical sampled study population in Nigeria. It also uses primary legal sources for the 
doctrinal component of the research, such as statutes, case law and customary international 
law, as well as other existing secondary data including textbooks, law periodicals, journal 
articles, government achieves, and other relevant publications. The chapter will discuss the 
whole process including the rationale behind the methodological approach, data collection 
techniques, as well as the participants sampling strategies and how that affects the aim and 
objectives of the research project.  
3.1 Research Philosophy: Ontological and Epistemological Approach 
The philosophical foundation of this empirical research is based on the Interpretivist 
philosophy that assumes that a social phenomenon can only be fully understood through the 
perceptions and experiences of the participant(s).
672
 Therefore, to understand the challenges 
that continue to inhibit the effective enforcement of international humanitarian law, the 
research sought for answers by underpinning several understandings of the participant’s 
views and the issue at hand. This defines the research’s relativists’ ontological 
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perspective,which suggests that reality has several interpretations, and those interpretations 
are in themselves a part of scientific knowledge.
673
 
Thus, because the complex nature of reality varies from one society to another, 
knowledge and understanding of a distinct phenomenon can only be construed out of 
interaction between humans and their world rather than by universal standard of 
validity.
674
Most of the existing literature in the area of our study defined the challenges for 
the effective enforcement of international humanitarian law rules from practical and 
progressive theory, independent of social context. This research’s ontological perspective 
considers it invalid to treat the topic in isolation of the people and the social context. In other 
words, we cannot objectively answer this complex study phenomena based on universal 
standard formula. 
The interpretivists, also known as constructivists, emphasize the interrelationship 
between the researcher and the research, thereby encouraging co-construction of meaning.
675
 
In other words, the researcher in this research is part of the research effort and outcome. This 
approach, however, does not in any way mean the research will be perforated with political 
bias or misrepresentation of facts. Rather, the approach simply allows me to become 
immersed with the data and move beyond the surface level meaning in search for the 
challenges that continue to mitigate effective enforcement of international humanitarian law 
rules. In doing so, emphasis has to be given to constructing inferred meanings from the social 
world as well as people’s thoughts and opinions, for the simple reason that reality cannot be 
known in the same way or better than the people who have lived experience.
676
 Distinctively, 
the experiences of civilians and armed actors living through the conflict in northeastern 
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Nigeria cannot be objectively determined without hearing the voices of the institutions that 
are saddled with the responsibility of providing security and the victims involved.  
The research’s interpretivist philosophy and its ontological and epistemological 
approach will guide the empirical research and it never aimed to replace the legal doctrine 
nature of the research. That is to say, the research’s philosophical empirical piece is 
particularly explored to figure out the characteristics of a weak state on the enforcement of 
international humanitarian law for the protection of women and children, and the prevention 
of genocide, subject to the general discourse and meanings attributed to the legal doctrine 
itself. The object of legal doctrinal method here is normative in nature, having the combine 
function of knowledge construction to determine objective solution to the legal 
problem.Formerly, the goal is to better understand the gap(s) in protection from all sides, how 
civilians perceive security actors, and what civilians expect from those who are supposed to 
protect them from harm by providing legal explanation to the legal question(s), using the 
empirical data. 
 The essential features of interpretivist methodological guidelines were utilized 
throughout the research in order to promote reflexivity and thoroughness.
677
 For example, 
participants’ thoughts, views and voices will form an integral part of the analysis and its 
presentation. Meanings are constructed from the data by letting a certain degree of 
participant’s story to visibly feature in the final research outcome. This is to allow the reader 
to distinguish and make connection between the analytical findings and the original data. The 
research constructs inferred meanings from the interaction through open-ended questions that 
focuses on the social processes, lived experiences and thoughts of the participants. The initial 
sets of open-ended questions includes, for example; even as the military continue in their 
push against the sect, the preponderance of the group’s activity continues to grow by the day. 
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To your knowledge what is the reason behind that?  From these initial questions, key 
elements of the study phenomenon were identified and the findings were used in shaping and 
defining which data to collect next before the entire findings of the research can be analysed 
using a flexible coding system which consist conceptualization, categorization, and analysis.  
3.2 Data Collection Process: Qualitative data 
The data collection process in this research was conducted under clear procedural processes 
which involved collection and analysis of qualitative data.  The research used qualitative data 
sources to ascertain the thoughts, feelings, and experiences of research participants, which in 
turn enabled improvement of an understanding of the study phenomena. This includes a 
flexible use of a variety of techniques such as in-depth personal interviews, focus group 
interviews, observational data, memoirs, diaries as well as secondary data, to explore and 
bring together diverse range of data. The qualitative approach used in this research includes 
continuous collection and analysis of data back and forth until same information starts to 
circle and the required data is obtained for the justification of the theory.
678
 Some of the 
systematic guideline techniques used in this process includes; purposive sampling and 
theoretical sampling, open-ended research questions, initial findings and next-question 
strategy. These techniques were designed and thoroughly followed as discussed below.  
3.3 Gaining Access into Research Sites 
Gaining entree into the empirical research sites here refers to the identification of the places 
and sites to explore and the procedure followed in gaining access to such places. The purpose 
of identifying the empirical research setting and the methods of gaining access into the 
targeted sites was to create a research design techniques that best explains the systematic and 
verifiable procedure required of this investigation. The key techniques used include planning, 
strategizing, and devising safety mechanisms. The process began initially with the 
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identification of the research settings and the best safety mechanisms and ways to go about 
the investigation. This is especially important because even though some research sites might 
be theoretically relevant, they could also be practically difficult to explore due to safety 
reasons; therefore, the sites could not be accessed even when identified as a potential data 
source. However, in relation to the qualitative empirical data used in this research, those 
limitations in terms of safety measures will not be a major hindrance to the quality of the 
data. This is because the goal is to understand the experiences of participants involved in the 
conflict. This therefore, presupposes that the sites explored in this research are only 
theoretically determined and not a sample representation of the entire population.  
For ethical reasons, the empirical research settings explored by this study was limited 
to three sites, namely Abuja, Maiduguri, and Yobestates respectively, (Yobe was through 
Phone due to security concerns).This selection was not designed in an effort to gain a 
population size sample of the people, but to discover possible source of rich data to 
understand the phenomena under study. The plan was to sample across a range of issues that 
will ensure an excellent independent assessment of the study phenomena to its fullest. For 
this reason, there was no attempt to expand the setting to a wider population. Through a 
comprehensive pilot study on the country’s terrain, the research gained a good idea and guide 
to site selection. The principal places and sites visited are places with specific public 
institutions and civil organisations where potential data relevant to the research inquiry will 
be discovered. Governmental bodies that were contacted including the Nigerian Army, the 
Office of the Attorney General of the Federation, the Nigerian Human Rights Commission, 
the Nigerian War College, the National Emergency Management Agency, and the Police 
Force.  
The Federal Capital Territory Abuja, which is the capital city of Nigeria, is home to 
virtually all the administrative bodies of the country and several non-governmental 
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organisations including Amnesty International, and International Committee of the Red 
Cross. The fundamental task involved in the process of exploring these sites includes gaining 
access to the research area. Considering the fragile security situation in the country, gaining 
entry into research sites to collect data presented one of the major challenges that the research 
encountered. Some of the hurdles encountered include high security checks, little or lack of 
support and co-operation from the participants etc. Fortunately, due to the nature of my 
research investigation- one that hinges on the international legal obligation vestedon the 
country to protect life and property of her citizens while prosecuting the war, as well as the 
reputability of her security forces, I was eventually recognised and granted access to certain 
targeted sites. The lack of co-operation by some of the participants also had to do with the 
relatively controversial nature of the research question, which makes some participants 
reluctant to disclose certain information or deny clearance to enter some internally displaced 
camps especially, in Borno by security operatives. These challenges were also supplemented 
through contacts made by networking in the course of the data collection. 
Having successfully explored the sites located in Abuja, the research embarked on 
another trip to other places across the country in order to explore important data sources 
including civil society organizations, and internally displaced persons camps. Two additional 
cities; Maiduguri and Yobe, were identified as potential sources of data and relatively secured 
location to explore important information. Although the two sites were previously marked as 
vulnerable to terror attacks and other political and social unrests - hence, conducting research 
in such places is permissible only whenadvised by the FCO (Foreign Commonwealth Office) 
fortunately, there was relative peace as at the time when the research took place. Even with 
the confirmation of relative peace in the research sites i visited, the research was carried out 
with maximum caution and in line with strict ethical standards. Similarly, in order to ensure 
maximum safety, I remained ever alert to the security situation in the places, and all the 
168 
 
necessary risk assessment were properly approved by the law enforcement agencies. With the 
safe arrival into the second research sites, I explored few internally displaced camps, victims 
and/or their families, traditional rulers and medical doctors, as well as the civilian joint task 
forcewere also contacted and interviewed. With the help of the supporting documents, 
including my identity as a research student, I was able to establish the necessary relationship 
with the participants and referral by initials contacts, most of whom are security personnel, 
activists, NGO’s and other relevant agencies.  
3.4 Research Participants Sampling 
In empirical research terms, sampling refers to the process of selecting individuals or group 
of research participantsfrom a larger population. The overall purpose of sampling and 
selection of research participants in empirical study is to gather data fromsection of a 
population that will be used in the final analysis to represent the entire populace as a whole. 
In this research, sampling was based on a distinct category of Nigeria’s governing bodies, 
security institutions, academics, independent non-governmental organizations, and activists. 
These distinct categories are expected to cover certain experiences relevant to the study, and 
not intended to cover population size. The sampling was applied in order to identify and 
select potential sources based on special characteristics of the study population. 
Having recognized the need to sort the initial participants sample out, the starting 
point of sampling in this research was identifying those who possess the requisite knowledge 
and lived experience on protecting civilian’s right and dignity during extreme violence. The 
initial purposive sampling identified a potential category of participants whom in one way or 
the other are concerned with the response to the humanitarian crisis posed by Boko Haram in 
the country. The academics are almost certainly part of most research initial purposive 
sampling, and so, this research started by identifying some of the academics having expert 
knowledge on the topic. Another potential source of data directly related to the research 
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includes those from the executive branch of government security institutions who are directly 
involved in the front line of the armed conflict in the North-Eastern part of Nigeria. Such 
institutions include the Army and the Police. In the subsequent chapters, I will explain the 
reason and purpose of choosing each of the purposive sampling categories.   
3.5 Purposive Sampling Characteristics 
As mentioned above, the importance of initial purposive sampling in this research was to 
identify potential information source that could be used in forming the necessary foundation 
from which the theoretical sampling will emanate and evolve throughout the rest of the data 
collection process. The research identified academics that are well experienced and well-
informed on rules of armed conflicts and how the law was applied in previous cases. As an 
interdisciplinary research which covered issues of law, politics, and history, the research 
started by interviewing renowned university scholars of law in international law. This initial 
sampling helped the research in building what was basically crucial to the empirical data 
collection process. What was particularly interesting about the interviews held with the 
selected academics was the fact that, aside from the highly productive sessions we had, they 
all were keen to help and connect me with other important targets and to offer me valuable 
materials. By this means, concepts and themes started to evolve and connect to other core 
issues related to the phenomenon under study. 
Following the initial interviews with academics from different field of study, the 
participants sampling took another dimension, this time around purposefully focussed on 
exploring those concerned with responses to the humanitarian crisis posed by Boko Haram by 
upholding human rights and dignity. Such targets include the National Human Rights 
Commission, the National Emergency Management Agency, and Office of the Attorney 
General of the Federation, the Nigeria Security forces. This special category of participants 
were purposely selected based on the preconception of their capacity as government officials 
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whom are constitutionally responsible for responding to, and managing civilian’s right and 
dignity, especially those displaced by the war in the north-eastern part of Nigeria. The 
rationale behind selecting these participants for interview is to obtain first-hand information 
on the challenges, if any, in managing the plight of the victims and overall safety of the 
citizens in the tragic situation they found themselves. The interview sought to find out each of 
their respective roles, efforts, and safety measures put in place to protect or alternatively 
reduce the effects of the war in the North-Eastern part of the country.  
In addition to exploring the stakeholders in government agencies, the research 
identified the security agencies that are under the constitution bestowed with the power of 
protecting the territory of Nigeria against any form of threat. These bodies are vested with the 
responsibility of responding to the Boko Haram inhumane activities and the danger they pose 
to the security consequence on Nigeria and the global community. It seeks to evaluate the 
methodology adopted by the Nigerian forces; together with the challenges they face if any, in 
observing the rules of engagement in the front line. Such rules include those that are targeted 
at protecting the civilian population and civilian objects as well as persons who no longer 
take part in active hostilities. They also restrict the means and methods of warfare. The 
overall purpose of engaging with these stakeholders is to understand the emerging challenges 
in the implementation of IHL in Nigeria, including such issues as the increasing participation 
and targeting of civilians, the evolving use of high-tech warfare in asymmetrical conflicts and 
the spread of suicide attacks. 
3.6 Initial Interviews: Observational and Data Analysis 
After the initial identification and selection of the above participants, the research proceeded 
with oral interviews and analysis concurrently, while keeping record of some vital 
observational data. The initial interviews focused on exploring the challenges that for 
whatever reason(s), continue to inhibit the effective implementation of international 
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humanitarian law in the Boko Haram armed conflict; to comprehensively understand the 
experiences of the victims and what they expect from those who are required by law to 
protect them in the face of danger.  Both semi-structured and unstructured interviews were 
conducted for maximum exploration of the participant’s general knowledge and deep insight 
into the subject matter. The initial interview questions were based on the distinctive character 
and experience of the participants, which overall, provided rich and diverse data - touching 
on range of issues relevant to the research enquiry. As the interviews progressed, a concurrent 
analysis of the data was applied, producing concepts and themes that set the tone and 
direction to the research. 
Each of the initial interviews generated key issues seeking further exploration, for 
example the Human Rights Commission’s claim of taking actions against all the allegations 
of sexual violence, especially in the internally displaced camps, particularly in Maiduguri, 
Yobe and Adamawa states respectively. This redirected the research to some non-
governmental organizations, and human rights activist group for interview and substantiation 
of those claims. Again, the initial purposive sample interviews with the country’s 
governmental agencies raised a different question which needs further verification and 
analysis. In addition to the initial interviews, observational data also formed an integral part 
of the data collection method. The observational data proved useful in overcoming 
discrepancies between different claims from the initial interviews; such as, for instance, the 
disaster and emergency management claim of responding to the humanitarian needs of the 
internally displaced persons or the human rights commission’s claim of taking actions against 
the abuse of women and young children in the conflict zones. Some of the vital observational 
data collected in the early stage of the initial sampling include visiting some IDP camps in the 
federal capital territory, and some camps in Maiduguri. This data was very important as it 
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helped examine and establish the reality of the civilian’s experiences and the government’s 
primary duty of protecting its citizen’s life and dignity in the face of threat.  
3.7 Evolving Concept and Categories from Initial Data Analysis 
Once the first sets of interviews had been conducted, I then applied a key point coding system 
to analyse the data I collected. This coding system involves three level of coding, starting 
with an open coding where the data was divided into similar concepts and categories of 
information. This was followed by axial coding which involved the process of relating the 
categories and concepts to each other with the purpose of understanding the generic 
relationships of persons (including the victims) involved in the conflict and the phenomenon 
under study. While the selective coding that wasapplied to integrate the concepts and 
categories to produce a coherent research project. Some of the categories generated from the 
initial coding analysis, particularly from the interviews with the government officials here 
include the understanding thatNigeria is a state party to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 
and their two Additional Protocols of 1977, the principal IHL instruments, the International 
Criminal Court and in many cases, no genuine criminal investigation is initiated against 
alleged perpetrators of war crimes and crimes against humanity. 
Victims of violence have not received redress or reparation, including compensation, 
leaving people on the breadline withstoking feelings of bitterness and desperation. From this 
emerging concept, the government’s obligation to take stepsto ensure that its security forces 
and members of the “civilian JTF” adhere strictly to their obligations under international 
human rights law, and international humanitarian law in particular, ensures that detainees are 
protected from extrajudicial executions, torture and other ill-treatment, but are to be treated 
humanely at all times. 
Another example of concepts and categories emerging through the comparative 
analysis of the initial information was the recurring theme of how the Nigerian 
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governmentconsistently negated the obligation imposed by international law to investigate 
and prosecute egregious violations of IHL by its military and other security agencies. This 
include investigating whether or not Nigeria is struggling to provide basic security to its 
citizens, while exploring the challenges that continue to create the windows for the alleged 
human rights abuses, poor security atmosphere, weak state syndrome, untrained security 
personnel, lack of independent courts; and cover ups for violations of IHL etc.  
3.8 Interview Guide 
Interviews are one of the essential research techniques and particularly useful for 
understanding the real world and getting to understand the story behind research participant’s 
experiences.
679
  One of the defining features of the constructivist grounded theory approach 
used in this research is the attention it pays to construction of meanings and understandings 
from the interactions with the real world and research participants. For that reason, I carried 
out a face to face semi-structured and unstructured interview covering a wide range of issues 
relating to the topic of the research. I was in the field for roughly about five months where I 
personally interviewed 58 participants face to face, while also interviewing 3 others via 
mobile phone. The interviews were particularly useful for exploring participant’s 
experiences, while also looking to construct meanings and understanding from the 
interaction. 
 The interviews usually lasted from 30 minutes to an hour, and contained a list of 
standardized and open-ended questions that offered the necessary freedom and flexibility to 
pull as much detailed information as possible. The interview questions are designed based on 
Michael Patton’s six types of interview questions that include the experiential and 
behavioural questions, which examine what a person does or has done. The opinion and value 
questions are designed to understand what people think about some issue or experience. Then 
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feelings questions, which elicit the emotional responses of peoples’ experiences and 
thoughts.
680
 A number of general questions were asked to allow participants take control of 
what and how much information they want to share and how long they wish the interview to 
continue. Those general questions were followed by probing questions to keep the focus on 
the main part of the interview or interaction. The interviews were conducted in three 
languages English, Kanuri and Hausa respectively, out of which eight was in Kanuri, six in 
Hausa. Fifty eight of the interviews were recorded using electronic recording device with the 
participant’s informed consent. Those recorded interviews were transcribed manually and 
three other oral interviews conducted via phone were saved, transcribed and stored in an 
encrypted media storage device. Participant’s consent was sought and granted prior to the 
interview. This was confirmed through request letters sent to each of the participants with 
consent forms attached. The participants were contacted via phone or emails some days 
before the arranged date for the interview to confirm the appointment and to make them 
acquainted with the purpose of the research. 
3.9 Ethical Issues 
The data collection process was embarked upon after receiving clearance and approval from 
the Coventry University Research Ethics Committee. In line with the ethical regulations, the 
research proceeded with the set out ethical standards throughout the data collection process to 
the final conclusion of the thesis. Initial informed consent of the research participants was 
sought prior to interviews, where a brief summary of the research background and objectives 
was communicated to let the participants know what the research is all about and will only be 
treated as an academic document. This was carried out via letters sent by email, post or direct 
communication. This is to ensure there was voluntary consent as part of the research’s ethical 
standards. The research also ensured participants’ confidentiality and anonymity. Therefore, 
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the stakeholders and institutions involved in this research will remain anonymous and will 
respectively be referred with special code(s) in the subsequent chapters 4, 5 and 6 that 
represent the analysis of the data collected.  
The identity of the research participants were kept anonymous and all other personal 
details including contact address were kept separate from computerised data. Being a medium 
risk research study, extra caution and ethical consideration was given paramount importance 
by the research to minimize the risk of harm and injury. In doing so, Coventry University, 
through the Deputy Vice-Chancellor, provided me with a link and password to access red24; 
a security service provider that provides access to an up to the minute information on global 
security and condition of situations. To obviate the danger of terrorists’ attacks or any form of 
political crisis in the field settings, the research avoided all crowd gatherings, including 
political and religious gatherings.As a Nigerian, I was aware of the social and political 
tension in the research setting and to avoid, and minimize this risk, the research omitted and 
does not include communities and places prone to the attacks, as advised by the ethics 
committee.  
The idea of concealing the identities of participants has attracted debate from many 
researchers. Tilley and Woodthorpe claimed that most institutions authorize masking the 
identities of research participants as a default point.
681
The ethics of anonymity is opposed by 
opponents who argue against the overprotectiveness and an exaggeration of the anticipated 
damage as a consequence of lack of anonymity.
682
 Others point out the adverse effect default 
anonymization can have on research results, arguing that on issues such as places and settings 
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can leave authorities unchallenged,
683
 thereby, impeding the search of transformative research 
aims.
684
 However, Kelly noted that most participants still want their identities 
masked.
685
Accordingly, Cordon and Sainsbury argued that most times, research participants 
don’t have a clear knowledge of how the information they have given will be treated,
686
 such 
that the Wiles claimed that impending injury from identifying participants will be difficult to 
avoid.
687
 However, in recent years, the question of concealing the identity of research 
participants is addressed with the use of consent forms to avoid issues that may be injurious 
to the participants in the future.
688
 
3.9.1 Data Management 
Research data management is an essential part of this study which is concerned with the 
creation, organisation and storage of data throughout the study period. The research was 
committed to the University policy of data preservation and protection in accordance to the 
General Data Protection Regulation 2016 (GDPR). Information collected including oral and 
documentary data were properly managed and stored. Oral interviews were recorded using an 
electronic recording devise, transcribed, and properly stored on a secured password-protected 
computer and encrypted storage device with access restricted to the researcher. Also, the 
observational data including field notes and memoirs were organised and reduced into a 
single word document and stored in a safe and encrypted storage device. All data collected 
was used strictly for the declared purpose of the study and retained in line with the Coventry 
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University data storage policy; all personal details of participants were destroyed after 
completion of relevant findings and analysis. 
3.9.2 Doctrinal Component of the Research 
In addition to the empirical inquiry, this research also consists of a doctrinal component 
which is concerned with a detailed and systematic analysis of the rules governing the 
research’s legal issues, the relationship between rules, areas of difficulty and, perhaps, future 
developments.
689
 Research into legal rules largely relates to their relevancein a 
givensituationbecause they are not just convenient norms, but are intended to be rules 
consistently applied and which evolve gradually.
690
 It follows that doctrinal research is a 
study into the law and legal concepts.
691
 
Like any other legal rules, the aspect of international humanitarian law that only 
applies in times of armed conflict, is a black letter law subject that is based on the 
interpretation of statutes, cases and international customary practices.
692
 The legal rules, 
statutes, cases and customary practice cannot in themselves provide a comprehensive 
clarification of the law in all situations. It is therefore important to analyse and apply the 
relevant legal rules to the particular facts of the study phenomena.
693
 The primary aim, 
therefore, of the study is to present critically analyzed challenges that continued to 
affecteffectiveenforcement of international humanitarian law in Nigeria, in its fight against 
Boko Haram.Therefore, an examination of the various international law instruments adopted 
and ratified by different member states, such as the UN Charter and Geneva Conventions and 
the two Additional Protocols, will essentially lead the research to look beyond the black letter 
law.  
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The doctrinal component of the research involves a process of identifying the sources 
of the legal rules and then interpreting the lawwithin a specific context. Once the general 
legal principles underlying the rules and limits in armed conflicts or war are identified, it 
could then be applied within the context of the study phenomena. The primary legal sources 
of data in this study, as has been cited earlier in the work, include international law legal 
instruments, such as, the UN Charter, the Geneva conventions and the Additional Protocols, 
as well as court cases and decisions. Debates and the legislative history of these international 
legal instruments, the court decisions and the general states practice on enforcement or 
violations of international humanitarian law rules in times of hostilities are all examined to 
address the research question.  
Like any other legal research, the doctrinal component of this research requires 
review of existing secondary data related to the research topic.The rationale behind 
examining the existing literature on the legal aspect of the research is to identify key areas of 
convergence together with divergence that may exist in the domestic law on acts of terrorism 
and enforcement of IHL and related legal opinions of other legal scholars. It also helped offer 
a wider understanding of the relevant issues. The existing secondary data sources include key 
legal textbooks, journal articles, law periodicals, legislative debates and other publications. 
Another valuable source of existing data that was particularly useful in this research has been 
the International Criminal Court, and some of the Ad hoc International Tribunals, which have 
substantially addressed controversial legal issues on violations of IHL rules over the years. 
3.9.3 Normative Character of the Legal Research 
 Legal research is often torn between achieving as much as possible by expanding the 
practical aspect of the law and its context, and reducing this complex whole to a manageable 
proportion.
694
 The internal analysis of the legal rules involves a number of approaches, such 
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as argumentative, exploratory or normative. Each of these legal doctrine approaches involves 
its own methods, and each research question will imply the use of the appropriate 
method(s).
695
 This research adopted the normative legal doctrine approach to build a system 
of generally valid ideas that presuppose the normative contents of international humanitarian 
law. A legal doctrinal research is referred to as normative for taking a normative position 
among values and interests.
696
 The obvious advantage of the normative approach is that it 
essentially explains what is desirable in problem-solving legal research seeking a new 
understanding and legal solutions to a particular complex area of the law.
697
 This approach is 
particularly useful for this research as it essentially aims to identify a potential legal solution 
regarding the conflict between the contemporary challenges in the effective enforcement of 
international humanitarian law in the fight against Boko Haram armed group. Although 
normative positions cannot be true or false, they must however, be justified. The justifications 
for the research positions, (as will be seen throughout the research), will include valid 
analogical reasoning and inductive reasoning. The role and rationale behind the use of 
normative reasoning in this research is explained below.    
3.9.4 Role of Normative Reasoning 
The analytical positivist approach to legal theory advocated by H.L.A Hart has challenged its 
inability to give a satisfactory account of legal reasoning, especially reasoning-in-
adjudication.
698
The normative approach in this research involves the use of inductive 
reasoning that entails reasoning from specific cases to a general rule. This is particularly 
useful owing to the fact that international law did not fill the lacuna of effective enforcement 
vis-à-vis the protection of human life when it is threatened. Therefore, this makes it key to 
filling the gap in the law. The legal reasoning involves the recognition of a new general rule 








 Atria Fernando “Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory Revisited” (1999) 18(5) Law and Philosophy, 537 
180 
 
which emerges from a number of earlier authorities which are then regarded simply as 
particular instances of the new rule. The normative approach also includes deductive 
reasoning to examine similar cases that have previously come before the courts or other 
dispute resolution mechanism. If upon examination the facts of these cases are found to be 
sufficiently similar to the facts of the subject matter, then it can be concluded that the subject 
matter should be treated in the same way. 
3.10 Sources of Research Secondary Data 
In a way, the study of the challenges of the enforcement of International Humanitarian Law 
(IHL) in Nigeria add to the general understanding of armed conflicts and their effects on the 
safety and dignity of human kind, domestic and international alike.
699
 The secondary source 
utilizes the archive collection of International Criminal Court. The library contains a wide 
collection of sources of IHL particularly the several Commission of Inquiry Reports on 
conflicts that have endangered mankind, especially conflicts that the international system 
ought to have taken responsible measures, but could not because of the envisaged challenges 
that have inhibited. Through the websites of the UN, I retrieved relevant statutes guiding the 
conduct of warfare, since the very centre of my research is on rules of warfare. The various 
laws governing warfare and recent developments such as the additional protocols to the 
Geneva Convention will all be critically analysed to help in the understanding of the 
challenge of international law as a factor to the effective enforcement of IHL in 
general.Google Scholar also serves as a useful source where many documents relevant to the 
topic under study have been well documented. Books, chapters in books plus peer reviewed 
journal articles can easily be sourced from the Lancaster library, Coventry University that is 
reputable for housing some of the biggest minds in the area of conflict research. 
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The study also includes an analytical legal research approach, which entails a research 
into legal rules, principles, concepts and doctrines. It includes the constitution of Nigeria, the 
national gazette, statutory laws and laws of administrative agencies. It also includes judicial 
pronouncements of higher courts, international treatises, opinio juris, and encyclopaedias. In 
the final stage of the methodology, after exploring the various literatures as evidence to back 
up the suggested sub-topics, I will then draw the conclusion that will capture whether there is 






























Sexual Violence and the Conflict in Northeast Nigeria: The Challenges of Weak 
Institutions and Disciplined Security Forces 
4.0 Introduction 
The situation in North-East Nigeria constitutes a non-international armed conflict, and thus, 
IHL rules that regulate non-international armed conflict apply. This includes Additional 
Protocol II of the Geneva Conventions, which Nigeria has ratified.
700
There is an increasing 
awareness on the effect of war on human dignity around the world.
701
 Nothing suffers more 
than human lives during armed conflict.
702
 The situation appears to be exacerbated when the 
conflict involves irregular forces such as armed groups or insurgents, or even terrorists, 
because they have no knowledge or respect for the established laws of war.
703
 Most research 
have concluded that State forces have a grasp of the rules of engagement requiring the 
protection of the vulnerable population during armed conflict including women, children, the 
aged and civilians not participating in the armed conflict. It is this understanding that has 
guided much research in both fields of international humanitarian law and international 
criminal law. However, this research argues against the conclusion that conventional armed 
forces are as a general rule - trained and disciplined and thus have a tendency to respect the 
established laws of armed conflict. However, this study has demonstrated that the security 
forces in Nigeria were not well disciplined to respect those established laws in the Boko 
Haram armed conflict, and therefore, the Nigerian government must ensure accountability for 
the violations of IHL committed by soldiers and Civilian JTF in the conflict.  
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The research query of this study thus becomes this: Is it possible to develop, through 
the courtrooms of international law, enhanced rules of international humanitarian law as may 
assist in combating impunity for those who perpetrate sexual violence against women and 
girls in the Boko Haram armed conflict, thereby contributing to deterrence against such 
violations in future and, thus, better protection to women and girls? The chapter focuses on 
the critical assessment of the challenges of undisciplined security forces and weak judicial 
system in the effective enforcement of IHL in the Boko Haram conflict, particularly in 
relation to the violations committed against women and girls in the internally displaced 
camps and military detention centres in northeast Nigeria.   
While it is expected that conventional armed forces should be seen to lead in the quest 
to respect the rules of war, the case of the Nigerian armed forces has been at best, 
disappointing and a departure from that assumption. Since the transformation of Boko Haram 
from a group of radical believers to an extremely violent insurgent group, sexual violence has 
featured prominently in the conflict that is characterized as non-international armed 
conflict.
704
 Indeed, “women's lives and their bodies have been the unacknowledged casualties 
of war for far too long."
705
 Rape and other forms of sexual violence such as sexual slavery 
have been reported in many instances in the North-Eastern region with little or no response 
from the Nigerian state.  
By way of methodology, this study interviewed victims, government agencies, and 
civil societies. Further, key debates in the jurisprudence of international criminal tribunals 
that relate to sexual crimes in armed conflicts, with a view to distilling from them practical 
solutions that are aimed at addressing the problem of sexual violence against women and girls 
in relevant aspects. Such discussions in this study will focus on the following issues: 
definition and adjudication of rape in international law; sex crimes and genocide; the issue of 
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forced marriage as a crime against humanity and superior responsibility etc. The chapter 
argues that indiscipline and poor judicial infrastructure are among the most visible challenges 
confronting the enforcement of international humanitarian law in the North-Eastern region of 
Nigeria.  
To analyse the resources gathered in the field, the chapter is further divided into four 
sub-sections. The first part discusses the summary findings of the field data. The second sub-
section deals with the definition of the various perspectives on elements of sexual violence 
including rape and reparation for the victims of sexual violence in northeast Nigeria. 
Reparation is focused on restoring the wellbeing of survivors of sexual violence and ensuring 
them a place of dignity in society through tangible forms of assistance as well as symbolic 
measures. Third, to draw practical measures of prosecution on these grounds, these 
definitions were derived from judicial rulings by competent judges and tribunals. The essence 
of the definitions is to enable the reader to appreciate the available avenues to undertake the 
prosecution of related cases of sexual violence in Nigeria’s war against Boko Haram. In 
particular, it covers opportunities for prosecution of alleged perpetrators of international 
crimes of the Rome Statute before the International Criminal Court. This sub-section is 
important considering the lack of a strong and independent judicial system that is required for 
the effective prosecution of sexual violence in the context of the Boko Haram armed conflict 
in Nigeria. The chapter has demonstrated the available avenue(s) to prosecute perpetrators 
and their accomplice for committing heinous crimes of sexual violence in the war against 
Boko Haram in Nigeria.  
The fourth section focuses on the challenges militating against effective enforcement 
of international humanitarian law in the quest to fight Boko Haram, and in particular deal 
with cases of sexual violence in the conflict. This sub-section deals with challenges of 
indiscipline of the security forces and members of the Civilian Joint Task Force on how their 
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actions has led to serious violations of international humanitarian law. In addition, it analyses 
the inherent challenges within the Nigerian judicial system including inadequacy of 
legislation on sexual violence and lack of access to judicial infrastructure in the North-
Eastern region and Nigeria in general. The following section sets out to shed light on the 
various international human and humanitarian laws that were considered to have been 
violated in the conflict. 
Against this realistic background, the humble aims of this chapter rest mainly in (a) 
helping to maintain visibility on a major challenge, and (b) making recommendations that 
may help in providing the motivation required to achieve later the instrumental objective of 
using IHL to protect women and girls more fully. The ultimate attainment of these humble 
aims would to this researcher be immensely fulfilling indeed.  
4.1 Violations of International Law in the Conflict 
As explained in this chapter, members of the Civilian Joint Task Force were acting under the 
instructions of the Nigerian Army, and/or were executing government’s tasks because they 
have committed crimes established in this study. They have also violated international human 
rights and humanitarian law, and the Nigerian government bears the international 
responsibility for any violations in this context.
706
 
Acts that constitute war crimes or crimes against humanity attract individual criminal 
responsibility. Grave violations of international humanitarian law constitute war crimes.
707
 
Crimes against humanity are prohibited acts perpetrated as part of a widespread or systematic 
attack targeted at a civilian population as part of a government or organizational policy.
708
 
The contextual factors of crimes against humanity require that each individual act be 
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committed in the context of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian 
population and with knowledge of the attack. Each element of these requirements must be 
proved before any accused person can be convicted of crimes against humanity. The human 
rights violations explained in this chapter indicate the context and nature of the attacks 
perpetrated against women and girls in north-east Nigeria, may each constitute crime against 
humanity, and stressed the obligation of Nigeria to investigate these violations as possible 
crimes against humanity. 
Consequently, in the following section, we begin by outlining the research findings 
from the data obtained, focusing on the Nigerian security treatment of women and girls in 
IDP camps and detention centres, as well as on women’s experiences in areas once controlled 
by Boko Haram group.    
4.1.2 Summary of Research Findings: The Plight of Women and Girls in the Conflict 
Based on the empirical evidence obtained, scores of women in the Boko Haram armed 
conflict described how the military forces alongside members of the Civilian Joint Task 
Force (CJTF) used force and threats to rape women and girls, and seized the opportunity of 
the situation to coerce women and girls into becoming their ‘girlfriends,’ which presupposed 
being available for sex at regular intervals. Seven women reported cases of rape to the 
researcher. This included three women who disclosed that they had been sexually abused and 
raped by the Nigerian military or Civilian JTF members while they had been starving or near 
starving in Dalori IDP camp in late 2016 or early 2017. Four additional women disclosed that 
they had been forced to become the ‘girlfriends’ to the military forces and the CJTF in Dalori 
IDP camp. They explained that they were pushed to be their girlfriends simply for them to get 
access to basic necessities for survival, and because no one dares to say ‘no’ to the demands 
of the security forces. The coercive environment that was created and exploited by the 
military and the CJTF members implies that consent to sex was practically impossible. 
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Women and girls interviewed expressed how the military and CJTF established an 
organized pattern to inflict sexual violence in Dalori IDP camp. The CJTF members select 
women in the camp(s) and take them to the military officers for sex. Two young girls 
between the ages of 14-19 stated that the structure of the Dalori camp was designed to make 
the sexual exploitation most convenient, by splitting young women and girls from their 
families - such as family in-laws and other people in the camp. They reported that if anyone 
amongst them dares to complain, they risk being tagged as ‘Boko Haram wife’ and face 
reprisals. 
The military and Civilian JTF members used force, or created or seized the 
opportunity of a coercive condition or circumstances; to have sex with women and girls in the 
IDP camp(s) may have committed the crime of rape. Because of the circumstances in which 
these crimes were perpetrated, those culpable may have committed war crime and crime 
against humanity of rape. If the members of the CJTF aided through selecting and taking 
these women and girls to the military for sex, such as being paid or rewarded in other forms 
by the military personnel involved, they may equally have committed the crime against 
humanity of enforced prostitution.  
4.2 Defining Sexual Violence in Armed Conflicts 
In the task of legal restraint of the crime of sexual violence in armed conflicts, one area in 
need of critical attention is that of definition of rape. It is an area loaded not only with 
substantive issues of the elements of the crime to be proved in specific trial, but also issues of 
the procedural sequencing of acts in the play of proceedings, with incidental consequences 
relating to questions of fairness of the treatment of the victims in the trial process. Providing 
adequate legal response is important because the victims of such crime may if motivated by 
reasonable apprehension of unfair treatment, decline to report or participate in the trial 
process. The consequence is that perpetrators may continue to enjoy impunity. 
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4.2.1 Sexual Violence 
In order to understand the full meaning of sexual violence, researchers must avoid the 
impulse to approach the subject matter from specific acts targeted at specific victims. This 
implies that the subject matter requires a holistic approach that would see the menace of 
sexual violence from a comprehensive or universal approach aimed at the psychological root 
of the subject. This holistic approach further suggests that it should not be treated as a mere 
act of crime committed against a single victim but to be seen as “collective affront against the 
people whom the victim represents, such as family or community.”
709
 First, Giddens argues 
that sexual violence should not be treated merely as a physical attack but should be 
considered as “an assault upon an individual’s integrity and dignity.”
710
 Following from this 
perspective, which sees sexual violence as an act committed to an individual, Omonubi-
McDonnel noted that sexual violence “degrade, control and humiliate the victim.”
711
 This 
provision clearly explains the experiences of thousands of women and girls that were exposed 
to physical and psychological torture; forced labour, forced marriage to their abductors and 
sexual abuse, including rape by the security forces.
712
 
A more legal way of examining scholarly views on sexual violence is to revisit the 
provisions of the Geneva Conventions in which Pictet wrote a robust commentary published 
in 1952.
713
 However, one does not need a serious perusal to know that since Pictet’s 
publication, many events have occurred with dramatic consequences on public international 
law. For instance, the Geneva Conventions have enjoyed universal acceptability and “their 
application interpreted in hundreds of cases.”
714
 Similarly, since the publication of 
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Pictet’swork explaining the details of the Geneva Conventions, International Human Rights 
Law (IHRL) has undergone serious development, merging with International Humanitarian 
Law, especially in conflict situations.
715
 Recent efforts to develop treaties on human rights 
with focus on sexual violence, such as the - Istanbul Convention on violence against women; 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 2006, - have witnessed the increasing 
intersection of IHRL and IHL in situations of conflict.
716
As the ICTY explained; the recourse 
to human rights law is generally a welcome and needed assistance to determine the content of 
customary international law in the field of humanitarian law.
717
The intersection and growth 
of public international law can also be seen in the area of International Criminal Law. Thus, 
Rosenthal noted that: “International criminal law has become something of a growth industry 
since the 1990’s when the tribunals for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and Rwanda (ICTR) 
and the International Criminal Court (ICC) were established with jurisdiction over IHL 
violations.”
718
Although the Geneva Conventions did not denote much time to the issue of 
sexual violence, the subject of humane treatment appeared firmly in Article 27 of the Fourth 
Geneva Conventions and an attempt to expressly denounce sexual violence appeared 
clearly.719 
Unfortunately, none of the terms that appeared in the second paragraph including 
‘rape, enforced prostitution or any form of indecent’ assault has been defined in the 
conventions. It is, therefore, important to examine these terms from different sources, 
                                                          
715
Droege, Cordula "The Interplay between International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights 
Law in situations of Armed Conflict" (2007) 40(2) Israel Law Reviews, 310 
716
McQuigg, RonaghThe Istanbul Convention, Domestic Violence and Human Rights 1
st
 Ed (Routledge, 2019) 
717
Kunarc, IT-96-23-T, Judgment, 22 February 2001, para 467 
718
Supra, note  
719
 Article 27 of the Fourth Geneva Conventions, paragraph 2“Protected persons are entitled, in all 
circumstances, to respect for their persons, their honour, their family rights, their religious convictions and 
practices, and their manners and customs. They shall at all times be humanely treated, and shall be protected 
especially against all acts of violence or threats thereof and against insults and public curiosity.  
Women shall be especially protected against any attack on their honour, in particular against rape, enforced 
prostitution, or any form of indecent assault 
190 
 
including rulings in international jurisprudence, the Rome Statute and some aspects of the 
Elements of Crimes of the ICC
720
 and opinions of legal scholars.   
4.2.2 Rape 
In most part of human history, rape has been perceived as a “violation of the honour, dignity 
and reputation of a woman (or even of that of her husband) and not as a crime in and of 
itself.”
721
 Even when there was an appreciable awareness on an international level, conflicts 
still had substantial cases of rape as “military tribunals rarely charged or sanctioned it.”
722
 For 
example, many of the foot soldiers in both sides of the First and Second World Wars 
committed rape in various degrees but nothing was done to redress it.
723
 Another major 
instance of neglect of rape in the war period was the lack of prosecution of Nazis who created 
brothels with Jewish women to satisfy their sexual urge. In fact, such instances were not 
mentioned at the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg.
724
 
Perhaps of more concern is the fact that after the Geneva Conventions and Additional 
Protocols came into being, there was hardly any difference by that enactment to the attitude 
toward rape during periods of war.
725
 History has also shown how political expediency stood 
in the way of prosecution of rape cases after approximately 200,000 women from Bengali 
were raped. This has appeared more straightforwardly in the work by Kelly: 
“In the 1970s, an estimated 200,000 Bengali women were raped during the war of independence from 
Pakistan, yet ultimately, amnesty was quietly traded for independence.”
726
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However, due to the increase of reports on the gravity of rape, especially in war times, the 
responses of the international community began to change in the 1990s. Beginning with the 
weighty reports of the Rwandan and former Yugoslavian conflicts, more productive reactions 
began to emerge and legal actors could no longer hold back.
727
 In this vein, de Brouwer noted 
that: 
“In reporting both conflicts, the media highlighted the policy makers use of rape as a “weapon of war” 
to ethnically cleanse a population. For the first time, rape was transformed from a private, off-duty, 




Following from the above, attempts have been made in international jurisprudence to define 
rape. For instance, the International Criminal Tribunal (former Yugoslavia), in its ruling in 
the popular Furundžija case noted that before rape is said to have occurred, “coercion or 
force or threat of force against the victim or a third person”
729
 must have taken place. Four 
years later in 2001, the Tribunal in the Kunarac case deemed it fit to include 
additionalconditions “which would render an act of sexual penetration non-consensual or 
non-voluntary on the part of the victim.”
730
 It is important to note that the Kunarac case 
argued that the reconsidered position is the most accurate definition of rape in public 
international law.
731
 Again, the Akayesu case which was decided by the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, rape was qualified as “a form of aggression” in which its 
fundamental elements cannot be taken in instinctive portrayal of objects and body parts.  In 
precise terms, rape was regarded as “a physical invasion of a sexual nature, committed on a 
person under circumstances which are coercive.”
732
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Rape and sexual violence can also constitute elements of other forms of crimes in 
international law. The Delalic case (the decision of the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the former Yugoslavia) asserts that the occurrence of rape can also be used as the basis to 
establish torture “when the specific conditions of torture were fulfilled.”
733
Similarly, the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda in Akayesu case maintained that “rape and sexual 
violence could constitute genocide when the specific conditions of genocide were 
fulfilled.”
734
 The Penal Code
735
 that is applicable in Northern part of Nigeria also proscribes 
and punishes rape. Even though the scope of the definition does not reach international 
standards of context of where and how the crime is perpetrated, it includes circumstances 
where consent has been obtained by placing the victim in fear of death or injury.
736
 Data 
obtained has demonstrated how in several occasions, the Nigerian military and members of 
the Civilian JTF reportedly, sexually penetrated women in circumstances that is coercive, 




It should be noted that there is no room for discrimination in the prohibition of rape or 
sexual violence. This means that all people, regardless of gender, age or race, are protected 
by the same prohibition on rape and sexual violence. This has been put more explicitly by 
Rosenthal: “Except for forced pregnancy, the crimes of sexual violence in the Statute of the 
International Criminal Court are prohibited when committed against “any person”, not only 
women. In addition, in the Elements of Crimes for the International Criminal Court, the 
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In the following section, we will examine different cases that have been decided by 
the Ad Hoc Tribunals and see how the geography of rape and the administration of reparation 
have changed over time.  
4.3 International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) 1998 – The AkayesuTrial 
Despite a variety of views, the most significant benefit of the International Criminal Tribunal 
for Rwanda (ICTR) 1998 is its pioneering role in the definition of rape.
739
 However, it should 
be noted that rape was never part of the initial issue in the case:rape was latter added to the list 
of crimes committed when it became glaringly obvious that the prosecution statement before 
the tribunal had much evidence of such instances. In fact, it was the Court itself that informed 
the prosecution of the need to include rape as one of the major claims. Consequent upon this 
action, Rene Degni-Segui who was the UN Special Rapporteur noted that, “rape was the rule, 
and it absence the exception.”
740
 
The case of genocide in Rwanda was much publicised because of the large number of 
lives lost, estimated to be within the range of one million people.
741
 The violations and cases 
of rape, mutilations and murder in Rwanda however, was gender biased as it was targeted at 
women, numbering about five hundred thousand in all.
742
 While a significant number of 
political and military leaders of the Rwandan armed forces were found to be culpable, Jean-
Paul Akayesu was specifically committed before the Tribunal for committing “genocide 
crimes against humanity and violations of the Geneva Conventions.”
743
 
The ICTR attempted a definition of rape in the following way:   
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“[A] physical invasion of a sexual nature, committed on a person under circumstances which are 
coercive. Sexual violence which includes rape is considered to be any act of a sexual nature which is 
committed on a person under circumstances which are coercive.”
744
 
However, a certain condition was attached for rape to be established. Specifically, the court 
noted that “coercive circumstances need not be evidenced by a show of physical 
force.”
745
Aside from an attempt to define rape, theAkayesucasealso included rape among 
crimes that can be qualified as “act of genocide, termed as genocidal rape.”
746
 Accordingly, 
the recognition of rape as act of genocide has now become a prominent feature of 
international criminal law as encoded in Article 6 of the Rome Statute.
747
 
The most significant aspect of the ruling to the development of the definitional value 
of rape relates to the following point:  
“[R]ape is a form of aggression and that the central elements of the crime of rape cannot be captured in 
a mechanical description of objects and body parts. The Convention against Torture…does not 
catalogue specific acts in its definition of torture, focusing rather on the conceptual frame work of state 
sanctioned violence. This approach is more useful in international law.”
748
 
The imprecision in the above definition is glaring. However, it is to the advantage of the 
victims of rape as it “allows room for more conduct to be captured within the definition,”
749
 
argues Alvarez.  
4.3.1 The Furundzija Case 
Immediately after the Akayesu
750
 case was decided, the Furundzija
751
 case added momentum 
to the evolution of the criminal definitional framework of rape. As noted above, the Akayesu 
case did not specifically address rape but it was simply added to it by the prosecution 
following the advice of the court. However, it was the first case that dealt with specific 
charges on rape. Describing the nature of the case, Marzen noted the following: 
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“Furundzija was the local commander of the “Jokers”, a unit of the Croatian Defence Council, and was 
convicted based on the rapes that took place during the interrogation of a Muslim woman, and was 
convicted of torture and outrages upon personal dignity, including rape.”
752
 
The Furundzija case claimed that there is no clear internationally acceptable legal definition 
of rape. It also queried the inherent imprecision of the Akayesuattempt at defining rape. 
Consequently, the court relied on a nationwide survey to determine the correct language and 
issues to include in what is to be termed an internationally acceptable definition of rape.
753
 
After much deliberation, the judges devised what they felt was a more acceptable definition of 
the concept of rape. The judgment thus established additional requirements which must be 
part of what constitute rape: 
“The following may be accepted as the objective elements of rape:  
(i)         The sexual penetration, however slight:  
(a)        Of the vagina or anus of the victim by the penis of the perpetrator or any other object 
used by the perpetrator;  
Or (b) of the mouth of the victim by the penis of the perpetrator;  
(ii)        By coercion or force or threat of force against the victim or a third person.
754
 
In contrast with the definition offered by the Akayesu case, the Furundzija case relied on specific 
touching of body parts to establish rape. It also discusses force which is not in line with the 
definition of rape in the Akayesu case. ‘Consent’ as a basic factor in establishing rape was not 
mentioned in the definition offered by Furundzija. However, the factor of ‘consent’ was 
discussed as seen below:  
“Any form of captivity vitiates consent. Under Rule 96 of the Rules, it 
is clear that no corroboration of the evidence… is required.”
755
 
Drawing from the above explanatory note, it is clear that consent (though absent in the 
definition) remains a fundamental factor in establishing the occurrence of rape. One 
fundamental aspect of the Furundzija definition relates with the reduction of the scope for 
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victim’s privilege which was very visible in the Akayesu definition. This was done to enlarge 
the scope of the definition to provide a broader perspective to the understanding of rape.  
4.3.2 The Kunurac Case756 
The name Kunaracresonatesin international criminal law following his conviction for torture, 
rape and, enslavement, and crimes committed against humanity when he was the head of a 
reconnaissance unit of the Bosnian Serb Army.
757
 There are two phases in the development of 
the definition of rape relating to this case; while the first one can be derived from the Trial 
Chambers judgment, the second is deciphered from the judgment in the Appeals Chamber. 
4.3.3 The Trial Chamber Judgment 
In principle, the view expressed in the definition of rape in the Furundzija case was upheld in 
this case.
758
 However, the position of the Trial Chamber judgment in respect of the definition 
of rape differs in the manner in which the Furundzija definition did not place emphasis on the 
requirement of force in its definition, as mandated by international law.
759
 Accordingly, the 
judgment of the Trial Chamber noted that the absence of ‘force’
760
 limited the scope through 
which victims of rape can seek for justice. It was based on this observation that the Trial 
Chamber defined rape in the following way: 
“The actus reus of the crime of rape in international law is constituted by: the sexual penetration, 
however slight: (a) of the vagina or anus of the victim by the penis of the perpetrator or any other object 
used by the perpetrator; or (b) of the mouth of the victim by the penis of the perpetrator; where such 
sexual penetration occurs without the consent of the victim. Consent for this purpose must be consent 
given voluntarily, as a result of the victim’s free will, assessed in the context of the surrounding 
circumstances. The mens rea is the intention to effect this sexual penetration, and the knowledge that it 
occurs without the consent of the victim.”
761
 
Although the definition infuses certain aspects observed in the previous opinions on rape, it 
reintroduced the aspect of ‘consent’ as a central feature of the definition of rape.  
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4.3.4 The Appeals Chamber Judgment 
As is customary with appeal cases, the appellant challenged key aspects of the judgment, 
particularly the definition of rape by the original Trial Chamber. The Appellant argued that 
rape cannot be said to have taken place unless certain conditions are established. Specifically, 
the appellant maintained that there must be two additional elements in a definition requiring 




In its response, the Appeals Chamber accepted the initial position of the Trial 
Chamber’s definition of rape and made two points in light of that definition of rape. First, the 
requirement claimed by the appellants that ‘resistance’ should be made as a condition was 
rebuffed as illogical as having no basis in “customary international law.”
763
 Another aspect of 
the definition that was discussed was the effect of force in qualifying the crime of rape. It can 
be recalled that the Trial Chamber departed from the initial definition of rape, which focussed 
“the absence of consent as the conditio sine qua non of rape.”
764
The Appeals Chamber 
endorsed the position of the Trial Chamber, which did not place emphasisonconsent in certain 
situations, particularly in cases ofgenocide.The situation pictured in the definition reflected on 
the obvious circumstances in the Kunaraccase as the victims (mostly women) were forcefully 
detained and were at the mercy of their abductors. Based on the scenario, “such detentions 
amount to circumstances that were so coercive as to negate any possibility of consent.”
765
 As 
noted elsewhere, force was not contended in the definition of rape in the Trial Chamber. This 
has error has been interpreted as “intentional in an attempt to ensure as wide a scope as 
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possible for rape victims outside that of pure physical force.”
766
 The Appeals Chamber itself 
has rationalised that: “A narrow focus on force or threat of force could permit perpetrators to 
evade liability for sexual activity to which the other party had not consented by taking 
advantage of coercive circumstances without relying on physical force.”
767
 
This definition perfectly fits into the situation of women and girls in the Boko Haram 
conflict. For instance, thousands of women and girls were be sexually exploited by the 
Nigerian security forces and members of the Civilian JTF in IDP camps. Women and girls 
were coerced to become girlfriends or wives of the Nigerian military or the CJTF which 
involved being accessible for sex on a regular basis in exchange for food. Women who 
complied with these demands to be girlfriends or wives said they agreed in order to get 
enough food to survive. They explained to the researcher how both the military and CJTF 
created and took advantage of these situations. Twenty seven year old Mara (not her real 
name), said that when she arrived in the camp in 2016, military forces and CJTF members 
took away the food meant for them, forcing women to have sex to access supplies. She said:  
Eighty five percent of the women in the camp have a boyfriend. Because all of us in the IDPs- we need 
assistance to get what we need to live. And the military and CJTF know this. So when they see you, if 
the lady is young and beautiful, they will start helping you. So when they help you, you know you have 
to pay for it, so you will go and sleep with them. From there the relationship starts. If you refuse, you 
wouldn’t get anything. Any benefit available in the camp would be denied to you. They will say you are 
a Boko Haram woman, a Boko Haram wife. You may be in trouble. They will harass you. You may 
have to hide in your tent. Otherwise, they will make trouble for you.
768
 
Even though the researcher was informed by some camp officials that the soldiers and CJTF 
were no longer allowed entering the camp at night, several women disagreed. They claimed 
the soldiers continue to enter the camp in the evening to have sex with them, and that 
girlfriends are allowed to leave the camp at night to meet the soldiers.
769
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4.3.5 Rape under the International Criminal Court 
Although rape was not specifically defined in the Rome Statute,
770
 but added amongst what 
constitutes crime against humanity and also as a war crime.
771
 However, an attempt was made 
to define rape as part of the Elements of Crimes of the International Criminal Court, 2010. It 
stated two conditions that may qualify as rape.
772
 
In the following section, we would critically analyse how the ICC treated the crime of 
sexual violence and the condition(s) the Court sets out in order to prove the crime of rape in 
the context of armed conflict. This is important because it guides us to understand the 
controversy surrounding command responsibility and legitimacy of consent – given in a 
coercive environment, particularly in relation to the circumstances of women and girls in 
areas under Boko Haram control, IDPs camps, as well as military barracks in Maiduguri. 
4.3.6 The Bemba Case773 
Legal scholars have high regard for the judgment in the Bemba case for two main reasons. 
First, the Bembe case goes down in history as the first case decided by the ICC which led to a 
“conviction for rape.”
774
SamiroDaoud, a senior director with Amnesty International in West 
Africa remarked that the judgement is “an historic moment in the battle for justice and 
accountability for victims of sexual violence in the Central African Republic (CAR) and 
around the world.”
775
 Furthermore, it is now known that “Bemba was the first ICC defendant 
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to be convicted on the basis of command responsibility.”
776
FatouBensouda in the following 
words:  
“highlighted the critical need to eradicate sexual and gender-based crimes as weapons in conflict by 
holding accountable those who fail to exercise their duties and responsibilities that their status as 
commanders and leaders entail.”
777
 
At the very least, the judgment can serve as a form of deterrence to those who hold 
commanding positions in the armed forces, given that they can be held for being irresponsible 
or for the irresponsible acts of their subjects. 
Regarding the controversy surrounding the subject of consent, the verdict established 
that a “victim’s lack of consent is not a legal element of the crime of rape under the 
Statute.”
778
 According to the verdict, a strict requirement to prove the consent of the victim 
who was violated “would, in most cases, undermine efforts to bring perpetrators to 
justice.”
779
Grewal has noted that“While consent in the context of rape laws has sometimes 
been a problematic concept, it has also been seen as a key means of recognizing the right of 
an individual to exercise freedom of choice and control over one’s body and life.”
780
The view 
expressed here reflects the definition offered in the Kunurac case, which recognises that 
victims in war situations would not have the opportunity to decide and thus consent was 
largely negated. In the Boko Haram conflict, this study has identified how the Nigerian 
military and the CJTF members usually used force and threats to rape women and girls, and 
exploited their condition to coerce women into becoming their girlfriends which makes them 
available at any given time for sex.
781
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Rape is likely to occur in four difference situations as outlined in the Elements of 
Crimes. The first three situations include “force,” “threat of force or coercion,” or “taking 
advantage of coercive environment.”
782
 Consent was only noted in the fourth; “against a 
person incapable of giving a genuine consent.”
783
 The Court moved on to explain that 
Elements of Crimes defines persons “incapable of giving consent as those affected by either 
natural, induced or age related incapacity.
784
 This acknowledges that there are certain persons 
that, regardless of the situation, are completely unable to give consent. This is in simple 
contrast to the Kunurac definition, which stressed the need of the overpowering of a victims’ 
free will through coercive environment. Therefore, as noted by Clark, Elements of Crimes 
made a clear distinction between situations and consent, which the Bemba judgment 
emphasized.
785
 This is because, as noted by the Court, in the first three situations the 
prosecutor is not required to prove the victim’s absence of consent.
786
 In general terms, it is 
the observation of this study on the difficulty involved in the definition of rape, especially in 
regards to the idea of “proving consent,” this study instead suggest that, a single definition 
which concentrates on the coercive circumstances of the act is more likely to achieve the ends 
of containment of sexual violence that one which will constantly require the Prosecutor to 
prove that the victim did not give consent to the act. Because these arguments on consent will 
continue to cause unnecessary delays and lose of hope by the victims in the legal system.  
4.3.7 Who is a Victim of Rape? 
As analysed above, the definition of rape would not be meaningful unless we understand who 
the victim of rape is. The understanding of a victim of rape would also help legal scholars and 
even judges in awarding the most suitable form of reparation and access to both local and 
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international mechanisms for adjudication. The term has been used at a general level by the 
Rome Statute to refer to “persons’ and ‘non-persons’ who have suffered as a result of the 
commission of any crime under the jurisdiction of the court.”
787
 The UN has also adopted a 
broad approach to the definition of victims to include persons that encountered: physical or 




Moffett argues that victimhood should be based on the effect of the act on the 
individuals and groups who may suffer it.
789
 While many studies have largely focussed on 
direct or primary victims (those that are directly involved in the case of rape),
790
 this study is 
also concerned with effect of rape on other classes of victims such as secondary and tertiary. 
Therefore, those who are adjudged as close to the primary victim of rape such as family 
members love ones of the victim and dependants of the primary victim are categorised as 
secondary victims.
791
 On the other hand, tertiary victims can be members of the victim’s 
immediate community who can feel the effect of the damage to a member of their social 
community (social club, group etc.).
792
 Legal scholars justify the effect of the damage on 
these three layers of victimisation to enable the appropriate form of reparation that should be 
given to each according to the class of victimhood. Moffett makes the point more succinctly: 
“The distinction can help to provide appropriate remedies to different groups of victims, such as 
compensation, restitution, and rehabilitation to the primary and secondary victims, to collective 
reparations and non-recurrence measures for tertiary victims.”
793
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As demonstrated by this research, women and girls who have experienced forced 
displacement, arbitrary incarceration in Giwa barracks, starvation for the purposes of rape as 
well as other grave violations of human rights and international humanitarian law have a right 
to reparation.
794
 Therefore, women and girls who were victims in the Boko Haram conflict 
should be provided with full and effective reparation, including restitution, rehabilitation, 
compensation and assurance of non-repetition.
795
 
4.4 The Prohibition of Sexual Violence in International and Non - International Armed 
Conflicts 
 
The Lieber Code appears to be the first legal instrument within the scope of international 
humanitarian law to prohibit rape in explicit terms. Specifically, paragraphs 44 and 47 of the 
Lieber Code noted the outright prohibition on not only rape but other forms of crimes as 
quoted below: 
“(...) all rape (...) by an American soldier in a hostile country against its inhabitants (...) under the 




However, it is important to note that Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions did not 
contend outright prohibition against rape. But it mentioned prohibition against “violence to 
life and person” including cruel treatment and torture and “outrages upon personal dignity.”
797
 
Thus it could be argued that Third Geneva Convention required those who are taking 
prisoners to ensure their honour and dignity is respected.798 
Further, Additional Protocols I and II firmly prohibited “at any time and in any place 
whatsoever, whether committed by civilian or by military agents” certain acts including 
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“outrages upon personal dignity.”
799
 Thus, more interestingly, Additional Protocol II noted 
that this condition to respect the personal dignity of all persons must also include acts 
committed during terrorist attacks as captured in Article 4(2) (d).
800
 While a further 
prohibition on rape appears in strong terms in Article 4(2) (e) that: “Outrages upon personal 
dignity in particular, humiliating and degrading treatment, rape, enforced prostitution and any 
form of indecent assault.”
801
 
The drafters of the First Additional Protocol noted in Article 75 the scope of the 
prohibition including “Outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and 
degrading treatment, enforced prostitution and any form of indecent assault.”
802
As stated 
above, rape has appeared boldly in Additional Protocol II, specifically in Article 4(2) (e).
803
 
Understanding the gravity of the offence of rape and the need to shield vulnerable populations 
from its threat, the Fourth Geneva Convention mandates the protection of women and 
children. This is provided in Article 27, which reads that “Women shall be especially 
protected against any attack on their honour, in particular against rape, enforced prostitution, 
or any form of indecent assault.”
804
 Similarly, Articles 76 and 77 of the Additional Protocol II 
noted the need for parties to the conflict to ensure equal protection for women and children 
respectively. In both the Fourth Geneva Convention and Additional Protocol I, did not only 
mention rape but enforced prostitution and other forms of indecent assault on the dignity and 
honour of persons. It is also important to note that the aforementioned namely “rape, enforced 
prostitution and any other form of indecent assault” on the dignity and honour of persons have 
been categorised as war crimes under Article 4(e) of the Statutes of the International Criminal 
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 Also, Article 3(e) of the Special Court for Sierra Leone prohibited 
these acts and declared them as war crimes.
806
 Some have argued that the language adopted in 
the prohibition in the Common Article 3 “outrages upon personal dignity” and “any form of 
indecent assault” can be interpreted to mean sexual violence.
807
 
Following from the Statute of the International Criminal Court, “committing rape, 
sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy … enforced sterilization, or any other 
form of sexual violence” can be seen as grave violation of the provisions of the Geneva 
Conventions. Again, some have extended the interpretation base on the provisions of the ICC 
Elements of Crimes Article 8(2) (xxii) and Article 8(2) (e) (vi)-1 both noted that “Committing 
rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, as defined in article 7, 
paragraph 2 (f), enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence also constituting a 
grave breach of the Geneva Conventions”in both international and non-international war 
scenarios.
808
 Further, “rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced 
sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity” has been 
pronounced as a crime against humanity in Article 7(1) (g) of the Statute of the International 
Criminal Court and “rape” measures up as a crime against humanity going by the position of 
the Statutes of the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia, (Article 5g) 
and Rwanda (Article 3g).
809
 
In the legal lexicon, a substantial number of military manuals do not only prohibit the 
acts of “rape enforced prostitution and indecent assault are prohibited” but also see them as 
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 Interestingly, the Nigerian military also proclaimed that these acts are 
prohibited as they all add up to war crimes. Even the country’s constitution noted that rape is 
illegal. This has appeared in section 357 of the Criminal Code Act, CAP 77, LFN, 1990.811 
Most states have been vocal critics of the violations of the laws governing wars and 
particularly the prohibition relating to rape and other forms of sexual violence.
812
 As with 
States, international organisations have also been in the forefront in the campaign against rape 
and sexual violence in both peace and war times. One clear example of the United Nations 
campaign against rape and sexual violence was the joint condemnation of rape by the Security 
Council, General Assembly and the Commission on Human Rights when it became glaring 







 and the conflicts in the Former Yugoslavia.
816
 Even the Former Yugoslavian 
controversial position was later upturn when international pressures mounted that: “It is 
significant that in 1993 Yugoslavia acknowledged in its report to the Committee on the 
Elimination of Discrimination Against Women that abuses of women in war zones were 
crimes contrary to international humanitarian law and apologized for an earlier statement 
giving the false impression that rape was considered normal behaviour in times of war.”
817
 
One can argue that rape remains prohibited even from the perspective of human rights 
law when one considers the extend of prohibition on related violations such as torture and 
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cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. Following from this rationale, the 
European Court of Human Rights has ruled the rape of detainees as amounting to torture.
818
 
Specifically, in the Aydin v. Turkey case, the rape of detainees was seen as equal to torture.
819
 
In this light, the failure to provide enough food and healthcare to detainees for the purpose of 
raping their victims and Giwa barracks violates prohibition on torture.
820
Similarly, since the 
1970s, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights referred to rape of detainees in the 
light of torture.
821
 Therefore, rape can be treated as an element of torture under human rights 
law. Besides, the European Court of Human Rights rejected certain practices where prisoners 
were treated without respect to their human dignity. In the case of Valasinas v. Lithuania,
822
 
the Court “found the strip-searching of a male prisoner in the presence of a female prison 
officer to be a degrading treatment.” 
Discrimination based on gender has been qualified as gender-based violence by the 
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women.
823
 There is an increase in 
the number of legal instruments that treat the trafficking of women and children with the sole 
purpose of prostitution to be a criminal offence.
824
 Likewise, there are appreciable number of 
organisations and instruments advocating for severe punishment of those who are found 
responsible for the offence of sexual violence.
825
 As one author concludes, “the prohibition of 
using sexual violence as an official punishment is clear; not only is such a punishment not 
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officially provided for by States, but also any confirmed reports of such an incident have 
either been denied or the relevant persons prosecuted.”
826
 Therefore, Rule 93 whether in 
international or non-international armed conflicts, acts of sexual violence are not permissible. 
4.4.1 A Hidden Atrocity of Sexual Violence in Nigeria’s Boko Haram Armed Conflict 
Sexual violence appears to be one of the most prevalent crimes in conflict situations but it has 
not received sufficient legal recognition across the world.
827
 In the North-eastern region of 
Nigeria where Boko Haram has been operating since 2009, sexual violence has become 
endemic, yet little or nothing has been done toward the prosecution of the offenders. While it 
is understood that “Boko Haram has adopted sexual violence as an instrument of war,”
828
 it is 
difficult to comprehend why the prosecution of the perpetrators is proving difficult. In fact, 
the group’s abduction of 276 young girls at Chibok in Borno State has sparked many 
reactions from the international community “largely due to the number and age of the girls 
involved.”
829
 It is also important to note that the group has committed other severe forms of 
sexual violence apart from the abduction of the Chibok girls. Accordingly, the Amnesty 
International has contended in its report that over “2000 women and girls have been captured 
and forced into slavery by Boko Haram in a little over 12 months.”
830
 
Following the pervasive cases of sexual violence, human rights institutions had 
recommended the effective prosecution of the group’s members for different forms of sexual 
violence, including “rape, sexual slavery and other forms of sexual violence.”
831
 There was 
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also the incident involving the abduction of another group of 110 young high school girls in 
Dapchi, a village in Yobe State.
832
 As has been revealed, the harsh condition in which they 
were subjected to while in abduction led to the death of some few of the girls.
833
 This is to 
say that girls are not only abducted but mostly maltreated in a manner that threatens their 
lives. However, the administration of cruelty in the course of abduction can differ depending 
on one’s faith. Commenting on the Dapchi incident, Akpoghome: 
“Leah Sharibu, who was fourteen years old when she was abducted in February 2019, was not released 




While it is difficult to establish the exact figure of girls and boys that have been sexually 
violated in the course of the Boko Haram conflict, information into the kind of sexual 
violence that occur in the camps run by the insurgent group have been narrated by those few 
who escaped or got rescued by the Nigerian security forces. The following accounts of sexual 
violence of the victims would enable the reader to appreciate the extent of violation 
committed by the sect against their victims. 
In 2018, a girl of 16 years old named JummaiIliya was rescued at Sambisa forest while 
vomiting blood. In an interview, she noted that the “terrorists took turns to have sex with her 
on a daily basis and she ended up being pregnant and was forced into an unwanted 
marriage.”
835
 Another lady of 23 years old named Asabe who managed to escape from Boko 
Haram captivity revealed that she was subjected to rape by 15 men and 15 times almost on 
daily basis until the period she got the chance to find her way out of the forest.
836
 While in 
other situations; “women have been fought upon in the camps as they are treated as ‘food.”
837
 
As a result of the conflict, there has been a significant increase in the cases of sexual violence 
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in the conflict region. In 2018, the United Nations reported that about 1000 were sexually 
violated in 2017 as against an estimated number of 664 in the year 2016.
838
 
The challenge of rape is that it has a psychological trauma which when not properly 
treated can continue to undermine the productivity and social inclusion of the victim years 
after the incident.
839
For example, many are being stigmatized years after they have been 
rescued or escaped from captivity. The case is even worse for those “who return pregnant or 
with children conceived through rape are usually rejected or forced to choose between their 
babies and their families.”
840
 
With the extant knowledge of the group on non-combatant groups, it is expected that 
they should be subjected to all forms of prosecution but that is not the case. It was Justice 
Louis Brandeis who noted that “sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectant.”
841
 This implies 
that the knowledge of the existence of sexual violence should naturally lead to the prosecution 
of the perpetrators. However, this has not been the case as justice has not been served to the 
victims. According to one commentator: 
“Once, we have acknowledged Boko Haram’s sexual and gender-based crimes, providing justice to 
survivors and victims’ is a necessary step but unfortunately to date no single member of Boko Haram 
has been prosecuted for sexual violence.”
842
 
More serious still, the administration of President Muhammadu Buhari has begun a massive 
program to grant amnesty to repentant members of the sect, thus betraying any hope of 
prosecution for sexual violence that is clearly against the spirit of the Nigerian constitution 
and other relevant international and regional legal instruments. The idea of granting amnesty 
was meant to be granted only for the crime of participating in armed conflict and does not 
include crimes committed in the course of prosecuting the conflict.  
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The act of sexual violence including forceful marriages, rape and sexual slavery 
committed by Boko Haram do not only constitute criminal offence, but it can be treated as a 
flagrant violation of the human rights of the victims as contended in Chapter Four of the 
Nigerian Constitution 1999 (as amended). In particularly, Section 33 of the Nigerian 
Constitution offers to protect the citizens’ rights and to protect their dignity. In specific terms, 
the law guarantees that: 
1) No person shall be subject to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment  
2) No person shall be held in slavery or servitude and; 
3) No person shall be required to perform forced or compulsory labor 
From this, it can be argued that the Nigerian Constitution did not consider sexual 
violence in specific terms. However, sexual violence can be accommodated under severe 
cases of violation of human dignity under the same provision, especially following the logic 
of jurisprudential interpretation. Therefore, the group members can be said to have violated 
constitutional provisions related to sexual violence and should be prosecuted as required. As 
stated earlier, no single member of Boko Haram has been prosecuted for sexual violence and 
the same goes to members of the Nigerian security forces and the Civilian Joint Task Force.
843
 
Also, there is no record of proper investigation of sexual violence committed by the sect or 
government security forces and the Civilian Joint Task Force.
844
 
4.4.2 Abduction of Women and the Chibok Girls 
The group’s strategies against the Nigerian government also involve the “abduction of women 
and the systematic targeting of schools.”
845
 From 2009 when Boko Haram became brutal, it 
has engaged in several cases of abduction of women and men (mostly children). The most 
popular of the cases of adduction in recent years has been the case of about 276 girls known 
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within the international media as “Chibok girls.”
846
 It has been argued that the manner of 
treatment of women by the group in Nigeria is similar to the horrible report of ISIL’s 
treatment of the Yazidis in the Middle East.
847
 However, there are different reasons why Boko 
Haram targeted the Chibok Girls, some of which are analysed below. In all, there are about 
three fundamental reasons namely; schoolchildren, Christians, or under the auspices of the 
Nigerian government.  
First, it is possible that the group’s target of Chibok girls was borne out of the desire to 
promote its “principle to end Western education.”
848
 This explains why the group has engaged 
in what Human Rights Watch described as “systematic targeting of schools, destroying 211 
schools in Borno, twenty-one schools in Yobe, as well as attacking the Federal Government 
College and an agricultural college.”
849
 Many lives have been lost as a result of the attacks 
with damaging repercussion on the education sector which was already strained.
850
 It is the 
conviction of the sect that their attacks on schools would discourage Nigerians from sending 
their children to orthodox schools if it was successful in mass abduction and sustained 
attacks.
851
 However, one kind observer who has been in the frontline of the war in the North-
Eastern part of the country noted that:  
“The motive is clear that they intend to scare people from sending their wards to Non-Koranic schools, 
they also intend to engage in forced conversion of the abductees. 
This - explains why they forcefully marry the young girls and rape them violently.”
852
 
Some have argued that the group’s targeting of the Chibok girls can be given a religious 
consideration. Chibok is a small town populated by Christian minorities in Borno State and 
the group’s consistent raiding of the town has made others to offer a religious interpretation to 
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 This religious card fits into the narrative especially that over 75 percent of 
the abducted girls were Christians.
854
 Besides, some have noted that that the few Muslims 
among the girls were given preferential treatment as some were allowed to leave while their 
Christian fellows were said to be given the “choice of converting to Islam or facing conditions 
of domestic servitude, whereas the militants allowed most Muslim abductees to leave.”
855
 
However, a closer look at the events suggests that almost all the girls were subjected to some 
form of sexual violence as they were forcefully married off to insurgents and some sold in 
distant lands: 
“It is easy to upturn any little thing into a religious game in Nigeria. For anyone who is familiar with the 
country, it has always been sensitive to matters of religion for understandable reasons. However, the 
case of the Chibok girls does not fit into this simplistic narrative. There were other cases of abductions 
and forced marriages by the group against fellow Muslims. The group has been brutal to both religions 
as it has thrown bombs on both Christian and Muslim worshippers. The least in the calculation of the 
group’s intention is religion even though it professed the intention to establish an Islamic Caliphate.”
856
 
A rational explanation that fits into the group’s agenda of targeting the Chibok girls is “to pay 
back the Nigeria government, which had engaged in a campaign of targeting the wives of 
Boko Haram leaders.”
857
 It is popular knowledge that the Nigerian government on many 
occasions attack the families and relatives of the group’s members as a way of neutralising 
them or weakening them psychologically.
858
One participant noted the following: 
“On many occasions, the security forces are seen to humiliate by way of incessant arrest of wives of the 
insurgents with the objective to make them surrender their attacks against the Nigerian government and 
other soft targets. It is possible that most of these women are completely innocent of the activities of the 
group members. But we are in a country in which its security forces are its own authority.”
859
 
In any case, the group has subjected women to various forms of sexual violence. There are 
those who were forcefully married off to fellow members of the group while others were 
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converted to slaves, working for the group’s interest and also satisfying their sexual desires. 
In the following, we will analyse the basis on which elements of the Rome Statute can be 
applied to prosecute the members of the Boko Haram for violations relating to rape and other 
forms of sexual violence.   
4.4.3 Prosecution of Sexual Violence through the International Criminal Court 
Through the principle of the complementarily, the International Criminal Court (ICC) canbe 
able to prosecute cases that the Nigerian government have been unwilling or incapable to 
prosecute such as the case of the violations of the Boko Haram group. In the case of Boko 
Haram, the ICC can, if proven, prosecute the leader of Boko Haram, Abu- Shekau, for 
genocide of rape under Article 2(b) of the Genocide Convention.860 
Following from the above, the prosecutor would ensure that the leader of Boko Haram 
responsible for acts of rape provided under Article 7(1) (g)-1, which contend crimes of “rape, 
sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other 
form of sexual violence of comparable gravity.”
861
 On its part, the Court is expected to 
establish each component of Article 7(1)(g)-1.  
With regard to the provisions of Article 7(1)(g)-1 the victims (who in this case are the 
several women that have suffered sexual violence), would establish evidence of physical 
invasion. Several of these Boko Haram victims have spoken about their conditions to the 
researcher and some have opened up to international organisations in Nigeria.
862
 Some of the 
victims have been evacuated to abroad for mental treatment and they can offer substantial 
evidence of rape during abduction by the group.
863
 It is significant to note that the court only 
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used twenty-seven witnesses to convict the defendant in the Akayesu case.
864
 Although the 
prosecutor, like in most cases has the higher burden to show evidence of “penetration,” the 
fact that most of the women abducted were impregnated shows that the group’s purposes of 




With regards to the second part of Article 7(1)(g)-1, it is expected that the prosecution 
would prove the occurrence of coercive action in a coercive environment. It would be easy for 
the court to find the existence of coercion considering the manner of their evacuation and how 
they were subjected to all forms of humiliation in the hidden camps in Sambisa Forest. This is 
aside, the widespread killings and slaughtering of other victims to frighten them from daring 
to escape. The Court had once ruled in the Gacumbitsi case that the threat to kill women who 
seek to resist was said to have “vitiated consent.”
866
 Clearly, Boko Haram has exercised 
complete control and command over their captives (women, children and other vulnerable 
groups). As a result, they decide their movements and choices. It is based on this observation 
that Gavin argued that the group used “rape as a weapon of war.”
867
 However, if the Court 
takes the path of Semanza, it may require rigorous processes of verification of individual 
cases with the aim to establish consent. But from the line of cases after Semanza, such as 
Gacumbitsi and Bembait does not seem that the court will follow in that order.  
Following from the analysis, one can argue that the chain of command and control of 
the enslavement and mass abduction of women by Boko Haram leading to rape is more like 
an established military institution of a state.  
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4.4.4 Application of the Genocide Convention 
Once the prosecution substantiates claims of the existence of rape, it is expected that the 
Court would entertain the more challenging case – to further argue that the various instances 
of rape of the abducted women amounted to genocide. At the very least, the Court should be 
able to establish that the leaders of Boko Haram nursed the agenda to cause serious bodily 
suffering and mental harm to the Chibok people and other minorities within the North-Eastern 
region as envisaged under Article 2(b) of the Genocide Convention by means of rape with the 
main objective to destroy them through same measure (Rape). 
In order to establish Boko Haram’s main objective to cause suffering and serious 
bodily harm to the abducted Chibok girls in the North-East Nigeria, the prosecution may 
consider available facts. To begin with, the insurgents normally present the abductees with 
two choices – conversion to Islam or remain a slave.
868
 This implies that the group’s 
punishment to those who refuse conversion to Islam is to continue being a slave till death.
869
 
Recently, Gavin opined that: 
“Most of those kidnapped by Boko Haram are from Christian homes, but were reportedly forced to 
convert to Islam. Women and girls were also forced into marriage, and there are reports of people being 
sold into slavery. Amnesty International estimates that more than 2,000 women and girls were abducted 
by Boko Haram in 2014.”
870
 
Secondly, the occurrence of sexual violence on its own can be interpreted as the causing of 
serious bodily and mental harm to the victim.
871
 Another important factor to present before 
the court is the fact that Boko Haram’s attack of Chibok, unlike in other cases of their attacks, 
is to enslave the people because of their religion and identity, just like the case of the Yazidis 
being attacked and enslaved by the ISIL.
872
 This should also involve a claim of killings of 
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women who resisted abduction or resisted rape when abducted. This should qualify the 
glaring existence of a grand intent to cause bodily and mental harm to the Chibok people and 
other minorities. In seeking to convince the Court of Boko Haram’s grand objective to cause 
the destruction of Chibok people and other minorities within the North-Eastern region, the 
prosecution can produce convincing facts based on Boko Haram’s own confessional 
statements.
873
 It is possible to present to the Court clear messages targeted at Chibok by Boko 
Haram leaders in Hausa and Kanuri languages.
874
 
It is customary for the Court to make a decision based on what is presented before 
them, including whether the Chibok girls and other abductees can live freely, practicing their 
culture under Boko Haram rule. No one needs extra effort to know that the Chibok girls and 
other abductees do not enjoy freedom, not of their right to self-preservation. Even the basic 
freedom of movement and worship is denied. From the foregoing, the fundamental reason 
why Boko Haram needs the Chibok girls and other women abductees is for sexual 
purposes.
875
 It is also important to note that the only thing short of sexual violence is death. 
The mass killings and bombings are clear evidences that cannot be denied.
876
 There is the 
likelihood for the case to take the tune of Sebrenica where the Court established localised 
genocide. What implies is that genocide can be local when not all members of the ethnic 
group are raped or killed?
877
 Besides, hundreds of women, if not thousands remained enslaved 
by the group.   
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While the factors analysed above are grounds for prosecution, below we will examine 
whether there is credible evidence to charge the Boko Haram members for the factors 
analysed or for non-genocide crimes provided for in Article VII of the Rome Statute.  
4.4.5 Rape as Genocide in light of the Boko Haram Armed Conflict 
Considering the position of Article VI of the Rome Statute which defines genocide as acts 
that are committed by a group “with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, 
ethnical, racial or religious group,”
878
 it will be difficult to prosecute the group’s leader for 
rape as genocide. Because, it is understandable that some of the group’s members might have 
been responsible for some incidents of rape or engaged in forced marriages and other forms 
of sexual violence. However, it will be difficult for the prosecution to establish the most 
essential requirement to show clear evidence that will indicate that the group committed those 




Perhaps the most challenging question for the prosecution will be to establish the 
grounds to convince the Court that the sole intent of the actions of Boko Haram is specifically 
targeted at a certain group. This will particularly be problematic because the message(s) of 
the group have failed to identify a specific group or ethnicity. One observer noted that “Boko 
Haram has communicated multiple different messages”
880
 and for that, it will be highly 
unlikely to convince the Court over the identity of the target group or ethnicity. The central 
message of the group has been to target ‘symbols of Western civilisation.’ A participant 
summarised the group’s target as follows: 
“Can we say they are after the Yoruba, Igbo or even Hausa/Fulani people? Or the minority group that 
occupy the middle belt region of Nigeria? Such a question can be difficult to attempt considering the 
fact that the group has attacked all groups including the Kanuri ethnic where the leaders of the group 
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come from. But we can hold unto the main message which their name is derived from. That is to say, 
the group’s target is western civilisation.”
881
 
For this main reason, the group has attacked school children, worship centres including 
Mosques
882
 and government buildings not excluding the UN building in Abuja.
883
 However, 
some have argued that the main intention of the group is to eliminate Christian population in 
the region.
884
 Arguably, the group has rendered many Christian communities homeless. If it 
becomes clear that the various attacks in the Middle Belt region are undertaken by the group, 
then one would have no reason to doubt that the Christian population may be the real target 
of Boko Haram. As one author noted:  
“Targeting Christians might work, but the evidence is unclear as to whether that is happening.”
885 
While it is true that Christians have been targeted by the group in many of its attacks, it is 
equally important to note that Muslim population, including their places of worship have not 
been spared. Responding to the question of whether the group sees the Muslims as part of its 
community, one respondent noted that: 
“Initially, we thought that the group emerged to defend the Muslims as part of the confrontation that 
has been taking place between Muslims and Christians, but with the passage of time, that believe has 
been upturned. The group has targeted and killed many Islamic scholars and used suicide bombers to 
kill Muslims. I can tell that we (referring to Muslims) have suffered more from the activities of Boko 
Haram than the people of other faiths.”
886
 
Similarly, Nigerian government, especially government institutions and public officers have 
also constituted a core target of the group.
887
 This explains why specific individuals have 
been targeted and killed as a result of their criticism against the group or support for the 
government. Pham noted that “there is also evidence that the group has attacked and killed 
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non-Christians, including Muslims who support the Nigerian government.”
888
However, one 
can argue that the group has separated Christians and Muslim captives as seen in the Chibok 
Girls incident.
889
 This was the same thing that culminated in the retaining of the only 
Christian captive, Leah Sharibu who was abducted alongside 110 other girls.
890
 But as 
Sverdlov has argued, “the separation of Christians from Muslims in the case of the Chibok 
girls is just one incident in six years, rather than a widespread and systematic attack. 




What happens in the event that the Court establishes that the Christians are the main 
target of the group’s activities? The next challenge will be to establish again whether such 
intent was in “whole or in part”
892
 When this becomes the case; there is the likelihood for the 
court to draw some lessons from the ICTY which noted that there is the possibility of 
localised genocide that led to the convictions of war criminals on the Serbian side.
893
 But the 
question that would arise from here is to determine the extent of a localised genocide. Can we 
argue that the various kidnappings of more than three hundred school girlsfall within that 
judgement? To answer such question, we also need to be reminded that more than half of the 
girls have been forcefully married off, a condition that is “similar to those that made up the 
genocide claims in Gacumbitsi.”
894
 Is it possible for the court to stretch the definition of 
genocide to accommodate such type of concerns? This is a good point the Court may wish to 
consider in the Boko Haram situation.   
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In the final analysis, it would be difficult for the court to be convinced that the 
intention of the group is principally to “destroy a people.”
895
 Similar to the prevailing practice 
among other insurgent groups, Boko Haram is not directly opposed to Christian belief.
896
 In 
all this, except for the isolated case of Leah Sharibu (who was retained for her faith even 
when her fellow captives whom she was abducted with, have been released), the group have 
not engaged in forced conversion of its abductees. But, it has engaged in sexual violence of 
all its abductees. However, it is equally important to note that the group “makes Christians 
face roadblocks to practicing their religion, not an outright prohibition.”
897
 This implies that 
isolated maltreatment of Christian abductees and victims of the conflict by the insurgent 
group can hardly be qualified as genocide.  
That as it may, prosecutors can succeed on other fronts since the claim of genocide 
can hardly scale through. It is possible that the insurgent group can be prosecuted on the two 
grounds all of which are derived from the Rome Statute. First, the group can be prosecuted 
for committing crimes against humanity as spelt out in Article 7 (1) (g) of the Rome Statute 
which reads that crimes against humanity that include “rape, sexual slavery, enforced 
prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of 
comparable gravity.”
898
 Or as provided under Article 7 (1) (k) which reads “other inhumane 
acts of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or to 
mental or physical health.”
899
 Perhaps, the group can also be prosecuted for committing war 
crimes as captured in Article 8(2) (a) (iii). However, it will be difficult for the ICC to indict 
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the group for crimes of torture under Article 8(2) (a) (ii) as earlier ruling of the same court 
(Bemba case) has clearly noted that “rape subsumed the allegations of torture.”
900
 
In the following section, the research will consider the alleged crimes of sexual 
violence against women and girls in military detention facilities and in the IDP camps by the 
military and members of the CJTF. 
4.4.6 Rape of Starving Women and Girls in the Internally Displaced Camps 
Scores of women and girls have described how they were being raped by the military forces 
and/or the civilian joint task force. Seven women reported that they were raped in Baga camp 
when they were starving or close to starving. Jamila, a twenty two- year old girl (not real 
name) informed officials of International Rescue Committee that she was raped after 
receiving food from a member of the CJTF who then believed is entitled to be ‘compensated.’ 
She expressed that:  
“They (the military and CJTF) will give you food and then return back late in the evening around 6pm 
or 7pm and ask you to come with them… one (CJTF) man came and brought food to me, he returned in 
the evening, but I hid myself. He came back the following day and asked me to take water to his place 
and I went. He then shut the tent door and raped me. He said I gave you these things, if you want them 
we have to be husband and wife.”
901
 
Larabe, 27 year old lady disclosed that she was raped numerous times after denying having 
sex with a member of the CJTF. She said:  
“There was a young man who is a CJTF… He came with money and told me he will give me this 
money if I agree to have sex with him and he will build a shelter for me with zinc. He said I should 
look at my neighbors, that he did the same with them and built them their shelters.”
902
 
Laraba explained that she refused to have sex with the CJTF member, and he reacted by 
beating her. She narrated:  
“Later, a military officer came and was sharing macaroni with the women. When I reached for some, 
the CJTF flogged me on my back till I fell…”
903
 
After some weeks, she said he came back to find her:  
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“He started raping me with force. I became very ill because there was no food… he (the CJTF) 
returned to me and said if I had agreed peacefully I wouldn’t be going through all this, and I wouldn’t 
need to strive for food.”
904
 
Twenty four year Talata told NEMA officials that she was raped on two occasions in the 
camp. She reported:  
“In or around June 2016, I was pregnant, and a military officer raped me. He knew I was three or four 
months pregnant. He said he saw me three times before. He didn’t offer me any food, he called me and  
I ignored him but on the third day (after I ignored him) he forced me to a room and raped me.”
905
 
Talata also narrated that another officer raped her when trying to get some water outside the 
camp:  
“About five of us went together and all of us were raped. The officers took us one by one when we 
came out of the camp. We informed the other women and they said we won’t go out to collect water 
unless we are in a group of twenty or thirty. We decided to go in large groups so no one can touch us. 
But when we were just few, they raped us. This has happened to others too.”
906
 
Few other women also reported that in the months after the camp was created, women were 
raped when they went to fetch water. The women confirmed that they began going in a large 
number in order to protect themselves from being raped.  
4.4.7 Fear of Reprisal 
Men and women who were interviewed explained that if they make an attempt to report or 
complain about the sexual violence in the camp they risked retribution.  
A particular woman who claimed she was raped explained that the perpetrator, a CJTF, had 
forced at least four other women in the camp to have sex with him. She also stated that the 
husband of one of those women was in the camp and attempted to complain: “The day that 
elderly man started talking about it, when he tried to complain, they took him to the prison, 
we haven’t seen him since then.”
907
 
Another elderly man also said: “Sometimes they will give the women food; 
sometimes they will force her or threaten to detain her if she tries to complain. They can say 
she is a Boko Haram wife and detain her. Even if the husband is around, if he says anything, 
they will say he is Boko Haram and take him to prison… (The sexual violence) is rampant 
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everyone knows about it, just that people don’t want to talk about it because they may arrest 
you or beat you.”
908
 
4.4.8 Allegations of Rape and Enforced Prostitution against the Security Forces in the Boko 
Haram Armed Conflict 
 
Rape is a violation of several human rights, including the rights to equality and non-
discrimination, to physical integrity, and to the proscription on torture and other ill-treatment. 
It equally breaches IHL and can amount to a crime against humanity
909
 and war crime
910
 in 
non-international armed conflicts. In several instances, the Nigerian forces or members of the 
civilian JTF have sexually penetrated women and girls in situations where even with consent, 
would not be valid because the offender created and/or took advantage of coercive conditions 
that prevailed.
911
 This is because, as earlier explained, there are several instances if present, 
nullifies any consent given. These include force or the threat of force or coercive 
environments.
912
 Coercive situations that negate consent include situations created by the 






 and the abuse of 
power.
916
 Consent will also be regarded invalid where the perpetrator takes advantage of 
coercive situations that already exist, even if they are not of their own making, such as those 
already inherent to an armed conflict.
917
 
Based on the analysis, the following factor(s) that occurred or were created by the 
perpetrators in the IDP camps makes the circumstances coercive: 
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 Military forces and CJTF members could arbitrarily beat women and girls 
in the camp with impunity, and did that on a regular basis, and the women 
knew if they decline sex- they could be whipped; 
 Food, water and health care facilities in the IDP camps were very 
insufficient that women and girls were forced to submit to demands for sex 
to get food and water for themselves and their family members to survive; 
 In some instances, women and girls were constrained to their camp in a 
situation related to conditions of detention and soldiers and the CJTF take 
advantage of their incarceration; 
 The Nigerian security forces and Civilian JTF members acted in an official 
capacity and exercised excessive power and resources over the women; 
and; 
 There was an ongoing armed conflict and all the incidents that occurred in 
the IDP camps originated as a result of the Boko Haram armed conflict.  
The military officers along with members of the CJTF, who used force to penetrate women 
and girls in IDP camps especially in Dalori camp, should be investigated for the offence of 
war crime
918
 and perhaps crime against humanity of rape.
919
 Military commanders in charge 
of Dalori camp should equally be investigated for command responsibility based on the fact 
that the military forces and CJTF members perpetrated acts of rape openly, and no tangible 
steps have been taken to ensure those found responsible are held accountable. Similarly, if the 
members of the CJTF were rewarded, in money or in otherwise, for taking IDP women to the 
military officers for the purposes of sexual exploitation such as buttering up with the officers 
                                                          
918
 See Article 8 (2) (e) (vi)-3, Rome Statute 
919
 See Article 7 (1) (g)-3, Rome Statute 
226 
 
for bringing them girls or women for sex, those involved should be investigated for criminal 
offence of probably crime against humanity of enforced prostitution. 
4.4.9 Torture and other ill-Treatment of Women and Girls in Military Detention Facilities 
Data obtained indicates how scores of women and girls interviewed by the National Human 
Rights Commission and other human rights organizations described how they were being 
beaten during military interrogations in Giwa barracks, Maiduguri, Borno State.
920
A fourteen 
year old girl described how she was mercilessly beaten in Giwa barracks after she and other 
people were being rescued from Boko Haram custody, although she reported that she and 
friends were abducted by the insurgent group, she expressed that:  
“The military started flogging and hitting us with big sticks saying we are Boko Haram wives. When 
they started beating us, one officer will come and flog us; later another one will come, beat and leave 
us. They beat us in every part of our bodies, including our heads- you can even see the scars of the 
beating all over our bodies…’ She narrated how the soldiers before bringing them to the army barrack 
in their trucks; made them to lie on the road and threaten to run over them.”
921
 
These women repeatedly claimed that the soldiers or members of the CJTF continually beat 
them. They described how they are being taken out from their cells blindfolded, their hands 
tight behind their backs and then beaten with a belt or stick.
922
 They explained how inmates 
constantly fight in their cells due to lack of space and food for themselves and their kids. One 
victim reported how both of her arms were broken because of beating by the army after she 
knocked on the door of the cell continuously, begging for water.
923
 When the researcher met 
her in Borno state, she barely lifts her arms well.
924
 
International human rights law and international humanitarian law proscribed torture 
and cruel, inhumane and degrading treatment.
925
 There is no situation in which torture or 
other ill-treatment is permissible. It is a non derogable right under any circumstances, 
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including in times of hostilities.
926
 The Nigerian Constitution under section 34(1) also 
prohibits torture and inhumane or degrading treatment.
927
 Therefore, the whipping of women 
and girls reported in Giwa barracks constitute torture or other ill treatment. The reason of 
incarcerations and constant whippings seemed to have been on the basis of collecting 
information or statements and/or to punish the women folks for their perceived connection 
with Boko Haram. The acts of torture were meted out by the military officers or members of 
the CJTF in an official position with the acquiescence of the Nigerian army.  
The brutality of rape and abuse by the military and the CJTF against women and 
teenage girls; an impact that was further exacerbated by the fact that most of these victims 
were young and survivors of abduction, forced marriage, sexual violence and other violations 
by Boko Haram armed group, may potentially amount to torture (beyond other ill-
treatments).
928
 Acts of rape and the lack of food, water to persons in detention also violate 
prohibitions on torture and other ill-treatment. In addition, the failure by the security forces to 
provide persons with information on the status or locations of their family members in 




4.4.10 War Crime of Torture or Cruel Treatment and the Crime against Humanity of Torture 
Torture is a war crime,
930
 and when conducted as part of a widespread and systematic assault 
on civilian population, is a crime against humanity.
931
 This study suggests that the acts of 
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torture and other forms of ill-treatment described above amounted to the imposition of grave 
physical and mental distress on those affected, and that these conditions would have been 
obvious to those managing or in charge of Giwa barracks and the IDP camps. As such, these 
crimes also call for an investigation by the relevant government authorities for possible 
international crimes. 
4.5 Challenges of Prosecuting Sexual Violence in Nigeria’s Boko Haram Conflict 
There are many challenges that have been identified to be responsible for inhibiting the 
prosecution of sexual offenders in conflict situation. To begin with, the national courts and the 
entire spectrum of the legal system exert significant influence on the enforcement of national 
and international laws, particularly regarding sexual offences that are committed in the course 
of armed conflict. States such as Nigeria that have ratified the international legal instruments 
(Rome Statute of the ICC) have sufficient grounds or legal backing to prosecute sexual 
violence during period of armed conflict that have been qualified as “war crime, crime against 
humanity or genocide.”
932
The explanation quoted below provides sufficient grounds for 
national courts to exercise jurisdiction over sexual violence: 
“It is important to observe that addressing accountability issue where it is impossible for the 
international tribunals to do so would require that the capacity of the national courts to respond to cases 
of sexual violence in armed conflict be determined to enable it take its position as a court of first 
instance as the right to investigate crimes committed in times of armed conflict rests with the national 
courts in pursuance of the complementarity rule as provided in Article 17 Rome Statute of the ICC. The 




The following reasons further furnish the national courts with the position of authority over 
cases related to sexual violence as explained below. 
First, the Rome Statute permits and guarantees State Party to the Rome Statute to be in 
charge of investigating and prosecuting international crimes that are reported to have been 
committed in its territory by its  own nationals.
934
However, as stipulated in Paragraph 10 of 
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the Preamble to the Statute, and also in Article 1 and 17(1) of the Statute, until a State Party 
has been shown to be unwilling and unable to prosecute such crimes, the international 
community has no role.
935
 
Second, State Parties to the Rome Statute are allowed to undertake investigations even 
if ICC has intervened.
936
 Third, most of the familiar cases of sexual violence in “domestic law 
such as rape, domestic violence, sexual harassment, gang rape and incest do not come under 
the jurisdiction of the ICC.”
937
 However, the ICC can prosecute cases related to war crimes, 
crimes against humanity, genocide and crimes related to aggression as captured in Articles 5-
8 of the Rome Statute. Therefore, Nigeria is guaranteed the right to prosecute for sexual 
crimes or other international crimes if the challenges analyzed below are resolved.  
4.5.1 The Inadequacy of Nigeria’s Criminal and Penal Codes 
One of the major challenges inhibiting the prosecution of sexual offences in the Boko Haram 
armed conflict has to do with the inadequacy of the criminal and penal codes. In fact, it has 
been argued that there is no domestic legislation that targets the prosecution of sexual 
violence in conflict regimes. The Nigerian Penal Codes are basically two – Criminal Code Act 
and Penal Code meant to be applied in the Southern and Northern regions respectively.
938
 One 
participant noted the following: 
“The evident lack of criminal and penal codes regarding the issue under consideration is a huge lacuna 
which must be filled if the state must effectively prosecute in conflict situations. The two available 
penal codes for the two major regions in Nigeria do not contend situations of armed conflict. I think this 
largely explained why there was no prosecution of defaulters after the Nigerian Civil War.”
939
 
To be clear, these pieces of legislation are peace time legislations and can be argued against in 
the courts considering that the cases of sexual violence under consideration are those 
committed against the victims of Boko Haram armed conflict. Again, one observer noted that 
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they need to “reflect the new international norms against sexual violence.”
940
 This implies that 
the criminal and penal codes available for use in the event of prosecution are largely outdated. 
One case of this deficiency has been noted by a participant in the following words:“…section 
1 of the Violence against Persons Prohibition Act (VAPPA)
941
 enacted in 2015 gives a 
broader definition of the crime of rape and includes males and females but the application of 
this law is limited to the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) Abuja.”
942
 
Relying on old laws with limited jurisdiction can be challenging as sexual violence 
takes different “forms involving so many victims with perpetrators operating in organizational 
forms as disparate as State armies, Para-Military groups, non-State actors and even the police 
in peace time as earlier noted and time of extreme violence.”
943
 From the various cases that 
have been prosecuted so far in other countries such as Rwanda, it is significant to note that the 
form, extent and context are important aspect of prosecution by national courts.
944
 Besides, 
because of the need to protect vulnerable people during armed conflict, sexual violence is 
normally prosecuted as an international crime, especially that it has been perceived variously 
including as crimes against humanity, war crime and genocide.
945
 
However, it is important to mention the fact that existing national courts in Nigeria 
have the strength and capability to prosecute sexual violence of all kinds including whether it 
is committed as a domestic or international crime. But this can only be possible when the 
Criminal, Penal Codes are amended to treat war crimes, crimes against humanity and 
genocide. Unfortunately, this reform of the existing Criminal, Penal Codes has not been 
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undertaken in Nigeria. A participant observed the inadequacy of the Criminal, Penal Codes in 
the prosecution of the sexual violence in the following words:  
“The offence of sexual violence is treated as a mere misconduct and that explains why moderate 
punishment is given. With increase knowledge of the need to protect human dignity, the two Codes can 
be amended by the National Assembly to reflect the immediate response against victims of sexual 
violence. This way, the national courts can respond to the various cases committed by both the 




4.5.2 Lack of Access to Justice and Confidence in the Nigeria Judicial System 
It is common knowledge that the entire spectrum of the Nigerian judicial system is largely 
unpopular and the people do not have sufficient confidence on the system to deliver justice as 
and when due.
947
 In fact, the average person in Nigeria prefers to settle disputes away from 
the system that is in place for that purpose. Largely, this explains the reason for numerous 
cases of ‘jungle justice’ where the people offer instantaneous ‘justice’ at the crime scene.
948
 If 
the people cannot trust the system of justice in place during peace times, what would happen 
to case of war time disputes relating to sexual violence? An attempt to answer this question, a 
participant expressed that: 
“Under normal circumstances (peace times), we do not have trust for the system, therefore, no one 
should expect miracle during period of armed conflict. We believed that the system is corrupt and 
inefficient to provide justice. In many cases, you spend years on a single case. I know that many victims 
of rape or other forms of sexual violence would prefer to keep quiet considering that during war times, 
survival is the ultimate goal.”
949
 
The situation is even worse for victims who reside in the countryside, where access to the 
“legal services may be difficult.”
950
 Where victims of sexual violence live in far-away 
distance from a police post, court or any instrument of judicial system, the stress of having to 
move a long distance in order to table a case can be more difficult. Where the victim is lucky 
to live close to a police post, priorities are given to “life threatening cases during period of 
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 This is not to mention the enormity of investigating cases of sexual 
violence, especially when the perpetrators are members of the armed group such as the Boko 
Haram. Moreover, available data suggest that previous attempts to investigate sexual violence 
in peace times have been shown to be biased in favor of the female gender.
952
 In other words, 
the police force of a patriarchal society like Nigeria does not pay attention to reports of male 
gender that have been sexually violated.    
In many cases, victims who have been sexually violated at the IDPs claimed that they 
do not know what to do about it or access to legal system. There are those who claimed not to 
have the resources to pursue the cases to the end. This is because, in Nigeria, the cost of 
litigation is relatively on the high side and the Legal Aid Council which is statutorily charged 
with providing free legal services for the needy may be handling the matter negligently as the 
attorney will not apply himself to the processes since he would not be paid by the victim. In 
addition to this, the excessive long period that it takes for criminal cases to be resolved may 
also work as a deterrent to victims.
953
 The insensitive attitude of the police may also deter 
women from reporting, and lack of victims’ protection hinders effective prosecution.
954
 
4.5.3 Lack of Special Tribunals and Trained Personnel for Prosecution 
Unlike in many parts of the world,
955
 Nigeria does not have special courts and trained 
personnel for the prosecution of sexual violence in situations of armed conflict. Where this is 
absent, it is expected that the prosecution would not only be weak but largely ineffective as 
there are numerous cases in a country of almost 200 million people. In countries that have 
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experienced violent conflicts such as Rwanda and Sierra Leone, special tribunals were 
established to try cases of abuse of power and privileges leading to indictments.
956
 This is 
important considering the magnitude of the crime of sexual violence as has been previously 
treated in those countries. The fact that offences associated with sexual violence are largely 
treated as international crimes, the judicial officers including the judges and the prosecuting 
agency (the police in the case of Nigeria) are expected to have advanced knowledge in the 
area of international criminal law. According to scholars,” They must have a good knowledge 
about the elements of crime if they want to secure convictions. For instance, in domestic 
crime of sexual violence, the lawyers duty is to prove that the charged acts of sexual 
offencehasoccurred and the direct perpetrator’s intent to commit the crime. But where it 
involves crimes of international character such as sexual violence in armed conflict, the state 
attorney must not only prove the charged acts of sexual violence that took place, but must 
relate those acts to a particular context.”
957
 
Whoever that is prosecuting the case of sexual violence must bear in mind that he/she 
has the duty to convince the court to believe that such action was targeted at a group with the 
negative intention to destroying them, that is, “genocide in a systematic manner
958
 (if charged 
as crime against humanity)
959
 or during an armed conflict (if charged as a war crime).”
960
 
Whenever this happens, it is expected that diligent investigation is conducted. Unfortunately, 
the system has not responded for the need to train prosecutors and hire specialized judges 
imbued with the necessary infrastructure in place for a fairer response to sexual violence in 
the ongoing conflict in the North-East. 
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4.6 The Complexity of Superior Criminal Responsibility for the Rape of Women during 
Armed Conflicts 
 
The notion of criminal responsibility was recognized by the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY as 
a ‘form of accomplice liability that was well established in customary international law, and 
under the Tribunals Statute.’
961
 The clearest mode of criminal responsibility is commission, as 
specified in Article 6(1) of the ICTR Statute and Article 7(1) of the ICTY Statute. An 
important challenge in the prosecution of the sexual violence during armed conflict has to do 
with the complexity where the perpetrators may not be the one to be directly tried. While the 
one who committed the crime (physical perpetrator) is directly charged, the case is different 
under international crimes. This is because the one in charge of command and control 
responsibility are treated as the perpetrators for failing “to do the needful by preventing the 
men under his or her control and authority from committing a crime and for his or her failure 
to punish the perpetrators.”
962
 Even where the commander or any leader in the chain of 
command was not present when the offence was committed, it is required that the prosecutor 
should establish a clear link to those acts through other forms of legal responsibility such as 
aiding and abetting, joint criminal enterprise or command/superior responsibility.
963
It is 
important to note that the rule is not the same when prosecuting cases of domestic sexual 
violence. While it is easy to identify the chain of command of the Nigerian security forces, 
those of Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) are still unclear. However, an informed source 
noted that: ‘The Nigerian military use the CJTF in intelligence gathering and help them in 
identifying some Boko Haram hideouts because they know almost every route since they are 
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indigenes of that environment. But he can’t categorically say whether they operate under the 
government or the Nigerian army.
964
 
Moreover, as explained above, there are different rules involved in the prosecution of 
sexual violence during the period of armed conflict. Apart from having a different legal 
requirement, the forms of responsibility largely differ. As one observer opined, “international 
and domestic cases involve different kind of evidence, investigation and prosecution 
strategies and victims of international sexual violence must be protected.”
965
 However, this 
research suggests that considering the prevalence of sexual violence in conflict situations as 
seen in our study (Boko Haram conflict) against women and girls, the responsibility to 
prevent must require more from the superior command. It must require the superior to set up 
steps aimed at preventing the perpetration of sexual violence during hostile situations. Such 
an obligation will help in denying impunity to senior officers or leaders who may have an 
inclination or tendency to connive at or condone the perpetration of sexual violence by 
subordinates.  
4.7 Denial on the Part of the Victims 
Most times, victims of sexual violence do not feel comfortable to come forward and properly 
report cases of their abuses. This is almost a global challenge. However, the case is worse in 
societies where stigmatization is often the reward associated with reporting sexual violence.
966
 
This situation has the tendency to compound the challenge of investigation and thereafter, 
prosecution of those who commit the crime. EvelynJosse noted that in most cases, the 
challenge with victim’s unwillingness to come forward to advance the course of justice can be 
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linked to emotional and psychological pressures associated with sexual violence.
967
 This 
situation has been visible in Rwanda and Sierra Leone as well as in Borno State of Nigeria as 
captured below:  
“What we know is that of the young girls and women end up not sharing their experiences because of 
shame and emotional and psychological trauma. Two young girls have been raped in one IDP by the 
personnel of the Nigeria security forces. Yet, the non-cooperative attitude of the victims to open up 
remains a nightmare. They are either afraid to do so or are traumatized.” 
968
 
The problem is further compounded by the total absence of experts in psychological 
counseling, especially during period of armed conflict. The plight of the victims may only be 
increased as the condition is not supportive. Consequently, where victims do not come 
forward for the reasons noted above “there would be no diligent investigation and prosecution 
thus, accountability mechanism will hardly succeed.”
969
 
Furthermore, there are other sociological factors that inhibit women, especially the 
Northern part of the country from coming forward to complain of the crimes of sexual 
violence. This has been well noted by Kelly that:“Women who survive sexual violence in 
times of armed conflict go through somedifficulties. Women are considered in most part of 
the world including Nigeria as keepers of the family’s decency and honor which is embodied 
in the custom. A woman may suffer if she reports the crime. She may lose her status within 
the society or her husband may leave her if she is a married woman. In cultures where female 
sexuality is a taboo like Nigeria, the victims will find it difficult to speak out about their 
predicament with male authorities. Victims of sexual violence have come to accept their fate 
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In Northern Nigeria, this beliefisingrained in the tradition of the people that see the act 
of sexual violence not as an assault against the human dignity of the victim, but as an “affront 
against the honor of the family.”
971
 No doubt, this can serve to inhibit the reporting of the 
cases of sexual violence as most of the family would want to guard against what is treated as 
‘humiliation.’ The pioneer Special Rapporteuron violence against women once noted that: 
“By using the honor paradigm, linked as it is to concepts of chastity, purity and virginity, 
stereotypical concepts of feminists have been formally enshrined in humanitarian law … 
When rape is perceived as a crime against honor or morality, shame commonly ensues for the 
victim, who is often viewed by the community as “dirty” or “spoiled”. Consequently, many 
women will neither report nor discuss the violence that has been perpetrated against them.”
972
 
4.8 Reparation for Victims of Sexual Violence 
There are certain provisions of international law that required victims of rape to receive 
reparation. This is not to cover simply for the huge physical and psychological damage that 
maybe caused by rape but to assist in rehabilitating the victims. The UN Basic Principles and 
Guidelines on the Right to Remedy and Reparation 2006 provides in its Article 18 that 
“victims of gross violations of international human rights law and serious violations of 
international humanitarian law should, as appropriate and proportional to the gravity of the 
violation and the circumstances of each case, be provided with full and effective 
reparation.”
973
 As stated above, the objective of reparation is not simply to cover for the 
damage emanating from the act, but, as noted by de Greiff, this measure is instituted for the 
purpose of three basic objectives among which are, “recognition, civic trust and social 
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 Above all, reparation is a social form of justice, which must recognise the harm 




Since the close of the last century, legal scholars have noted a significant rise in the 
number of those who are “demanding justice through reparations.”
976
 This has led to a 
situation where the International Court of Justice has shifted its attention more to perpetrators, 
crimes and legalism, with less regard given to victims and their needs.
977
It is expected that 
those whose rights have been violated through rape should be offered practical support 
including “economic and social provisions, medical facilities, psychological/trauma 
counselling, or indeed all of these.”
978
 However, Moffett has argued that the initiation of 
reparation to victims of rape by the ICC marked a significant innovation as it “has the 
potential to satisfy a number of victims’ needs and deliver them a broader sense of justice 




This section reflects on the essential aspects of the chapter. This would enable readers to 
comprehend the most relevant argument(s) of the research and contribution to the existing 
body of knowledge. First, the chapter identified several definitional approaches, including the 
difficulty of proving consent by the victim(s) to the crime of sexual violence with much 
emphasis on rape drawn across different judicial rulings around the world. While the chapter 
resists the temptation to adopt a specific definitional framework to sexual violence or even 
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rape, it provided a wide range of approaches to enable the reader appreciate the available 
options for the prosecution of the violators in the case of Boko Haram armed conflict in 
Nigeria. Second, the study identified range of reparation that can be offered to the victims of 
sexual violence in line with universal best practices. This is meant to minimise the effect of 
sexual violence on the victims. As noted in the work, the various reparation measures depend 
largely on the scale of sexual violence. Moreover, the effect of sexual violence on the victims 
differs and it is expected that the state should be able to provide a range of reparation 
measures to reduce the social, psychological and economic effects on the victims. This, 
according to the study, can help to repair the damages that have been done to the victims as 
well as reconcile them with the hostile cultural environment of the North-Eastern region. 
However, one cannot overlook the challenge associated with the definition of sexual violence 
during armed conflicts – this is because it is the view of this study that the objective of 
criminal liability may be defeated if victims (including women and girls in the Boko Haram 
conflict) are compelled to refrain from taking part in rape proceedings as a result of unhealthy 
focus on their own actions at the time of the crime. Such may occur from a definition of rape 
that unwittingly puts the victims on trial, by constantly focusing on whether or not they gave 
consent to the sexual conducts. This study rather believes that the focus should be on the 
hostile environment of the action of the victim could have led to consent or objection to the 
sexual conduct. A definition of rape that focuses on the hostile situation of the act is more 
likely to achieve the ends of containment of sexual violence that one that constantly requires 
the prosecution to prove that the victim did not give consent to the sexual conduct.   
Third, it is also worthy to note that the study attempted a conceptualisation of the 
status of a victim of sexual violence within existing legal instruments. This is important to 
identify the specific group in which the study is focussed. Fourth, sexual violence appears to 
be one of the major instruments of war used by the Boko Haram insurgents in advancing its 
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course in Nigeria’s North-Eastern region. Like other terrorist organisations in the Middle 
East, the group adopted all forms of sexual violence to achieve its goals. Fifth, from available 
resources that the researcher utilised, the Nigerian securities and Civilian Joint Task Force are 
equally culpable in committing the offence of sexual violence against their victims whom 
they are meant to protect. In this regard, the study noted the loopholes of the law in terms of 
command responsibility for crimes perpetrated by his subordinates. As it is, the law vested 
the responsibility to prevent and/or to punish the commission of crimes on the superiors in 
the command chain. Regrettably, the responsibility of a superior to prevent the perpetration 
of the crime, including the crime of sexual violence in armed conflict – is not engaged unless 
it is demonstrated that the superior had prior knowledge that the subordinate was committing 
or was about to commit the offence.Similarly, the chapter argues that there are limited legal 
instruments in Nigeria’s legislation on which the court can rely to effectively punish 
offenders. The chapter noted that the penal code of Northern Nigeria requires serious review 
to accommodate new response to the crime of sexual violence, especially those committed 
during armed conflicts.  
Sixth, the central contribution of the work relates specifically to the empirical 
evidence generated through interviews with victims of sexual violence and the security 
forces. These interviews were conducted after the researcher got approval from the relevant 
authorities at Coventry University. The analysed data has helped to further expose the 
culpability of the Nigerian security agencies that have been involved in all kinds of sexual 
violence in the ongoing armed conflict between the Nigerian armed forces and the insurgent 
group. The chapter further identified two major challenges that have inhibited effective 
enforcement of international humanitarian lawin the fight against Boko Haram. The first 
challenge that has been explained in details above has to do with the high level of indiscipline 
on both sides of the war. In respect to Boko Haram, it is expected that an organised insurgent 
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group should at least be aware of the responsibility to protect armless civilians including 
children, women and the aged. From the analysis above, the group has been found to be in 
clear violation of this responsibility and thus should be prosecuted. 
Another aspect of the challenges of enforcing international humanitarian law that is 
analysed in this chapter relates to the poor judicial infrastructure that has further limited 
access to justice for victims of sexual violence in the North-East. As seen elsewhere above, 
the crime of sexual violence requires reliable evidence(s)to prove the allegations, and this 
comes with thorough investigation by the police. Unfortunately, the police who are meant to 
provide protection to the victims of sexual violence have instead abuse such privileges and 
engaged in same crime. Many reports of the involvement of security forces in sexual 
violence, especially rape, has been utilised in the analysis of the chapter.Also, the chapter 
argues that in the event domestic legal instruments are not enough to prosecute violators, the 
ICC can be drawn to do the prosecuting while relying on the provisions of the Rome Statutes.  
In conclusion, since 2009 when Boko Haram transformed into an extremely violent 
group, sexual violence has been committed in a systemic fashion. While this is not entirely 
new, the state has offered little or no response to the crime of sexual violence. Instead, it has 
defended the security forces in a fashionable manner each time international bodies attempt 
to raise questions on the culpability of the Nigerian security forces in the fight against Boko 
Haram. In fact, at a point, the United States refused to sale arms to the Nigerian government 
on the grounds that its armed forces have been culpable in prejudicial killings and all forms 
of primitive practices that have been proscribed by international law,
980
 not excluding sexual 
violence on the victims of the armed conflict.    
This is unfortunate, considering the fact that victims of armed conflict, as explained in 
chapter 2, are regarded with special status in customary international law. They are required 
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to enjoy the protection of the state in all situations. Following from the above analysis, it is 
evidently clear that the Nigerian security forces are not disciplined enough to realise that the 
protection of victims of armed conflict is the greatest calling of their profession. However, it 
is also expected that when all odds are against the victims of armed conflicts, the judicial 
system should offer high degree of shelter through which they can seek justice. 
Unfortunately, as identified in the analysis above, there are no enough judicial infrastructures 
to rely on for the dispensation of justice. Again, the prosecution requires rigorous training in 
relevant aspect of International Criminal Law to undergo the task of prosecuting sexual 
violence. From the empirical as well as other sources, this has proven to be a serious source 
of challenge to the Nigerian state.  
In the following chapter, we will examine, in addition to the crimes identified in this 
chapter – war crime and crimes against humanity of sexual violence, the political will of the 
Nigerian authority, under international law, to conduct genuine investigation and prosecution 
of all the heinous crimes committed by both sides to the conflict. In this light, we will also 
remind the international community of their legal responsibility in international law of 











              Chapter Five 
An Assessment of Lack of Political Will and Responsibility of States in the Effective 
Enforcement of International Humanitarian Law in the Boko Haram Armed 
Conflict in Nigeria 
5.0 Introduction 
The complementarity principle of the International Criminal Court states that State parties to 
the Rome Statute have the principal responsibility to investigate and prosecute activities that 
amounts to international crime recognized under the Rome State of the ICC. The Court may 
initiate investigations only when a state party to the Statute is unable or unwilling to 
investigate and prosecute alleged offenders. On that note, this chapter consists of two 
sections; the first section seeks to critically assess the political willingness of the Nigerian 
government to conduct genuine investigations into the grievous crimes committed in the fight 
against Boko Haram are held accountable. The second part sets out the core purpose of 
Common Article 1 and related obligations under international law so that third states 
concerned about the atrocities civilians, especially women and girls in our study are made to 
endure may find a common cause in challenging the inhumanity that is contemptuous of 
human beings and the untold suffering it imposes on millions.The objective is to demonstrate 
the unwillingness of Nigeria to conduct genuine investigations and to urge third states to use 
their influence and stand for a secured Nigeria by advising the Office of the Prosecutor of the 
ICC to initiate a full investigation into the alleged offences committed in the Boko Haram 
armed conflict.  
Against the foregoing, this chapter seeks to examine the ICC-OTP’s preliminary 
assessment in Nigeria since 2010, and critically examine willingness or inability of the 
Nigerian government to ensure accountability for international crimes committed in the Boko 
Haram armed conflict. 
For the purposes of this research, the researcher has examined terms of references, as 
well as summaries of findings of commissions and/or panels of inquiry established by both 
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Nigerian political and military authorities with the mandate to investigate a range of 
allegations of breaches of IHL rules committed by the parties to the conflict in northeast 
Nigeria. In addition, I have directly and repeatedly engaged with some non-governmental 
organizations such as the International Rescue Committee, the ICRC country office, Amnesty 
International as well as military personnel and legal practitioners. 
5.1 Complementarity Principle of the ICC: the Legal Context and Judicial Practice of 
the Court 
 
Complementarity is a fundamental element of the Rome Statute, which establishes that States 
party to the Statute have the foremost responsibility to investigate and prosecute persons who 
commit international crimes of the Rome Statute. In the framework of the preliminary 
assessment process, and in compliance with Article 53(1) (b) of the Rome Statute, the OPT 
carries out an ‘admissibility assessment’ to determine whether the case would be admissible 
pursuant to Article 17
981
 of the Rome Statute, and if there is any ‘complementary’ appropriate 
domestic level proceedings that have been or are being carried out. The provision of Article 
17 of the Rome Statute states that a case will be admissible before the ICC where a State 
proves unable to investigate and prosecute perpetrators of crimes of the Rome Statute.
982
 
Similarly, Article 17(1) (a) considers when state governments are currently examining the 
same case as the ICC; and Article 17(1) (b) considers situations where the state government 
has investigated the same case but choose not to prosecute.
983
 
 Therefore, the Office of the Prosecutor’s (OTP) complementarity review at the 
preliminary examination stage first analyses the factual point, that is, whether there are or 
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have been any significant domestic investigations or prosecutions.
984
 This is because; there 
would be no legal ground for the Court to consider the case inadmissible before it where the 
suspect or the crime has not been investigated by the domestic authorities.
985
 Simply put, 
‘domestic inaction,’ the failure of domestic trials, is enough reason to render a case 
admissible before the ICC, without even taking into account some of the other elements set 
out in Article 17 of the Rome Statute; including the questions of unwillingness or inability of 
the concerned country.
986
 The OTP’s preliminary assessment procedure expounds that 
inaction could be attributed to several factors, including ‘the lack of sufficient legal 
framework; the existence of laws that serve as a shield for effective national proceedings, 
such as immunities or statutes of limitation, amnesty; deliberate concentration of the 
proceedings on low-level or slight number of perpetrators notwithstanding evidence on those 
more responsible; or other, more general issues related to the lack of political will or 
institutional incapacity, such as the judiciary.
987
 
During the preliminary assessment, there is still not a ‘case,’ as understood to include 
an established set of situations, suspects and actions.
988
 Therefore, ‘the contours of the 
possible cases will often be rather vague because the investigations of the Prosecutor (at the 
preliminary assessment phase) are at their early phases.
989
 Admissibility is thus examined 
base on certain criteria defining a ‘potential case’ including 
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 The group of persons involved that are potentially the focus of an investigation 
for the purpose of shaping future case(s); 
 The crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court allegedly committed during the 
incidents that are likely to be the focus of an investigation for the purpose of 
shaping the future case(s).
990
 
Therefore, domestic stage investigations must ‘encompass the same persons and substantially 
the same actions as alleged in the proceedings before the Court.
991
 In addition, in line with the 
jurisprudence of the ICC, as well as the OTP’s guidelines on preliminary assessment, relevant 
national proceedings will be evaluated on the degree to which they focus on those bearing the 
greatest liability for the most grievous crimes.
992
 
The final essential component of an admissibility analysis has to do with an 
examination of whether domestic proceedings are corrupted by an unwillingness or inability 
to genuinely conduct the proceedings, and whether proceedings were carried out with the 
intention to bring the person(s) to justice.
993
 The Court has equally noted that preliminary 
assessments must be concluded ‘within a reasonable time... irrespective of their intricacy.
994
 
The hypothesis of Article 53(1) of the Rome Statute... and that of a reasonable mind is that 
the Prosecutor investigates so as to enable the office to appropriately examine the relevant 
facts.
995
 This means that, the extension of a preliminary assessment beyond such time is, in 
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 The ‘reasonable ground’ of valuation method of a preliminary 
assessment does not require any compound or an in-depth process of review, and the 
information presented need not be ‘all-inclusive or conclusive,’ especially bearing in mind 
the limited investigative powers at the prosecutor’s disposal, relative to those provided for in 
Article 54 of the Rome Statute at the investigation phase.
997
 Therefore, by and large, an 
investigation should be launched without delay and be carried out in an efficient manner so 
that it can be effective.
998
 
The OTP has equally noted that it will not only examine if a relevant domestic 
proceedings occurs or not, but also seek to encourage, to the extent possible, a genuine 
domestic investigations and prosecutions by the state(s) concerned with regards to crimes 
listed in the preliminary assessment (positive complementarity).
999
 Immediately after the 
preliminary assessment is completed, and the situation is not referred to the Court by a State 
party, the OTP must request authorization to open a propriomotu investigation under Article 
15 of the Rome Statute. The Pre-Trial Chamber of the ICC will carry out a judicial 
examination to determine whether the situation that the State is investigating adequately 
reflects the situation which the OTP is investigating.
1000
 To conduct this assessment, the 
primary situations under investigation - both by the Prosecutor and the State, together with 
the acts or actions of the suspect(s) that leads to his/her criminal responsibility for the act 
mentioned in those situations must be compared.
1001
 Where it has only been determined that 
discrete aspects of the case before the Court are being investigated nationally, it will very 
likely not be possible for a Chamber to decide that the same case is under investigation.
1002
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5.1.2 Investigations at the Domestic Level: Analysis of the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber 
In 2017, the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber examined a domestic level ‘commissions’ or ‘inquiries’ 
set up to investigate allegations of international crimes perpetrated in a – at the time - ICC 
states party. In its ruling regarding the OTP’’s Article 15 call to authorize the opening of an 
investigation in Burundi, the Chamber expressed that if documentation ‘provided to the 
Chamber discloses that these commissions and proceedings do not cover exact (groups of) 
people that are likely to be the focus of an investigation into the circumstances (in a States 
Party) or that the Commissions have not conducted concrete, and advanced investigative 
steps... there is no conflict of jurisdiction between (the State Party) and the Court.
1003
 
5.2 Trials at the State-Level 
As explained above, the Office of the Prosecutor’s complementarity examination at the 
preliminary assessment phase will first consider the question of whether there are or have 
been any germane domestic inquiries or prosecutions.
1004
 In essence, concerning the ICC’s 
admissibility examination, state-level proceedings of inquiries and prosecutions must relate to 
acts or activities that violates the Rome Statute and within the jurisdiction of the Court during 
the incidents as defined by the Court. Consequently, where the suspect or an act has not been 
investigated at the State-level, there is no legal ground for the OTP not to proceed to 
investigations stage or the Court to find the case inadmissible.
1005
 
 In the following sections, I will present my research findings on the major, 
potentially relevant state-level trials completed or ongoing in Nigeria covering the period of 
OTP’s preliminary assessment in Nigeria. 
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5.2.1 The Case of Baba Fugu 
In 2009, Baba Kuru Fugu, the son of late Baba Fugu Mohammed – 72-year old father-in-law 
of the founder of Boko Haram – Mohammed Yusuf, who was unlawfully executed by the 
Nigerian security forces in July 2009 – filed a suit against the Nigerian government for the 
arbitrary execution of his father before the Borno State High Court, sitting at Maiduguri.
1006
 
In April 2010, the Court ruled that the killing of Baba Fugu, was “illegal, unconstitutional 
and a breach of his right to life.” In its judgment, the judge held that:  
“The killing of the applicant’s father did not only violate the Constitution of the Federal Republic of 
Nigeria, the African Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, but also the sensibilities 
of decent and right thinking Nigerians. It is against everything that is decent. I do not think even the 
Spanish inquisitors could have done worse.”
1007
 
The Court ordered the Nigerian government to compensate the family with 100 million naira 
for the damage caused, exhume his body for proper burial, and express regret for their 
“reprehensive and unconstitutional acts.”
1008
 Even though the Federal Government did not 
contest the facts of the case during trials, it however appealed the ruling four days after the 
judgment. In September 2011, with the appeal still pending, unidentified gunmen shot and 
killed Baba Kuru Fugu, the son of Baba Fugu who sued the Nigerian government. Soon after, 
the Nigerian government withdrew its appeal and compensated the family 100 million naira. 
The then governor of Borno State, KashimShettima sympathies to the Fugu family, noting 
that, ‘no amount of money will compensate for the loss of human life.
1009
 However, the 
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However, the alleged final words of Babakura, the son of Baba Fugu have raised 
concerns and so many unanswered questions. This is because, on 15
th
 September, two days 
before he was killed, Babakura met with former President of Nigeria Chief Olusegun 
Obasanjo to discuss the controversial death of Mohammed Yusuf.
1011
 When asked by Sahara 
Reporters if he has any video or pictures of the meeting, Babakura said “the former president 
came with his personal camera men and didn’t get any pictures.”
1012
 He was further asked if 
he had any prior relationship or connection with Obasanjo, Babakura said, “No, I have never 
met him before now.”
1013
 But Sahara Reporters claimed that Babakura was killed before 
appearing on the channel - Sahara TV, where he was expected to disclose details of his 
meeting with former president Olusegun Obasanjo. However, the Fugu family lawyer, 
Barrister Anayo, dismissed all rumours surrounding Obasanjo’s visit, stating that ‘his visit to 
the family is a welcome development.”
1014
 Therefore, based on the findings and analysis 
presented above, this research considers that, as at the time of writing this research, this is the 
only genuine case that got fair hearing and victim’s family were compensated.  
5.2.2 Trials Concerning Boko Haram Members 
In 2014, the OTP reported that the Nigerian government has been ‘carrying-out proceedings’ 
against members of Boko Haram group for activities which amounts to international crime 
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under the Rome Statute.
1015
 In 2015, the OTP clearly noted that it has obtained information 
on about 150 cases with respect to Boko Haram members at various stages which has been 
forwarded to the Attorney-General of the Federation for authorization.
1016
 In 2017, the OTP 
reported that only a “limited number”
1017
 of case files seem to relate to the alleged atrocities 
committed by Boko Haram members against civilians.
1018
 However, it is not clear whether 
the cases referred to by the OTP in its report concerning the alleged crimes conducted by 
Boko Haram members relates to conduct(s) within the jurisdiction of the ICC, or which cover 




However, the findings of this research indicate that before October 2017, just a few 
cases were actually presented before the Federal High Court across the country - concerning 
the alleged crimes committed by the Boko Haram armed group. In response to the request for 
information, the Ministry of Justice noted that as of October 2017, a total of 12 Boko Haram 
suspects were convicted in ‘terrorism related cases.’
1020
 
Among these cases, two of them relate to high-ranking members of the Boko Haram 
armed group. First is the case of KabiruSokoto, the man who carried-out the ‘Christmas Day 
bombing’ in Madala, Niger state, Nigeria.
1021
 In December 2013, he was found guilty on 
terrorism charges and sentenced to life imprisonment by the Federal High Court sitting at 
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 According to reports, there were deep concerns regarding the fairness of the trials, 
with the accused asserting accusations of torture and refusal of access to his legal 
counsels.
1023
 The second case relates to Usman Umar Abubakar popularly known as Khalid 
Al-Barnawi, the alleged ex leader of the Ansarufaction of the Boko Haram. In early 2017, he 
was arraigned before the Federal High Court sitting in Abuja on charges of kidnapping and 
killing of ten foreign nationals.
1024
 However, it is still obscure whether the suspect has been 
convicted as well as the present stage of the trial. Even though, as at the time of writing this 
thesis, these two cases may possibly be the only indictments of top Boko Haram members in 
Nigeria, and inadequate information and lack of access to court documents renders it more 
difficult to examine how relevant and genuine the trials are. In spite of persistent request, the 
researcher was not able to gather information on what crimes these suspects were indicted 
for, and especially, no court documents with respect to the two mentioned cases was provided 
– claiming they are classified.
1025
 
5.2.3 Mass Trials 
The Nigerian government started mass proceedings of Boko Haram suspects in October 
2017, in what appears to be an attempt to tackle the large backlog of persons in military 
custody pending trial. At the beginning of the mass proceedings, the office of the Attorney- 
General of the Federation stated that 1670 individuals were held in Kainji, pending the 
hearing of their cases by the Court.
1026
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In general, three (3) court hearings were held; in October 2017, February and July 
2018 before the Federal High Court sitting in Wawa military cantonment in Kainji, Niger 
state, each lasting for two (2) to four (4) hours only. The suspects that were brought before 
the “Kainji mass trials” were amongst the thousands that were arbitrarily arrested by the 
military. They were not given the reason(s) for their arrest or incarceration. They were moved 
to military prisons without charges and after several months or usually years of incarceration, 
most detainees are still not aware of the charges brought against them. For instance, out of the 
144 Boko Haram suspects tried in 2018, 19 were charged with terrorist activities, 1 for 
hostage taking, 124 charged as Boko Haram members, 68 hiding of relevant information, 76 
for assisting the armed group, 49 for and/or participation in Boko Haram meetings. Out of 
these suspects,107 were indicted - 7 were indicted for terrorist acts, one for hostage taking, 
and the remaining 99 for Boko Haram membership or assistance, taking part in trainings or 
meetings, hiding of tangible information from the security authorities, or a fusion of these 
charges.
1027
 The ‘mass trial’ hearings were also characterized by many serious fair trial 
violations,
1028
 including lack of legal representation,
1029
 lack of court interpreters because 
most of the suspects, if not all, don’t understand English, which violates their right to fair 
hearing.
1030
 The hearings were conducted in Wawa barracks, and while speaking on the 
environment, Justice Nyako, a judge of the Federal High Court that was assigned to hear 
these cases, noted that ‘the settings - civilian courts in a military base - was not ideal, which 
also violates their fundamental rights of fair hearing.
1031
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5.3 Judicial Proceedings Concerning alleged Crimes Committed by the Nigerian Army 
In 2017, the OTP recognized 2 national- level commission of inquiries set up by the 
government: The ‘Special Board of Inquiry’ (SBI), established by the Nigerian army, and the 
‘Presidential Investigation Panel to Review Compliance of the Armed Forces with Human 
Rights Obligations and Rules of Engagement’ (PIP), established by the Presidency - which it 
stated could potentially form a prima facie, relevant hearings regarding its admissibility 
assessment of possible cases as regards alleged crimes conducted by the Nigerian military. 
The two investigative bodies noted by the OTP in its 2017 report should be noted against 
Nigeria’s record of establishing panels of inquiry that do not produce credible investigations 
and prosecutions. These two panels are examined below: 
5.3.1 The Special Board of Inquiry 
After series of petitions in relation to gross human rights abuses and reports of crimes 
committed by officers of the Nigerian army by civil organizations and human rights groups, 
and in the midst of manifest pressure from the US and UK government to probe these 
claims,
1032
 the Chief of Army Staff (COAS) Lt. Gen. Tukur Y Buratai instituted a nine- 
member Special Board of Inquiry (SBI) in March 2017 to assess these series of allegations. 




The board was established under section 172 of the Armed Forces Act, 2006. It was 
assigned to ‘express its opinion’ and was vested with investigatory powers only. Besides, 
section 172 clearly stipulates that no evidence obtained or received by the board would be 
admissible in court martial proceedings except a witness had given false evidence.
1034
Further, 
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the terms of reference of the board does not contain a clear mandate to identify and 
recommend persons for scrutiny or prosecution, instead the board was mandated with 
“determining the genuineness of the reports by civil societies with regards to the claims 
against some high ranking retired military officers.
1035
 Therefore, this is an indication that the 
board was not a body established to bring about criminal prosecutions and does not conform 
to Nigeria’s responsibility to investigate and prosecute persons alleged to have committed 
international crimes and abuses of human rights. 
In 2017, the board presented its findings to the COAS, but as at the time of writing 
this research, the full report was not made available to the public. The researcher obtained a 
summary of the report from Amnesty International (claimed to have received it through the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs), however, the summary was actually the same as the one 
released to the public in a media briefing in June 2017.
1036
 Therefore, it is not possible to 
independently analyse the findings, methodology and credibility of the information collected 
and reviewed in the board’s report.   
The board generally concluded in its summary report that there was no credible 
evidence of human rights violations as claimed against the Nigerian armed forces in their 
military activities in the north-east and thus, denied all allegations of serious violations of 
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human rights, including sexual violence, extra-judicial executions, torture and enforced 
prostitution.
1037
 In addition, the outcome of the board’s report sought to reduce the weight of 
human rights violations by the security forces. For instance, the report stated that detention 
centres were not maintaining adequate records and did not rightly register that ‘most of the 
detained persons were at the time of arrest malnourished and in weak physical condition’ 
which could be misconceived as proof of premeditated starvation.
1038
 The board dwell on 
denying all claims of potentially individual and command responsibility tabled on now 
former, high ranking soldiers including Maj. Gen. John Ewansiha, Maj. Gen. OT Ethan, and 
Maj. Gen. Ahmed Mohammed, Maj. Gen AO Edokpayi, and Brigadier Gen. RO Bamigboye, 
dismissing documentary and other evidence publicly available by claiming lack of forensic 
evidence to verify allegations.
1039
 
As far as this study could verify, the outcome of the Special Board of Inquiry have not 
been forwarded to any competent investigative agency in Nigeria to assess and, if required 
carry out further investigations and/or criminal prosecutions. Rather, the COAS assessed the 
board’s report and concluded that the report contained “incredible findings” and those 
allegations by civil societies and human rights organizations are spurious. Instead, the COAS 
seems to have accepted four recommendations only, and none is connected to any steps 
towards criminal investigations of officers of the Nigerian Army.
1040
 
5.3.2 The Presidential Investigation Panel 
The presidency established the Presidential Investigative Panel to Review Compliance of the 
Armed Forces with Human Rights Obligations and Rules of Engagement, in August of 








Ibid a) The DA should take reports and recommendations of the SBI with a view to clearing the issue with 
stakeholders at his end; b) The ministry of Justice should facilitate the setting up of a special prosecution team to 
profile and prosecute the detainees; c) The ministry of justice should discountenance the spurious allegations of 
human rights abuses; d) The ONSA should ensure that there is synergy among the stakeholders in the 





 The panel was made up of seven members: a Justice of the Court of Appeal as the 
chair of the panel, a Maj. General from the Nigerian Army, a delegate from the Office of the 
National Security Adviser, and a legal practitioner who was also on the board of SBI (Special 




The panel was vested with the responsibility to investigate the Nigerian armed forces 
compliance with international humanitarian law obligations in the Boko Haram conflict, and 
of “matters of conduct and discipline” of the military forces.
1043
 The panel was also obliged 
to make recommendations on “methods of avoiding” the violations of IHL rules during 
hostilities, as well as additional recommendation(s) the panel find it essential.
1044
 However, 
their terms of reference were clearly silent on whether the panel is required to proffer 
recommendations for the investigation and prosecution of persons alleged to have committed 
grave crimes or to set up criminal proceedings by itself. Likewise, the legal ground on which 
the panel was set up was never clarified.
1045
 In addition, the geographical scope of the panel’s 
authority or jurisdiction was not defined and thus there was lack of accuracy on how 
backward in time the panel was authorized to go in its investigation into reported allegations 
and matters of conduct and discipline in the armed forces, and whether the panel’s authority 
or jurisdiction covers investigation of criminal activities perpetrated throughout the 
country.
1046
 It also seems that the panel was not equipped with all necessary technical and 
manpower resource capacity to carry out such a broad and complex investigative assignment 
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aside a secretary and a counsel. Considering the nature of allegations the panel was assigned 
to investigate, it is necessary for the panel to be well-established with competent and 
independent professional personnel with skills in criminal investigation, human rights 
investigation, forensic analysis, legal analysis, data management, and witness protection 
advice, interpretation as well as gender advice.
1047
 
Instead, the panel pursued a quasi-judicial method in its investigation, which basically 
means that all the people who made submissions to the panel pursuant to its public call for 
memorandum, including experts, witnesses, victims and civic societies, were considered as 
petitioners/complainants, while the alleged offenders, the army more broadly and its varied 
fields, were addressed as the respondents.
1048
 Although the activities of the panel were 
reported to be conducted in public, the panel’s procedural regulation stated that “the panel 
may hold private hearings where ‘this is necessary in the interest of National Security and 
public safety.’
1049
 In addition, the regulation noted that press and media coverage would not 
granted access to the panel’s proceedings.
1050
 In practice, this has led most hearings where 
major allegations against the army were made to be arbitrarily conducted in closed 
sessions.
1051
 The panel submitted its final report to the presidency in February 2018.
1052
 
However, as at the time of writing this research, this report was not made available to the 
public and as such, it would be unreasonable and practically impossible to independently 
examine the findings, methodology and validity of information obtained and reviewed in the 
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 However, the refusal to release the findings of the panel is a clear indication that 
the government is genuinely not willing to investigate and prosecute persons who committed 
international crimes in the conflict. 
5.4 Assessment of Potential Admissibility of Boko Haram Case before the ICC 
In line with international law, Nigeria has the responsibility to investigate and prosecute all 
crimes allegedly perpetrated by all parties to the Boko Haram armed conflict in north east 
Nigeria; including the Nigerian armed forces and members of the Boko Haram armed group. 
Also, as a state party to the Rome Statute of the ICC, Nigeria has clear international 
obligation to genuinely discharge its responsibility of the Statute. Its principal - 
“complementarity”- responsibility (with the ICC as a “last resort”) is to investigate and, 
prosecute persons alleged to have committed Rome Statute crimes (including war crimes and 
crimes against humanity) committed on Nigerian territory or by Nigerian nationals, and to co-
operate with the International Criminal Court.  
A general review of the ten (10) years of the OTP’s preliminary assessment period in 
Nigeria sets the impression of some activities happening related to cases under review by the 
OTP. Such a situation, where there is an indication of related domestic proceedings taking 
place, no matter the slightest such could, potentially pose some difficulties to the OTP in its 
admissibility examination, and thereby making it more difficult for the OTP to quickly go 
ahead and make an Article 15 propriomotu request to open an investigation.
1054
 With that 
said, as set out in the following parts of this study, the research’s assessment of the conflict 
situation in north east Nigeria reveals that there is indisputably inadequate national-level 
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action to fulfil the inadmissibility conditions of the Rome Statute, especially with regards to 
the two identified crimes in chapter 4 (War Crime and Crime against humanity), allegedly 
perpetrated by the Nigerian armed forces. Therefore, this research holds that notwithstanding 
the indication of prima-facie national-level proceedings carried-out or being carried out in 
Nigeria, the OTP should present that the case of Nigeria is admissible before the Court, and 
in accordance with Article 15 of the Rome Statute, make a propriomotu application for 
authorization to the Court to open an investigation. This is because the ten-year delay in 
conducting relevant national-level trials in Nigeria - especially into crimes perpetrated by the 
Nigerian armed forces and the CJTF- has not been justified with objective reasons. 
Basically, as explained above, to investigate and prosecute crimes of the Rome 
Statute, the Nigerian government essentially has to demonstrate both the capacity and the 
political will to do so-Nigeria must be willing to be able.  Data obtained suggests that the 
obvious domestic inaction in Nigeria largely demonstrates the governments’ lack of 
willingness to genuinely hold perpetrators accountable for their alleged wrongful acts. In this 
light, the Pre-Trial Chamber of the ICC stated that preliminary assessments must be 
concluded ‘within a reasonable time... irrespective of their complexity.
1055
 The suggestion of 
Article 53(1) of the Rome Statute and of logical reasoning is that the OTP investigates in 
order to be able to thoroughly evaluate the relevant facts.
1056
 It noted that a protraction of a 
preliminary assessment beyond that point is, in principle, unnecessary.
1057
 
The ‘reasonable basis’ phase is the minimum evidentiary standard set out in the 
Statute. In view of this, the ICC has provided that ‘the preliminary assessment per se ‘does 
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not necessitate any complex or exhaustive process of evaluation,’ and the data available is not 
expected to be ‘comprehensive’ or ‘conclusive,’ especially given the limited investigative 
powers at the OTP’s disposal, in comparison with those provided for in Article 54 of the 
Rome Statute at the investigative phase.
1058
 Therefore, ‘an investigation should in general be 
initiated without delay and be carried out efficiently in order for it to be effective.
1059
 This 
study considers that any further unnecessary delay in initiating a full investigation in Nigeria 
should be examined against its possible violation of victim’s universally recognised rights as 
stipulated in Article 21(3) of the Rome Statute.
1060
 
In the following sections, this study presents what the research considers as some of 
the crucial related factors, examined as a whole, would lead to a reasonable conclusion that 
Nigeria has failed in its obligations under IHL to protect her citizens from the dangers of 
armed conflict, and is not showing genuine willingness to investigate and prosecute crimes 
under international law perpetrated in her territory, and as such, this research presents the 
motion that the OTP tables the case for admissibility before the Court and request for opening 
an investigation into the Boko Haram situation in Nigeria. 
5.4.1 Admissibility due to Lack of National Level Proceedings 
As noted earlier,
1061
 the first issue in a complementarity examination is whether there are or 
have been any proper domestic investigations or prosecutions as explicitly provided in Article 
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17 of the Rome Statute. In essence, the lack of any appropriate national-level action, 
technically referred to as ‘national level inactivity,’ is in and by itself enough to render a 
situation admissible before the ICC. This is because, the OTP’s preliminary assessment 
procedure states that various factors could lead to inactivity by a State, including the lack of 
satisfactory legislative framework; intentional focus of trials on low-level or marginal 
perpetrators; or other general signs of the lack of political will or effective judiciary.
1062
 
If it is established that there are or have been appropriate domestic investigations or 
prosecutions, the OTP proceeds to evaluating whether such trials identify with the ‘potential 
cases’ being evaluated by the OTP and in particular, whether their concentration is on those 
most responsible for the most grievous crimes perpetrated.
1063
 This evaluation of the degree 
to which domestic relevant trials relate to the potential cases (at the preliminary assessment 
stage) is relatively unclear because the OTP’s investigations are still at their initial stages. As 
noted above, the ICC’s admissibility test at the preliminary assessment stage is wider than at 
subsequent trial stages, in view of the fact that there is not still a case, as understood to 
encompass an established set of incidents, suspects and action.
1064
 Notwithstanding, there are 
established requirements in defining potential cases for the purpose of admissibility 
evaluation in this stage.
1065
 
This research’s analysis of whether Nigeria has undertaken any proper national- level 
proceedings in the country demonstrates that the Nigerian government has not initiated any 
criminal investigations or prosecutions into those most responsible for international crimes 
perpetrated by the Nigerian armed forces or CJTF. The ICC prosecutor has already said in 
2017 that the Office is confronted with critical information gap on the evidence of any 
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genuine national level proceedings on violations perpetrated by the Nigerian military.
1066
 In 
addition, assessment of the mandates, structure and activity of the two potentially relevant 
committees of inquiries
1067
 established in 2017, the SBI and PIP, maintain that they were 
never established to bring on criminal prosecutions and as a result do not comply with 
Nigeria’s responsibility to investigate and prosecute reported perpetrators of criminal 
activities under international law.
1068
 The terms of reference of both committees does not 
contain defined mandates to determine and recommend persons for investigation or 
prosecution.
1069
 Similarly, the complete findings and recommendations of these committees 
are still unknown because the government is yet to release the full findings to the public. But 
from the brief statement made public, it is clear that the SBI - has not made any referrals or 
recommendations of criminal investigations despite identifying some grave violations and 
potential crimes, including possible unlawful arrests and detentions, congested and unhealthy 
detention facilities.
1070
 As far as this study could confirm, the outcome of these committees, 
SBI and PIP have not been submitted to any competent investigative institution or agency in 
Nigeria with the intention to carry out further investigations or criminal proceedings. This 
study has thus concluded that the official results of these two investigative commissions- 
exonerating all high-ranking military officers-serves to conclusively prove inactivity by the 
Nigerian government. 
With regards to crimes perpetrated by Boko Haram, this study is aware of only two 
cases
1071
 that may possibly demonstrate internal proceedings against those mainly responsible 
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(top Boko Haram members) for grave crimes equal to the Rome Statute crimes. But the entire 
measure employed by the Nigerian government does not reflect meaningful accountability 
sufficient for the large scale criminality perpetrated by Boko Haram. The significant majority 
of cases reportedly investigated, prosecuted and/or ongoing hearings, including those 
examined in the ‘mass Boko Haram trials which began in October 2017, seem to have 
targeted largely civilians trapped in the crossfire. These hearings are not only fundamentally 
erroneous but identify the fact, proven above, that the investigations concluded by the 
security forces, which have led to the mass trials of Boko Haram suspects, centred basically 
on crimes of alleged support or connections between some civilians and Boko Haram 
members, and not on the actual crimes perpetrated by Boko Haram against the civilian 
population.
1072
 In essence, the Nigerian government appears to be prioritising investigations 
into the wrong crimes and against the wrong people. The OTP in its preliminary evaluation 
regulation, noted that ‘the deliberate focus of proceedings on low level or marginal 
perpetrators despite evidence on those more responsible may show inactivity of a State party 
as well as raise serious concerns about those proceedings’ genuineness.
1073
 Therefore, the 
mass trials of alleged Boko Haram suspects cannot be relevant proceedings pursuant to 
Article 17 of the Rome Statute. 
5.4.2 Lack of Accountability due to Unwillingness 
All through the OTP’s preliminary assessment report on Nigeria, reference is made to 
inadequate data or data gaps in relation to domestic trials.
1074
 In 2017, the OTP explained 
these gaps in data on significant national level hearings as an indication of impunity gaps that 
need to be detected and rectified by relevant actors, based on the current admissibility 
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 Although the OTP has not gone as far to express so, this study considers that 
constant lack of information or gaps are evidence of insufficient investigative measures. In 
2014, the OTP stated that it was anticipating more information from the Nigerian government 
on domestic trials including, but not limited to, those most legally accountable for alleged 
crimes by the armed group.
1076
 The 2014 report did not specify the purported criminal 
activities for which the accused were indicted, nor the significance of the cases to the OTP’s 
preliminary assessment, instead it noted some issues concerning the information’s relevance, 
noting that hearings in Nigeria would have to be considerably identical as those that would 
possibly arise from an investigation into the situation and be conducted into those most 
accountable for the most grievous crimes.
1077
 The OTP also observed that data/information 
gap continued in relation to domestic trials, especially in regards to the high discrepancy 




In 2015, the Nigerian government notified the OTP that about 150 cases in regards to 
Boko Haram suspects at various stages had been presented to the Attorney General of the 
Federation for authorization.
1079
 No additional information was given regarding the rank of 
the Boko Haram suspects identified or the extent of any national- level trials all through the 
command structure of the Boko Haram armed group. In 2017, the OTP expressed that trials 
conducted in Nigeria pertained to low level Boko Haram members only and not the 
leadership.
1080
 This again, highlights the failure to provide significant information by the 
Nigerian government. In the opinion of this research, the OTP is allowing itself be controlled 
by the Nigerian government by providing contradictory, inadequate, insignificant, and 
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delayed information. It seems like the provision of information by Nigeria of potentially 
relevant open case files and arrests (without- as the OTP noted in 2014 - information on 
consequent relevant legal trials) and partial investigative steps has served to hold the ICC at 
bay. This perhaps leaves the ICC in limbo, making it conclude that there is too much national 
level action to be certain ICC judges will find OTP conduct permissible, but way too little 




The OTP has stated that a ‘denial to give information or to cooperate with the Court is 
a significant element in its complementarity examination of willingness or inability to carry-
out appropriate national-level trials and may demonstrate an intent to protect individuals from 
criminal liability
1082
 or unwarranted delay in carrying out national-level trials.’ It is therefore 
binding on the Nigerian government to proactively engage with the OTP by providing 
relevant data on domestic trials if any, without necessary prompting by the OTP. 
As such, it is the opinion of this research that in line with the ICCs’ Pre-Trial 
Chambers decision, the OTP should consider that the consistent lack of data to confirm 
Nigeria’s claim of ongoing appropriate and genuine domestic trials, indicates a situation of 
inactivity and unwillingness.
1083
 In view of the foregoing evidence of inactivity, an OTP 
investigation into the Nigerian situation is potentially admissible pursuant to Article 17 of the 
Rome Statute.  
Below we will examine the legal obligations of States under international law of 
armed conflicts to enforce IHL whenever its rules are violated by parties to a conflict.  
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5.5 Responsibilities of States under Common Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions 
We have seen Nigeria’s unwillingness in enforcing IHL by holding persons who violated its 
rules in the Boko Haram conflict. In this light, this section will examine the earliest hope of 
the High Contracting Parties in Common Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions in enforcing 
IHL and getting justice for victims. We will analyze whether the wide-ranging reading is 
underpinned by the behavior of States, particularly within the parameter of third state 
response to humanitarian crises in the conflict between the Nigerian State and the Boko 
Haram insurgent group. In the final analysis, it will conclude with a general appraisal of the 
reading of Common Article 1 in the context of the negative and positive responsibilities of 
the High Contracting Parties and what is required of states in the alleged perpetrators of 
crimes before the International Criminal Court. 
5.5.1 The ICRC Commentary of 2016  
This section sets out and examines the positions espoused on CA1 by several legal scholars 
on the ICRC Commentary. The International Committee of the Red Cross aspires to act as an 
impartial and independent actor in the provision of humanitarian assistance to victims of 
armed conflict. The function of the ICRC that is related to the present study relates with the 
provisions of Article 5 of the Statutes of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent 
Movement which empowers ICRC to carry out any duties that would help in the 
implementation of IHL. It also pledged to raise alarm whenever and wherever IHL is 
threatened and to educate the world on the essential rules governing armed conflicts.
1084
 To 
ensure easy understanding of the work of IHL, it has undertaken to publish commentaries on 
the Geneva Conventions. 
In line with this mandate, the updated Commentary of the ICRC of 2016 noted that 
the scope of duties of Common Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions hasenlarged from the 
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earlier version developed in the 1950s. The updated 2016 Commentary of the ICRC 
explained that CA1 has evolved by introducing an undertaking to ensure respect in all 
circumstances, which, in turn, comprises of an internal and external component. The internal 
components of CA1 include a range of measures a State such as Nigeria must take to respect 
and ensure respect for the Conventions by its armed forces and other persons or groups (such 
as the Boko Haram insurgent group) whose conduct is attributable to them, not excluding its 
general population under its authority.
1085
 On the other hand, the external element suggests 
that States that are not party to the conflict, including regional and international bodies,
1086
 
have a duty to take measures in order to safeguard compliance with the Conventions, and 
arguably with the whole body of IHL, by the parties to the armed conflict. Dorman and 
Serralvo observed that responsibilities under CA1 are ergaomnes responsibilities owed to the 
international community in general.
1087
 Such responsibilities have generally been construed 
as a general grant of duty for third States to act to address serious violations of the 
Conventions or other jus cogens breaches
1088
 (including violations of the 1949 Genocide 
Convention).
1089
Furthermore, they claimed that CA1 imposes specific obligations on all 
States – omission to carry out such obligations may result in liability.1090 
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Under this new interpretation, CA1 obligations are not just discretionary rights to act, but 
duties that prescribe rules of responsibility on States. This reading moves beyond the 
previous construction of “may and should,” instead of asserting an affirmative duty.
1091
 
5.6 Scope of CA1 Obligations: Negative and Positive Duties 
One area of the CA1 which the updated ICRC Commentary noted has to do with the 
expansion of state obligation to encompass both international and non-international armed 
conflicts.
1092
 The expansion of the High Contracting Parties obligation to ensure respect has 
also broadened to encompass “negative and positive duties.”
1093
 Most importantly, on this 
interpretation, CA1 obligations to third states consist of positive duties in addition to negative 
duties not to support or encourage in the breach of IHL.
1094
 This reading also suggests 
“positive” duties extend to proactive measures taken to prevent violations of the 
Conventions.
1095
 According to Dormann and Serralvo, CA1 employs the term “ensure” in the 
active voice, which suggests that the scope of the obligation to ensure respect is “undoubtedly 
larger than just not encouraging,” and also includes a series of positive obligations … High 
Contracting Parties have a duty to exert their influence/take appropriate steps to put an end to 




These duties suggest that States will take measures both to prevent violations of the 
Conventions along with to stop ongoing IHL violations. Dormann expressed that a state does 
avoid liability for its allies for violations of the Conventions simply by ex post intervention; 
instead, it must put measures in place to ensure such violations never occur from the 
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 The scope of these duties indicates that duties to prevent violations will also be 
more extensive when States have close ties.
1098
 Likewise, a third state obligation under CA1 
is not the same as “right to intervention.”
1099
 Common Article 1 obligations are not to be 
employed in order to justify unilateral humanitarian interventions.1100 
The general proscription on the use of force provided under Article 2(4) of the UN 




5.6.1 Application of the Due Diligence Standard 
This section assesses the due diligence requirement for determining third state responsibility 
for CA1 “to ensure” obligations. It begins with an overview of the standard and the possible 
sources of international law that may support its application in the CA1 context. 
5.6.2 Common Article 1 State Responsibility: Due Diligence Requirement 
In the updated Commentary, the ICRC endorsed “due diligence” as the standard for CA1 
third States obligations that “States remain in principle free from choosing between different 
measures, as long as those adopted are regarded adequate to ensure respect. The duty to 
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ensure respect is to be conducted with due diligence. As noted above, its content rests on the 
specific circumstances, including the seriousness of the breach, the means reasonably 
available to the State, and the degree of influence it exercises over those responsible for the 
violation. Unlike the negative obligation described above, it is an obligation of means, that is, 
the High Contracting Parties are not responsible for a possible failure of their efforts as long 
as they have done everything reasonably in their power to bring the violations to an end.”
1102
 
In a nutshell, scholars have expressed that “the obligation of result is an obligation to 
“succeed,” whereas, the obligation of diligent conduct is an obligation to ‘make every 
effort.’...
1103
 States can only be under obligation to exercise due diligence in choosing 
appropriate measures to influence belligerents to abide by the law. This does not turn the 
responsibility to ensure respect into a vacuous norm, since states are under the obligation to 
act. However, depending on the influence they may exert, to take all practical measures, as 
well as any lawful means at their disposal, to safeguard respect for IHL rules by all other 
States. If they fail to do so, they might shoulder international responsibility.
1104
 
Accordingly, it was observed that the ICRC’s due diligence imposes obligations on 
the conduct of States, but does not require them to attain specific results: states will not be 
held liable for failures to prevent other states from breaching the Conventions as long as they 
can show that they “made every effort” to prevent the violation.
1105
 The intricateness of 
international relations, including the political dynamics to which a State might be subject, 
does not diminish the validity of this obligation.
1106
 In light of this, close ties (diplomatic, 
geographic, social, or economic) between States magnifies the due diligence obligation that 
emanates in regards to other states under the CA1 responsibility to ensure respect for the 
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 This is exactly the underlying reasoning of CA1, as well as of other IHL 
rules that close relations between States leads to the increase of their existing obligations.
1108
 
Additional guidance on CA1 could be derived from the ICJ in the case of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro.
1109
 In that, the ICJ expressed that the legal duty to 
prevent genocide encoded in Article 2 (b) of the Genocide Convention was also one of due 
diligence. Regarding due diligence standard, it ruled that States are required to employ “all 
means reasonably available to them” and that a State incurs liability only if it has “manifestly 
failed to take all measures to prevent genocide which were within its power, and which might 
have helped to avoiding the genocide.” The ICJ further added that due diligence can only be 
examined in concreto.
1110
 This is the responsibility of due diligence,
1111
 including the 
obligation to ensure respect for IHL by others.
1112
 Therefore, only a case by case assessment 
can show whether a State has actually breached CA1.   
5.7 The Pictet Commentaries 
During the 1950s, the ICRC published commentaries that supported a broader reading of the 
Common Article 1. The commentaries expanded the scope of obligation that now includes 
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the need to “ensure respect of the terms of the Convention by others.”
1113
The author 
expanded the scope of the obligation to ensure respect on others, leading to a broader reading 
of the terms of Common Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions.
1114
 This implies that the duty 
to protect victims of armed conflict also rest with others. Following from here, the 
responsibility for humanitarian protection according to Pictet must not be restricted among 
signatories to the Convention but that they “should do everything in their power to ensure 
that the humanitarian principles underlying the Conventions are universally applied.”
1115
 
One can argue that the wording employed by Pictet (may and should) suggest a 
prerogative, where States are recommended to take necessary actions that are not necessarily 
obligatory. These differences are more pronounce in distinguishing the terms. Pouvoir is 
French for entitlement to act as against devoir, which stands for an obligation.
1116
 Some 
scholars have also queried the interpretation of the provision as an obligation, arguing that it 
is not exactly the same as an “undertaking.” Scholars, including FrédericSiordet, noted that 
whenever States interpret the provision as an obligation, it gives rise to a situation where the 
“the private right of belligerents was substituted [for] the general interest of humanity, which 
demanded scrutiny, no longer as a question of right, but of duty.”
1117
In this regard, the word 
undertake appears to be in tandem with the 2016 updated commentary, which is interpreted as 
a more duty to take positive measures that will either prevent or minimize acts that violates 
the fundamental principles of IHL.  
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 Furthermore, the ICRC noted that, pursuant to Article 32 of the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties, drafting records serves only as supplemental avenue of interpretation.
1118
 
Article 31(3) (a) (b) of the Vienna Convention demonstrates that subsequent state practice, 
later agreements between parties, and internationally applicable norms are likely to be more 
relevant in determining a treaty’s meaning than drafting documents.
1119
 
 At any rate, the acceptance of an obligation to ensure respect by others for both 
international and non-international armed conflicts was explicitly acknowledged after the 
adoption of the Geneva Conventions and is also what emanates from an analysis of the (more 
relevant) subsequent practice and judicial precedent in the application of the treaty.  
 
5.8 Responsibilities of States Pursuant to Common Article 1 to the Geneva Conventions in the 
Boko Haram Armed Conflict in Nigeria 
As reviewed above, Common Article 1 obligations of State parties – as High Contracting 
Parties – under the Geneva Conventions are outlined in a clear and unambiguous fashion. 
States, as earlier noted, have an obligation to respect and ensure respect for the four Geneva 
Conventions in all circumstances. This, in effect, means that States that are not hostile parties 
in a given hostilities – commonly known as Third Party States – are required to abstain from 
supporting violations, rather take proactive stance to bring about respect for IHL.
1120
 
Common Article 1 responsibilities apply in any type of conflict whether international or non-
international
1121
 and relate to all conflicting parties. The responsibilities of Common Article 1 
are also relevant in times of peace.
1122
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As earlier discussed in this chapter, the ICRC’s updated commentary on the Geneva 
Conventions conclude that CA1 imposes two broad obligations on third States to ensure 
respect for the Conventions. This duty to ensure respect by third states consists of both a 
negative and positive obligation. “Under the negative duty, High Contracting Parties may 
neither encourage, aid or assist in violations of the Conventions by  parties to a conflict (in 
our case Nigerian forces and Boko Haram armed group).Under the positive responsibility, 
they must do everything reasonably in their power to prevent and bring such violations to an 
end.” The continued third states supports for Nigerian armed forces in its conflict with Boko 
Haram arguably violate both these negative and positive obligations.  
5.8.1 International Military Assistance: Who are they Assisting – Nigeria or Boko 
Haram? 
 
Measures by third states to promote and to ensure respect for IHL in situations where they are 
not a party to the conflict are clearly important as well as obligatory. But the reality of 
contemporary armed conflicts, particularly the Boko Haram situation in Nigeria, shows that 
much more needs to be done. A fundamental part of CA1’s obligation to ensure respect is 
prevention, including steps that work against the destruction of life and means of survival in 
conflict settings. An important area is the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) of 2013.
1123
 This was an 
important turning point considering the resurgent nature of the international arms trade after a 
noticeable dip in the aftermath of the Cold War.  
As set out by Swisspeace, the ATT lays out “robust international rules to stop the flow 
of weapons and munitions to states when there is an “overriding risk” they would be used to 
perpetrate war crimes or grave human rights violations” with the main objective of 
contributing to global peace and security, and a diminution in human suffering.
1124
 With 
regards to the criteria states may employ to evaluate the risk of transferring weapons, the 
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ICRC has proposed variety of indicators, including the recipients past and present IHL 
record, alleged intention of the recipient – as expressed through its own commitments – and 




A growing number of contemporary conflicts involve several forms of coalitions, 
alliances or partnerships that bring to the fore the relevance of Common Article 1 and the 
significance of all concerned parties using their influence, and power to ensure respect for 
IHL. As in all cases of threat, prevention is better than efforts to cure the harm inherent in 
armed conflicts scenes. This well-known truism has particular resonance in terms of 
Common Article 1 and related responsibility.  
States often give support such as training, weapons, intelligence gathering to allies or 
partners that are parties to armed conflicts. Such assistance will, almost invariably, translate 
into a privileged position of influence as well as important responsibilities to ensure respect 
for IHL. It is worth emphasizing that the greater the support rendered to a warring party the 
more extensive the steps required on the part of the supporting third state.   
The importance of Common Article 1 in the context of the Boko Haram armed 
conflict provides valuable insights to the way in which States allied with Nigeria - country 
that has committed grave human rights violations in the Boko Haram conflict - question the 
depiction of their responsibility and the rules that apply in this context. This is because the 
Nigerian government significantly relies on military equipment from allied countries such as 
the purchase of $593 million American A-29 Super Tucanos,
1126
 British military hardware 
including AK47s, grenades, bombs, machine guns, and missiles.
1127
 Nigeria also acquired 
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unknown number of military vehicles consisting of VT-4 battle tanks and self-propelled 
howitzer from China,
1128
 including twelve Mi-35M combat helicopters from Russia.
1129
 In 
addition, Nigeria has also received financial assistance from these countries; the USA 
assisted Nigerian military and police with US$6.3 million in 2014, up from US$6.2 million in 
2013.
1130
 Similarly, the United Kingdom has in 2017 supported the Nigerian government with 
200 million pounds sterling to fight Boko Haram among others.
1131
 
This in effect means that four out of the five Permanent members of UNSC are 
substantially involved in a conflict that has proved deadly for civilians both as a direct result 
of bombings and, indirectly, as a result of indiscriminate attacks and destruction of civilian 
property and other infrastructure.
1132
 It is important to reiterate that all State Parties, including 
P5 members,
1133
 have clear responsibilities to conduct in accordance with international law. 
The provision of Common Article 1 requires them to use their influence to ensure and uphold 
fundamental principles of international humanitarian law in order to protect the lives, and 
survival of victims, and other civilians stuck in the Boko Haram conflict in northeast Nigeria.  
5.8.2 Empowering Boko Haram 
However, there are some major concerns here: first, most of this sophisticated military 
hardware end up in the hands of the insurgent group.Boko Haram has on several occasions 
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attacked military base and barracks – looting heavy weapons, equipment, guns, ammunitions, 
including armoured vehicles, further killing and destroying civilian lives.
1134
 As a result Boko 
Haram’s violent activities, some thousands of lives were lost, and displaced over 2 million 
people, with over 14 million people in dare need of humanitarian assistance. Corruption 
fuelled under-resourcing of frontline soldiers has indirectly benefitted Boko Haram. 
Photographs and video footage testify to the group’s use of captured military trucks and 
sophisticated arms stolen after raiding military barracks. Furthermore, the Nigerian defence 
sector corruption has also weakened the military’s counterterrorism capability – with 
allegations of embezzling $15 billion since 2011, further strengthening Boko Haram. In 
March 2020, for example, the Theatre Commander of Operation Lafiya Dole, Major General 
Olusegun Adeniye – while in the frontline fighting Boko Haram with his troops, lamented 
how his men were outgunned and ambushed by the group. In a video that went viral, he urged 
the military authorities to supply them with weapons and accurate intelligence to combat the 
group in the northeast region.
1135
 In an interview, Brigadier MD Dala, sector II Brigade, Yobe 
state, also claimed that “the Nigerian Army is not ready to fight Boko Haram,” explaining 




5.8.3 Negative Obligation 
Starting with the negative obligation, as previously discussed, the ICJ in Nicaragua case 
observed that CA1 imposed on USA “an obligation not to encourage persons or groups 
engaged in the conflict in Nicaragua to act in violation of the rules of Article 3 Common to 
the four Geneva Conventions. The Court held that the United States was aware of allegations 
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that the contras were violating IHL and ruled that knowledge of these allegations was 
sufficient to indicate the foresight of future violations by the non-state actors.
1137
 Given the 
fact that the United States knew that IHL violations were “likely or foreseeable,” it had a 
legal duty to stop the provision of any assistance that could broadly be construed as 
encouragement. Because it had not done so, it had breached its responsibility under CA1.  
In the current case of Boko Haram, these States (US, UK, China and Russia) may 
likewise be in violation of the negative duty under CA1. The United Kingdom and United 
States have particularly provided more support in the form of funds - aside the arms and 
ammunition they have provided. These countries provided support despite knowing of 
credible allegations that Nigeria has continuously violated IHL. The U.S for example, has in 
the recent past, held up sales of weapons to Nigeria, citing military’s human rights violations 
by the Nigerian army.
1138
 In one instance, up to 236 people died after the Nigerian air force 
bombed an IDP camp in Rann, Borno State, Nigeria.
1139
 They restarted sales of weapons to 
Nigeria only after receiving assurances that Nigeria would take more precautions to avoid 
abuses and/or weapons ending in the hands of Boko Haram. However, States that make good 
faith effort to encourage belligerents to comply with IHL can still be held to violate their CA1 
responsibilities. In Nicaragua, the Court found the US accountable for violating CA1 despite 
the existence of a CIA manual that US claimed was intended to discourage the contras from 
breaching IHL. Indeed, the Court took the manual’s recommendations aimed at ‘mitigating’ 
the violations by the contras as evidence that the United States was aware that future 
violations were likely or foreseeable.
1140
 Thus, it appears that violations of the negative duty 
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not to encourage or induce violations of the Geneva Conventions might not be mitigated by 
recommendations or assurances. 
That is particularly true in situations where, as here, there is evidence that efforts to 
reduce or lessen IHL violations may have been ineffective. Indeed, Nigeria’s commission of 
IHL violations after it assured the USA it would put measures to lessen them – as well as 
warnings by studies such as this research, that Nigeria was incapable of complying to IHL 
because of serious, systematic problems within its armed forces – demonstrate that the IHL 
violations in Nigeria may well have been ‘likely foreseeable’ under the Nicaragua standard.  
Accordingly, the routine support by these States could be construed as encouragement in 
violation of Common Article 1’s negative obligations. 
5.8.4 Positive Obligation 
In accordance with the updated ICRC commentary, this positive duty requires States “to 
exercise due diligence in choosing appropriate steps to persuade parties to a conflict to abide 
by the law.” States must take “all necessary steps, as well as any legal means at their 
disposal” to “ensure respect” for the Geneva Conventions. There is no bright line rule for 
determining third state duties. Instead, the commentaries provided a sliding scale in which 
“the responsibility to ensure respect for the Geneva Conventions is particularly strong in the 
situation of a partner in a joint operation, even more so as this is closely related to the 
negative duty neither to encourage nor to aid or assist in violations of the Conventions.”
1141
 In 
the Bosnian Genocide case, the Court stated that due diligence can only be assessed in 
concreto.
1142
 This is the case with any responsibility of due diligence,
1143
 including the 
responsibility to ensure respect for the Conventions by others. Hence, only a case by case 
examination can disclose whether a State has truly violated CA1.  
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Therefore, whether these States have truly violated their positive responsibility under 
Common Article 1 may depend on the adequacy of each of these State’s mitigation measure. 
According to the ICRC’s due diligence standard, States may discharge their positive duties 
under Common Article 1 by undertaking efforts to reduce and prevent violations. That IHL 
violations by the Nigerian forces have continued does not particularly mean that these States 
have failed to discharge their positive obligations. This is because; the due diligence does not 
require states to attain specific results. Rather, the responsibility has been interpreted as 
simply requiring third states to “make every effort” to prevent the violation.
1144
 Whether the 
assurances that especially the UK and US receive from the Nigerian government mitigate 
their positive duties under Common Article 1 turns on the credibility of the assurances. If 
Nigeria’s assurances cannot be regarded credible – or if the Nigerian military was incapable 
of adhering to IHL rules in its fight against Boko Haram, regardless of the assurances – then 
these states were obligated not to provide any form of support. By this reasoning, these states 
would be obliged to cease its assistance for Nigeria and it may also be required to adopt 
further positive steps, such as diplomatic pressure and public denunciations, in order to avoid 
further liability. 
5.8.5 Failure to Conduct a Genuine Investigation 
As demonstrated in this chapter, Nigeria’s government has responded with a heavy hand to 
Boko Haram’s violence. In the name of ending the group’s security threat to Nigeria, the 
Nigerian forces have engaged in excessive use of force, physical abuse, secret detention, 
sexual violence, torture, and extrajudicial killings of thousands of lives. Despite ample 
evidence about the violations perpetrated by the security forces, the Nigerian military and 
civilian authorities have consistently failed or rather not willing to take meaningful action to 
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bring the perpetrators to justice. Both the PIP and SBI
1145
 investigative panels that were 
established to investigate the alleged atrocities committed by the Nigerian security - broadly 
concluded that all reports against the Nigerian army and government as baseless accusation. 
In 2014, at a workshop on civil-military cooperation, the Nigerian authority that the 
government takes all reports concerning human rights violations by the security forces very 
seriously, but “Findings, have generally shown that these reports are, in the main, 
exaggerated.”
1146
 The Nigerian government have repeatedly assured the world that they 
would investigate all allegations, but have consistently failed to provide any tangible 
information on the progress of these allegations.
1147
 Instead, the Nigerian government has 
refused to constitute the National Human Rights Commission, saddled with the responsibility 
of investigating and reporting cases of human rights violations since 2015.
1148
 
5.8.6 Lack of Genuine Domestic action 
Article 17(1) (b) of the Rome Statute states that cases are inadmissible before the Court if 
they have been previously investigated by a State which has jurisdiction over them and the 
State has resolved not to prosecute the concerned person(s), except where such decision 
stems from the unwillingness or incapacity of the State to genuinely prosecute- so called 
sham proceedings. Article 17(2) of the Rome Statute outlined the requirements for evaluating 
unwillingness or inability to genuinely conduct the trials and to examine whether trials were 
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 OTP PE Policy, para Article 17(2) and paras 50-9 
283 
 
This research’s analysis of the potentially effective national-level trials set out in the 
OTP’s preliminary assessment report 2017,
1150
 in respect of both the Nigerian armed forces 
and the Boko Haram armed group, indicates, based on this study’s findings - the trials were 
mostly sham trials and demonstrate the unwillingness of Nigeria to genuinely conduct 
investigations and prosecution of offenders reasonably suspected of committing international 
crimes.  
5.9 Conclusions 
This chapter has analysed the twin issues, which largely results in the ineffective enforcement 
of IHL in the Boko Haram armed conflict in Nigeria. First, the chapter has demonstrated that 
the Nigerian government did not exhibit the political willingness to prosecute the military and 
the CJTF for violating IHL rules, and as such committed heinous crimes of sexual violence of 
rape, enforced prostitution, torture, and others that constitute war crimes and crimes against 
humanity. Likewise, as a whole; the country has failed to bring Boko Haram perpetrators to 
justice. Second, the provision of Common Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions was 
examined in the context of our study, and concluded that Common Article 1 is no more than a 
reminder of all obligations (negative and positive) to respect the Conventions even if they are 
not party to a given conflict, and that this has progressively acquired an unspecified 
recommendatory meaning for States to adopt a lawful step to induce Nigeria not only to 
comply with the Conventions, but they also have an obligation not to encourage, in whatever 
way, the violations of the Conventions. 
It is very obvious that no genuine investigations and prosecutions has been undertaken 
against the officers of the Nigerian Army and members of the Civilian Joint Task Force. To 
the point that the SBI and the PIP purportedly investigated allegations against the officers of 
the Nigerian Army and Civilian JTF members – and concluded that there is no basis to 
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proceed to criminal trials. However, all available evidence shows the commission of serious 
crimes of rape, sexual exploitation, enforced prostitution, arbitrary arrest and detention that 
constitute international crimes of war crime and crime against humanity as highlighted in 
chapter 4 of this thesis. The establishment of the SBI and PIP sought to conceal the 
perpetration of crimes, and to avoid a full inquiry by the OTP, as well as to provide a veneer 
of accountability in Nigeria, and specifically, to protect military officers and the CJTF from 
criminal responsibility.
1151
 Therefore, it is fair to conclude that the trials concerning crimes 
committed by the Nigerian Armed forces have not been adequate to satisfy Nigeria’s 
willingness under international law to prosecute those who committed crimes in the Boko 
Haram armed conflict. 
There are insufficient investigations or prosecutions of Boko Haram members, 
particularly Boko Haram leaders, or those most liable for crimes under international law 
perpetrated by the armed group. The research has established that only about ten Boko Haram 
suspects have been found guilty for committing grave crimes such as terrorist acts, killings or 
hostage takings since the Boko Haram conflict started in 2009. In reality, until the mass Boko 
Haram proceedings, which started in October 2017, only about 60 Boko Haram suspects were 
sent to trial. In response to the researcher’s request for information the Ministry of Justice 
stated in November 2017 stated that only 9 Boko Haram suspects had been convicted with 
regards to Boko Haram activities.
1152
 Furthermore, this research has demonstrated that mass 
proceedings of alleged Boko Haram suspects undertaken from 2017 and through the 
subsequent years are not relevant for any determination of the admissibility of the cases 
concerning crimes perpetrated by Boko Haram. Importantly, applying the OTP’s own 
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standards, the Nigerian government’s proceedings in the mass proceedings seem not to have 
targeted substantially the same criminal conduct as required for the purposes of 
complementarity and the ICC’s admissibility determination.  
Consequently, this research considers that States under Common Article 1 use their 
influence to require the OTP to make a propriomotu application, in line with Article 15 of the 
Statute, to the ICC chamber to request authorization to proceed to full investigation. This is 
because, there is “No such thing as innocent by standing” stated Nobel Laureate, Seamus 
Heaney when reflecting on years of war and how knowledge of its cruelty and agony 
involves us all.
1153
 It is a reminder that indignation at the pain and sorrow of war is never 
enough when the task is to be assertive and determined in challenging the brutality and cruel 
consequences of contemporary warfare as substantiated by this research in the ongoing Boko 
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Boko Haram’s attack capability and its impact on Nigeria have substantially decreased since 
writing this thesis. The Nigerian military has satisfactorily pushed the insurgents out of the 
towns and villages they previously held, leaving them to wither and reinvent themselves in the 
harsh environments of the Sambisa Forest and Lake Chad. The victims of the insurgency, 
however, remain dispersed across the country, languishing in IDP camps with no home with 
which to return. The consequence of this insurgency has been largely shouldered by the 
masses in the northeast of the country, further dividing the country. Meanwhile, the 
government continues to face challenges from a pervasive culture of corruption,
1154
 as well as 
a resurgence of a national sentiment among supporters for a secessionist Biafra in the 
southeast of the country.
1155
 Certainly there is much to do for a more peaceful and united 
Nigeria, that share a common interest in development that advances human security and 
dignity. 
As noted in the introduction, any research on Boko Haram takes place within a grey 
area. As far as I am aware, there are no embedded journalists among the insurgents. Indeed 
there seems to be much competition in the media to appropriate the discourse on the 
insurgency and make gratuitous claims. Who sponsors them? What role, if any, do politicians 
play in perpetuating the crisis and/or does the Nigerian authority has a hand in it? With so 
many stories and a dearth of substantial evidence, these questions, for the time being, remain 
unanswered. 
This thesis has attempted to regroup the competing narratives that dominate Nigeria 
and international politics. Some of the claims appear contradictory, others are downright 
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absurd, but most are sourced from credible people who have been closely observing the 
symptoms of the insurgency and have an intimate knowledge of the country. This has helped 
bring some clarity to our explanation. I have attempted not to make too many assumptions but 
have ground my analysis on the existing evidence and prevalent reports. It is perhaps easier to 
assess the impact of this insurgency on the social and political fabric of the country. A focus 
on the political willingness of the government, the judicial system, the security forces, and the 
international community can also reveal some of the challenges in the effective enforcement 
of IHL to the threat of Boko Haram.    
6.1 Summary of the Study 
The foregoing has been an exploration of the ways in which international humanitarian law 
could be improved with a view to adapting more effectively for the protection of civilian 
population; especially women and girls, from sexual violence in the Boko Haram armed 
conflictin Nigeria. The main aim is to deny impunity to those who commit such crimes from 
both sides of the conflict. This research began, in chapter 1, with an attempt, to understand a 
country that is unfamiliar to many, and help contextualize the environment in which Boko 
Haram was able to thrive.  
In chapter 2, we explored the differences in the law applicable to international and 
non-international armed conflicts. This difference is more pronounced in relation to the 
applicable treaty laws. The characterisation of armed conflicts in particular can be very 
complex. These complexities are somewhat related to the legal classifications themselves, 
whose content is often unclear or ambiguous in the treaties that establish them. In that context, 
the development of customary international law is indispensable because it allows those 
classifications to be incrementally expressed in concrete terms by examining them in the light 
of practical cases. The most remarkable contribution in this respect is perhaps that of the 
ICTY in relation to the notion of non-international armed conflict. In this light, we explored 
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the ways in which a non-international armed conflict may become an international armed 
conflict. First, the invaded State may recognize the situation as an act of war.  A second way 
in which the conflict will be governed by the rules of international law is when the situation 
amounts to a war of national liberation. Third, the most common way in which an internal 
armed conflict will be internationalized is through intervention by a foreign State. This can 
occur in two ways: intervention through the troops of a foreign state, and control over a non-
state armed group by a foreign state. In both ways, the facts will prove decisive. Since the turn 
of the century, a third type of armed conflict has been contended, one that is described as a 
transnational armed conflict or extra state conflict. Advocates of this type of conflict label that 
they are neither international armed conflicts, because they are not fought between a state and 
a non state armed group, nor are they non-international armed conflicts because they cross a 
state border (as we have seen in the Boko Haram armed conflict). However, such conflicts are 
no more than a subcategory of non-international armed conflicts. Conventional ‘internal’ 
armed conflicts such as the Boko Haram armed conflict usually have some sort of cross-
border element, with the armed group (Boko Haram) being based on the territory of 
neighbouring State (Nigeria), with their presenceoverspilling to other territories. Even though 
some recent non-international armed conflicts have involved States and armed groups that are 
not located in adjacent territory, the deciding factor is one of degree rather than type. In 
essence, what distinguishes non-international armed conflict from international armed conflict 
is not the geographical location but the parties to the two types of conflict. 
Even though the main focus of the study is on “the analysis of the challenges of 
effective enforcement of international humanitarian law in the fight against Boko Haram in 
Nigeria,” the exercise began with a review of some plausible explanations of the atrocities 
committed in the course of security operations against Boko Haram in north-east Nigeria, as a 
general phenomenon. From there, we focussed on the review of the particular brand of 
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inhumanity that women and girls are made to endure in times of adversity – that is, sexual 
violence.  
In chapter 3, we explained the research approach of the study. This study follows 
years of research and monitoring conducted by the research candidate into the widespread 
human rights violations, and grave crimes, including war crimes and crimes against humanity, 
committed in the context of the non-international armed conflict between the Nigerian armed 
forces, and Boko Haram armed group in North-East Nigeria. It involves more than 67 
interviews, conducted in person and by phone with survivors, victims, their relatives, 
eyewitnesses, human rights bodies, lawyers and military sources. The field investigation was 
conducted over a period of 4 months in Nigeria. Over the years, I have been closely 
monitoring public reported inquiries, judicial proceedings and other claimed accountability 
mechanisms conducted in Nigeria with respect to grave crimes, and human rights abuses 
perpetrated by both sides to the conflict in the North-East.  
In chapter 4, we explored the evil of sexual violence in the Boko Haram armed 
conflict. The chapter identified two major challenges that have inhibited effective 
enforcement of IHL in the fight against Boko Haram. The first challenge concerned the high 
level of indiscipline on both sides of the war, particularly the Nigerian security forces. The 
second challenge related to poor judicial infrastructure, which has further restricted access to 
justice for the victims of sexual violence. It also suggests that in the effort to achieve a legal 
framework which will contain the crime of sexual violence during armed conflicts in general, 
there is a need to formulate a more effective and clearer definition of rape in both 
international and domestic laws. The part envisaged for such a definition in the analysis of 
criminal responsibility will include legal developments, in terms of procedure that will 
impede perpetrators of sexual violence during armed conflicts from enjoying impunity. This 
is because the main objective of criminal responsibility may be defeated if victims of sexual 
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violence during armed conflicts are induced to refrain from taking part in rape hearings due 
to an unhealthy focus on their own actions at the time of the crime. This follows from a 
definition of rape that unwittingly puts the victims on trial, by constantly focusing on whether 
they consented or not. The main focus should rather be on the hostile environment of the 
occasion, rather than whether the conduct of the victim could have amounted to consent or 
not. It is therefore, submitted by this study that, a definition of rape which concentrates on the 
hostile environment of the occasion is more likely to achieve the ends of containment of 
sexual violence than one which constantly requires the prosecution to prove that the victim 
did not give consent to the act. In addition to reviewing the definition of rape in domestic 
legislation of Nigeria, this study suggests that the Penal and Criminal Codes of Nigeria be 
updated to include coercive circumstances in the list of conditions of proving the act of rape 
in conflict situations such as the case in our study – Boko Haram victims. 
Most fundamental to this research is the legal debate in relation to the crime of 
genocide. Such debate relates to whether the conviction of Boko Haram members for 
genocide of rape of the Chibok girls requires the prosecution to prove that they (Boko Haram 
members) possessed particular intent to destroy at least a significant part of a protected 
society. While this debate is often thought to engage the question of the mass of the victims 
against whom acts of genocide had been actually perpetrated, the debate really only engages 
the element of intent to commit genocide and not the actus reus of genocide. In order words, 
the argument does not require that the acts amounting to a crime be committed against a 
significant part of the protected society; it is rather that the perpetrator is seen to have 
intended the destruction of a significant part. Therefore, the conception of rape as an act of 
genocide must remain largely unperturbed by the implications of this debate, as long as the 
essential intent is established on the part of the perpetrator. Thus, rape may continue to be 
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conceived as an act of genocide, whether or not it had been indicated that a significant part of 
a given society had been victims of acts of genocide – including the rape itself.   
In general, the chapter examines the experiences of women and girls who fled their 
homes and villages that had been controlled by Boko Haram, as the military intensified its 
operations. First-hand testimonies describe the appalling actions against them, especially of 
the Nigerian forces, both in IDP camps and military barracks. 
Chapter 5 builds on the weak judicial system and violations by Boko Haram and the 
Nigerian military along with Civilian JTF members, including sexual violence, rape, sexual 
exploitation, torture and rape, which in chapter 4 of our study identified as amounting to war 
crime and crimes against humanity. Premised on the political will of the Nigerian government 
and the legal obligation vested upon States in international law, this chapter critically 
examines the International Criminal Court’s Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) tenth-year 
preliminary assessment into alleged crimes committed in the context of the armed conflict in 
northeast Nigeria, together with the government’s failure to investigate and prosecute alleged 
perpetrators of criminal offence under international law. First, the chapter demonstrates that 
most of the investigations and prosecutions conducted against alleged members of Boko 
Haram do not relate to the appalling crimes against civilians perpetrated by members of the 
group and that they are not genuine proceedings. Similarly, this study reveals that, in the last 
ten years, the Nigerian government has not conducted any relevant criminal trial related to 
Rome Statute crimes against officers of the Nigerian security forces and its allied Civilian JTF 
members. Ten years since the opening of the preliminary examination of Nigeria by the OTP, 
this research submitted that the Nigerian government has not undertaken any relevant criminal 
trials into the war crimes and crimes against humanity committed by both sides of the Boko 
Haram armed conflict. This study, therefore, urges the OTP to open a formal investigation in 
Nigeria for her unwillingness to enforce IHL rules. 
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From the foregoing challenges of Nigeria’s lack of willingness to hold perpetrators to 
account, this study sets out the principal purpose of Common Article 1 under international 
humanitarian law so that States concerned about the atrocities that civilians, especially women 
and children, are made to endure in the Boko Haram armed conflict, may find common cause 
in challenging the inhumanity that is contemptuous of human beings and the untold suffering 
it imposes on millions in northeast Nigeria for over a decade. It is an obligation - not an 
option, upon States to stand not only for a secured Nigeria, but to ensure that - nations prosper 
when they allow women and girls to reach their full potential.    
6.2 Lessons Learned from the Study 
Boko Haram has in the past re-emerged from the ashes, adjusting to new environments and 
reinventing its purpose and strategy as it faces difficulties and opportunities. In military a 
perspective, the group operates with a few thousand ‘hard’ fighters and a supporting crew of a 
couple of thousand recruits.
1156
 This makes up a moderate troop but hardly a military strength 
to be reckoned with. The hit and run method, the use of women and children suicide bombers, 
as well as indiscriminate brutality arguably cause more horror than the actual number of 
casualties. This also discredits the legitimacy of the Nigerian authority by highlighting its 
inability to take charge of the territory and protect its citizens. The armed group has also 
benefitted from the confusing and fear mongering reports typically present in the media and 
the unfounded accusations made by some dishonest politicians. Certainly, the hint of rumours 
that “Boko Haram is approaching” can trigger sweeping civilian displacement, clogging up 
the already overburdened IDP camps.
1157
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Boko Haram’s operations since 2018 has been typical of an insurgent group or 
guerrilla group, geographically restricted and causing relatively fewer casualties. The 
Nigerian armed forces confiscation of many of the small arms and vehicles the armed group 
previously used and the interruption of its supply routes have forced them to review their 
strategy. To many, the military’s successes arrived too late. Over two (2) million people are 
still displaced, abducted scores of women and girls that are still missing, dozens of women are 
still sexually exploited, and thousands have been killed. 
Although some casualties are unavoidable when conducting counterinsurgency 
operations, military strength alone is hardly the most effective way to counter a terrorist 
group. Inasmuch as the armed group emerge and secure support from deep rooted injustice 
and insecurity, the country’s use of force merely perpetuates this feeling of persecution and 
estrangement. Rather, short and long term investments in the economy, starting with key 
infrastructure, will help in establishing the government’s presence, interest, and legitimacy in 
the area. The use of military force without providing basic services expected from the country 
can have the opposite effect by marginalizing the population from their “caretakers.” This can 
therefore be an obstacle when conducting a counterinsurgency operation where community 
cooperation is an advantage to succeed.  
 Furthermore, the international commitment to the conflict by way of selling 
sophisticated arms have also played a part in compounding the situation, allowing for Boko 
Haram to grow in scale by raiding military barracks and stealing most of these weapons. 
Although British and American military officers have helped in training paratrooper and 
ranger brigades and helped in the counterinsurgency strategy since 2015, one of the 
deficiencies identified with such assistance is the lack of a trickle-down  effect, with much of 
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 In the final analysis, we have regrettably - seen that there are little or no international 
standardised enforcement mechanisms to make readily and uniformly realisable the objective 
of the instruments of international humanitarian law, including the Hague Convention 
Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land 1907, the Geneva Conventions 1949, the 
two Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions 1977 etc. – ‘which seek, to limit the 
effects of armed conflict and protect those not taking part or no longer participate in the 
hostilities.’ Effective enforcement of the rules established in these instruments rests wholly 
within the domestic system of States. Enforcement therefore, depended upon the ‘will’ and 
‘ability’ of each State to accept the civilised merits of these rules and incorporates them in 
their national laws. Particularly evident is the responsibility on States to domesticate only part 
of the range of the rules established in the instruments ratified at the international level. For 
example, the Geneva Convention Act (1960) of Nigeria offered Nigerian courts the 
jurisdiction to prosecute only the ‘serious violations’ provisions of the Geneva Conventions of 
1949 – including articles 50, 51, 130 and 147 of the four Geneva Conventions respectively. 
This limited incorporation omits all other rules specified in the Geneva Conventions 1949. 
Specifically omitted are the rules recognised in Article 3 Common to the Geneva 
Conventions: the only provisions of the Geneva Convections that apply to our study - armed 
conflicts not of international character. The significance of the omission of Common Article 3 
from the scheme of domestic incorporation is immediately obvious in relation to the incidence 
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of sexual violence against women and girls in the Boko Haram armed conflict. But this 
limited domestication is exactly what the Geneva Conventions themselves demanded.
1159
 
Several violent acts against women were compounded by the impetus towards 
infringements as was encouraged by the lack of standardised international enforcement 
mechanisms in the international instruments of the past. As discussed in chapter 2, notable 
among these acts were, that women were indiscriminately abused in their thousands in 
Rwanda and elsewhere. However, with strong resolve from the international community, 
aided by the unrelenting encouragement of committed scholars, foundations of hope have 
been laid in the plains of the international criminal court for the effective enforcement of 
international humanitarian law where a State fails to enforce them or are unable to do so. 
Most importantly, in this light,- is the prosecution and conviction of Thomas Lubanga by the 
ICC for committing atrocities of sexual violence amongst others in the context of the armed 
conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo. This has built hope and confidence in the 
women and girls abused in the Boko Haram armed conflict, - that those guilty of atrocities 
may, eventually, face the law. 
Indeed, any further unnecessary delay in the opening of full investigations in Nigeria 
should be examined against its possible infringement of victim’s rights to access justice and 
reparations as stipulated in Article 21 (3) of the Rome Statute. In addition, delays in opening 
full investigation tent the Court’s credibility in Nigeria and weaken – year on year – the 
Court’s pressure on Nigerian government to carry out relevant and genuine domestic trials. 
6.3 Reflections 
From the beginning, we have argued that Boko Haram is a Nigerian problem. The insurgency 
emerged out of a weak state policy, especially in the northeast that is rooted in years of 
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socioeconomic frustrations and discontent. The Nigerian authorities failed to take this threat 
seriously, and the military’s brutal force strategy only exacerbated the problem. While Boko 
Haram may remain a Nigerian problem, understanding the dynamics of the insurgency can 
help inform policy makers on how to respond to the growing threat of radical ideology. This 
does not mean, however, that Boko Haram is not part of a global threat, as it remains largely 
rooted in the Lake Chad region of northeast Nigeria. However, Boko Haram is unlikely to 
recruit foreign fighters because of language and geographical barriers that will inevitably 
deter external actors. Its agenda is still very much unclear, and while it was briefly in control 
of significant part of Nigeria’s territory, before settling in the Lake Chad region, it appears 
more culturally and locally driven, making it a poor ally for ISIS and Al Qaeda and any other 
similar radical organisations.  
Boko Haram will not disappear in the near future. Even if defeated, the roots of such 
radicalization will continue to flourish, feeding off the frustrations of a population that feels 
ignored or neglected by its government. Addressing issues such as inequality and economic 
opportunity will help deter radicals from becoming insurgents by offering them viable 
alternatives. A focus on displacing the supply chains by taking drastic measures on weapons 
smuggling and controlling borders can provide ongoing oversight and controls over regions 
identified as high risk. Investment in key infrastructure such as effective training of security 
officers and judicial officers in the field of IHL will significantly assist in controlling the 
threat of an insurgency and obtaining justice for victims by enforcing the law whenever it is 
violated. There will always be radicals ready to pick up arms, especially in a country as 
diverse, divided and complex as Nigeria. It is important therefore to remain attentive to these 




Finally, the law of IHL compels States and non-state parties to do their utmost to 
protect and preserve the life and property of civilians, while at the same time allowing parties 
to a conflict to commit acts of violence within certain limitations. However, when those 
limitations are exceeded, and when perpetrators of war crimes are not brought to face the law, 
there is a natural instinct to dismiss IHL as lacking any real normative force.
1160
 This is 
understandable, but it fails to comprehend the complexities of IHL, and, indeed, international 
law by extension. As Falk has observed, there is an  
“ironic tendency for individuals to expect law in international issues to do more for the order and 
welfare of the community than it does in domestic issues ... when these extravagant expectations (of 





Because we expect so much of IHL – that it never breached – when it is broken, we might be 
inclined to think the whole structure is broken.  
However, such an approach fails to acknowledge that the law has made life for those 
individuals trapped in armed conflicts demonstrably better than if the law had never existed. 
Such dismissal of IHL would diminish the substantial progress made by States and 
organisations alike, by the ICRC, by the United Nations, the International Court of Justice, the 
International Criminal Court, and the hybrid criminal tribunals in reminding every person that 
the use of force is prohibited; that even in conflict situations, there are laws that must be 
complied with, and when those laws are violated, consequences will follow, and such will be 
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